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Abstract 
The 2006-2011 period has been marked by increased volatility in food an agricultural commodity 
prices at a global level. In the EU, the continuous liberalization of agricultural markets under the 
Common Agricultural Policy has led to the exposure of EU agricultural to increasing market price 
volatility. This thesis has investigated the transmission and management of price volatility in EU food 
supply chains. The transmission of price volatility in various food supply chains is first investigated 
through a literature review followed by an empirical analysis of price volatility transmission in the 
case of the German fresh pork supply chain. The effect of market power was also taken into account in 
the latter empirical analysis. Next, the management of price volatility was investigated through 
interviews conducted with actors of selected EU food supply chains. This was followed by the analysis 
of the effectiveness of selected price volatility management strategies. Lastly, in light of the policy 
support for agricultural insurance within the Common agricultural policy, premium rates of an 
agricultural revenue insurance contract were calculated for the Dutch ware potato sector.  
One of the gaps identified in the reviewed literature is the lack of attention given to the effects of 
contextual factors on price volatility transmissions in food supply chains. Contextual factors include 
market power in the chain and pricing strategies (e.g. contracts) by chain actors. Results of the price 
volatility transmission analysis conducted in this thesis in the case of the German pork chain show that 
retail market power limited both the transmission of price levels and price volatility. This thesis shows 
that price volatility is perceived as risky by all actors in the food supply chain. Deviations of prices by 
more than 10 to 15 % from expected levels were perceived as price volatility by a majority of the 
chain actors. Results further show that price volatility management strategies in EU food chains are 
diverse and well beyond traditional instruments such as futures and forward contracts. Contrary to 
expectations, price fixing contracts were not found to be desirable by interviewed chain actors. This 
thesis also found that the effectiveness of contracts in reducing price volatility depended on how the 
contract price was set.  
Results of this thesis further show that premium rates of a revenue insurance contract for the Dutch 
ware potato sector across categories of farms. The average premium rates calculated were 32.1%, 
22.2%, 33.1% and 24.0% on guaranteed revenue per hectare for the high expected yield, low expected 
yield, high yield variance to expected yield ratio and low yield variance to expected yield ratio 
categories of farm, respectively. The difference in premium rates across categories of farms implies 
that charging the same average premium rate to all Dutch ware potato farms can lead to adverse 
selection.   
Keywords: Price volatility, management strategies, price volatility transmission, EU food chains, 
market power, agricultural revenue insurance 
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1.1. Background  
 
In the last decade, price volatility increased at a global level due to demand booming and supply 
slowing factors (Rabobank, 2011). In the EU, the recent rise of volatility in international agricultural 
commodity prices has intensified the debate about risk related agricultural policies. Such debate was 
already underway in response to increasing volatility of agricultural prices as a result of successive 
reforms of the CAP, since the early 1990s, which have led to the exposure of EU domestic prices to 
international price signals (Tangermann, 2011). Market measures under the CAP such as border 
protection through import barriers, export subsidies, production quotas and intervention buying have 
traditionally kept EU agricultural prices at high and stable levels (Bardaji et al., 2011; Tangermann, 
2011). The mounting pressure of such market interventions on the EU budget and the increasing 
tensions with the EU’s trading partners have led to the CAP reforms in 1992 and 2003 which 
gradually shifted the policy from market interventions to decoupled single farm payments and opened 
up the EU to international markets (Sckokai and Moro, 2009; Tangermann, 2011). However, the 
Single Farm Payment Scheme, even though proven to be a powerful income stabilization tool (Bardaji 
et al., 2011), does not reduce the price risk faced by farmers (Tangermann, 2011). Yield volatility has 
also increased in the EU as a result of recurrent extreme weather events and more regulated uses of 
herbicides, medicines and vaccines (Meuwissen et al., 2011; Severeni and Cortignani, 2011) thereby 
subjecting EU farmers to income volatility.  
 
1.2. Problem statement  
 
Price volatility has undesirable consequences at all stages in the food supply chain. Farmers may react 
to price volatility by reducing output supply and investments in productive inputs (Seal and 
Shonkwiler, 1987; Rezitis and Stavropoulos, 2009; Sckokai and Moro, 2009; Piot-Lepetit, 2011; 
Tangermann, 2011; Taya, 2012). Furthermore, agricultural input price volatility exposes the 
downstream sector of food supply chains to sourcing uncertainties, forcing food and agricultural 
companies to alter their sourcing strategies as a coping mechanism (Rabobank, 2011). Unexpected 
price increases also pose food security risks, particularly to consumers who spend a large share of their 
income on food items (Hernandez et al., 2013).  All this implies that managing the risk from price 
volatility is necessary for the smooth functioning of food supply chains. 
Managing the risk from price volatility requires an understanding of the extent to which price 
volatility transmits in the chain. This is because the level of price volatility faced by a chain actor may 
not only depend on the price volatility that originated in his/her own market but also on the price 
volatility that is transmitted from other stages of the chain. Knowledge of price volatility transmission 
in chains can, among others, improve price volatility forecasts in own market (Apergis and Regitis, 
2003; Buguk et al., 2003), allow cross-hedging in futures markets (Buguk et al., 2003) and support 
policy makers in identifying the chain stages that are major sources of price volatility in the chain. 
Currently, the literature concerned about price linkages in the chain focuses mainly on price (level) 
transmission with limited attention given to price volatility transmission in the chain. While the former 
type of transmission refers to the transmission of predictable price changes, the latter type refers to the 
transmission of unpredictable price changes in the chain. The limited interest of researchers in price 
volatility transmission may be due to an implicit assumption that the transmission of price levels 
implies the transmission of price volatility, and vice versa. Research has however shown that that may 
not be the case. For instance, Natcher and Weaver (1999) detected volatility transmission from the 
feeder and live cattle market to the beef wholesale market, while no-short run causality in price levels 
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could be detected for the same markets. Another example is Serra (2011) who found no short-run 
causality between farm and retail beef price levels, while she found volatilities in these two prices to 
co-vary although the covariance was regime dependent.  
In the price (level) transmission literature, several factors were shown both empirically and 
theoretically to affect the degree of price transmission. The factors include the degree of market power 
in the chain, menu costs in changing prices, and inventory strategies of firms (e.g. First-in-first out, 
First-in-first out) (see the review by Meyer and Von Cramon Taubadel, 2004). The most prominent 
factor is however the degree of market power in the chain (Meyer and Von Cramon Taubadel, 2004). 
Firms are shown to use market power to asymmetrically transmit output and input price changes or to 
keep output prices rigid in response to input price changes (Meyer and Von Cramon Taubadel, 2004; 
Weber and Anders, 2007). The effect of market power on price transmission has often raised concerns 
among policy makers due to its negative implication on the distribution of welfare among actors in the 
chain (Griffith and Piggott, 1994). For instance, price related measures designed to decrease the cost 
of production of farms through subsidies may not benefit consumers if retailers use market power to 
keep consumer prices irresponsive to decreases in producer prices (Girapunthong, 2003). Although it 
is argued in the price volatility transmission literature that market power also reduces the transmission 
of price volatility in the chain (for example, in Serra (2011) and Rezitis (2012)), such an effect remains 
unexplored both theoretically and empirically. Exploring the effects of market power on price 
volatility transmission is also of policy interest. For instance, a negative effect of retail market power 
on the transmission of farm price shocks to consumers may imply a squeeze in the margin of the 
processor who is unable to transmit farm price shocks to the retailer. Such an effect in turn provides 
support for a more competitive retail market. 
Although price volatility may transmit in the chain and therefore may expose all actors in the chain to 
price risk, the price volatility management strategies of actors beyond the farm stage are not covered in 
the current literature. The current literature focuses on the farm sector (see for instance Meuwissen et 
al. (2001), Hall et al. (2003), Greinier et al. (2009), and Bergfjord (2009) for studies investigating 
price volatility perceptions and adoption of management strategies, and Neyhard et al. (2013), 
Manfredo et al. (2003) and Bielza et al. (2007) for studies investigating the effectiveness of price 
volatility management strategies). The focus on the farm sector may be reasonable given the fact that 
the farm sector has limited control over prices due to its atomic structure, the time lags in farm 
production and the undifferentiated nature of farm products which prevents farmers from influencing 
the level and degree of variability of price. These factors combined may make farmers the most 
vulnerable actors to price volatility. Nevertheless, given that price volatility can affect not only 
farmers but also other chain actors, exploration of strategies from the farm stage to the rest of the chain 
is necessary.  Another limitation of the current agricultural risk management literature is that it focuses 
on few farm instruments that include forward contracts, derivative markets (i.e. futures and options), 
insurance and income diversification (for instance in Martin 1995, Meuwissen et al. 2001, Hall et al. 
2003, Bergfjord 2009). The structured types of questionnaires used in large scale surveys, which pre-
specify a list of traditional strategies, may have contributed to the focus on a limited number of 
strategies. In this regard, exploring chain actors’ price volatility management strategies through open-
ended in-depth interviews is necessary. Such an approach is not only useful in identifying a wider set 
of strategies, but also to have a deeper understanding of actors’ perception of price risk. Knowledge of 
actors’ price risk perceptions can in turn explain the choice of actors’ management strategies. 
 In an era of an increasingly liberalized EU agricultural market, new instruments supporting chain 
actors to better manage the risk from price volatility may be needed. An area of policy support worth 
considering is the launching of revenue insurance schemes for EU farmers. Unlike chain stages 
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beyond the farm stage (i.e. wholesalers, processors, retailers) with better control over supply, farmers 
are not only exposed to price volatility but also to yield volatility. Given the European Commission’s 
recognition of the need to subsidize EU farmers’ income insurance (Severeni and Cortignani, 2011; 
Perez Blanco et al., 2014), exploring practical issues related to the launching of revenue insurance 
schemes is of interest. The problem of adverse selection is one of the most important issues that need 
to be addressed when considering the implementation of any insurance scheme. Adverse selection 
arises when farms with higher risk levels constitute a major share of the insurance pool because farms 
have more detailed information about their risks of loss than the insurer (Bielza et al., 2007). In such a 
situation, assessing farms’ risk levels and charging premium rates commensurate with risk levels can 
be a solution to deal with adverse selection.  
 
1.3. Research objectives 
 
The general objective of this thesis is to examine the transmission and management of food price 
volatility in food supply chains. The sub-objectives are the following: 
1. To review the existing price volatility transmission literature in food supply chains and 
identify the research gaps. 
2. To investigate the effect of market power on price volatility transmission in the food supply 
chain. 
3. To explore the price risk perceptions and management strategies of actors in food supply 
chains. 
4. To design a method for evaluating the effectiveness of price volatility management strategies 
in reducing the price volatility faced by food supply chain actors 
5. To calculate premium rates of agricultural revenue insurance by taking into account the risk 
heterogeneity of farms.   
 
The above research objectives are applied to selected food supply chains. Table 1.1 shows the 
agricultural products, the chain stages and the countries investigated per specific research objective. 
The chains are selected in such a way that different classes of food products are represented, i.e. meat, 
dairy, cereals, and vegetables. Both storable and non-storable products are also represented in this 
thesis. The country-food product combinations assure that the countries for which the selected 
products have the most economic significance are selected. The Chapters dealing with the whole food 
supply chain (Chapter 3, 4 and 5) represent the chain stages that handle significant shares of the 
volume of product flowing through the chains.    
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Table 1.1 – Agricultural products, chain stages and countries investigated 
Chapters Agricultural product(s) Country  Chain stage(s) 
2- Market power 
and price 
volatility 
transmission 
Fresh pork Germany Farm, slaughterhouse, 
retail 
3- Price risk 
perceptions and 
management 
Wheat grain, wheat flour  Bulgaria Farm, wholesale, 
processing  
Wheat grain, wheat flour France Farm, wholesale, 
processing 
Fresh pork Germany Farm, wholesale 
Milk, cheese Netherlands Farm, wholesale, 
processing, retail 
Fresh tomatoes Netherlands Farm, wholesale 
Fresh tomatoes Spain Farm, wholesale, retail 
4- Effectiveness of 
strategies 
Fresh tomatoes Spain Farm, wholesale 
Fresh pork Germany Farm, wholesale 
5- Revenue 
insurance 
Ware potatoes The 
Netherlands 
Farm  
1
Not applicable. 
 
Figure 1.1 illustrates the thesis framework. The chapters address two key issues. These are price 
volatility transmission in the chain and price volatility management strategies. While price volatility 
transmission is addressed in two chapters (Chapter 2 and 3), price volatility management strategies are 
addressed in three chapters (Chapter 4, 5 and 6). The latter three chapters deal with three aspects of 
price volatility management strategies. Chapter 4 identifies the strategies, Chapter 5 evaluates the 
effectiveness of strategies and Chapter 6 focuses on the pricing of one management strategy (i.e. 
revenue insurance) for which premium rates are calculated. While Chapter 2 and 4 address the whole 
chain, Chapter 3 and 5 focus on the farm and intermediate stages of the chain. Chapter 6 focuses on 
the farm stage. 
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Figure 1.1 - Thesis framework 
 
1.4. Thesis outline 
 
This thesis is composed of a general introduction (Chapter 1), five research chapters with each chapter 
aimed at achieving each of the five research objectives (Chapters 2-6) and a general discussion and 
main conclusions (Chapter 7).  
Chapter 2 reviews the previous literature on price volatility transmission in food supply chains. The 
review first illustrates the definitional and methodological differences between price transmission and 
price volatility transmission in food chains. The review then explores methods adopted to investigate 
price volatility transmission and the data used. It then identifies the research gaps in previous literature 
and suggests improvements for further research. 
Chapter 3 provides evidence of the effects of market power on price volatility transmission in the 
food supply chain by taking the case of the German fresh pork supply chain. Theoretical models of 
price transmission and price volatility transmission are first developed to theoretically link both types 
of transmission with market power. These models are then used to empirically estimate price 
transmission and price volatility transmission in the German fresh pork chain. A vector error 
correction model and least square regressions are used for the empirical estimations. 
Chapter 4 explores the price risk perceptions and management strategies of food chain actors by 
conducting interviews with forty-two actors in six EU food supply chains. Price risk perceptions are 
explored by asking chain actors on percentage price deviations from expected levels which they 
perceived as price volatility. Actors are then asked about the strategies they use to deal with price risk. 
Chapter 5 designs a method for evaluating the effectiveness of strategies in food supply chains. The 
presented method proposes a way to remove the effects of market power in the chain when attempting 
to evaluate the effectiveness of strategies in food supply chains. The method uses the percentage price 
Farm 
  
 Intermediaries 
(Wholesale/Processing) 
 
 
 Retail 
Pricing of a 
management Strategy 
(Ch.6) 
Volatility transmission (Ch.3) and Effectiveness of 
management strategies (Ch.5) 
 
Volatility transmission (Ch.2) and Identification of management strategies (Ch.4) 
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deviations defined in Chapter 4 to define triggers of strategy implementation of food chain actors. 
Strategies identified in Chapter 4 for the Spanish tomato and French wheat farmers and wholesalers 
are used to illustrate the presented method. 
Chapter 6 calculates premium rates of a hypothetical revenue insurance contract for Dutch ware 
potato farmers. Premium rates are calculated by categorizing farms based on their expected yields and 
yield variances. These two measures are used because they affect farmers’ likelihood of losses and 
therefore determine farmers’ risk levels. Farmers’ categorization can in turn help to reduce the 
problem of adverse selection. Expected yields and yield variances are predicted by estimating a Just-
Pope production function. In premium rate simulations, the dependence between prices and yields is 
modelled using copulas.  
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Abstract: 
This paper reviews the literature on price volatility transmission in vertical food markets. The methods 
and major findings of the literature are discussed and avenues for future research are suggested. The 
literature review shows that price volatility is analyzed using a class of univariate and multivariate 
GARCH models. The reviewed studies conclude that price volatility transmits along food supply 
chains thereby exposing all chain actors to risk and uncertainty. Extension of the limited sample 
period, country, product, and chain stages coverage of the current literature are suggested as avenues 
for future research. A largely ignored aspect in the current literature is the identification and empirical 
testing of the role of contextual factors on the degree of price volatility transmission.  
Keywords: Literature review, price volatility transmission, food supply chains. 
 
2.1. Introduction 
 
Global agricultural prices have experienced an increasing degree of volatility in the last decade (FAO 
et al., 2011). Prices rose sharply in 2006 and 2007 reaching peak levels in the second half of 2007 for 
some products and in the second half of 2008 for others, and then plummeted sharply in the second 
half of the same year to sharply rise back in 2011 (FAO et al., 2011). Demand booming factors such as 
economic growth, shifting dietary patterns in developing countries and growth of the biofuel industry, 
and supply slowing factors (such as the weak transfer of market price signals to farmers) are attributed 
to the recent rise in food price volatility (Rabobank, 2011).  While there is no generally accepted 
definition of price volatility (Serra and Zilberman, 2013), it is commonly acknowledged that price 
volatility is characterized by price changes that are unpredictable and unanticipated in nature (Piot-
Lepetit, 2011; FAO et al., 2011; Serra and Zilberman, 2013; Rabobank, 2011). Price changes along a 
well-established trend reflecting market fundamentals and with known cyclical patterns are less a 
matter of concern (FAO et al., 2011) and may not be defined as price volatility. 
The impacts of price volatility extend to all food supply chain actors. Price volatility implies risk to 
farmers who may react by reducing output supply and investments in productive inputs (Seal and 
Shonkwiler, 1987; Rezitis and Stavropoulos, 2009; Sckokai and Moro, 2009; Piot-Lepetit, 2011; 
Tangermann, 2011; and Taya, 2012). Furthermore, agricultural input price volatility exposes the 
downstream sector of food supply chains to sourcing uncertainties, forcing food and agricultural 
companies to alter their sourcing strategies as a coping mechanism (Rabobank, 2011). On the other 
end of food supply chains, an unexpected price increase poses food security risks, particularly to 
consumers who spend a large share of their income on food items (Hernandez, 2013). These chain 
wide implications of food price volatility stress the importance of investigating the degree to which 
each chain actor is exposed to price volatility and the mechanism by which price volatility transmits 
along the chain. 
Investigating the magnitude and direction of price volatility transmission in food supply chains is 
particularly informative to policy makers and risk managers. As put by Buguk et al. (2003), policy 
changes in primary input markets that alter price volatility will have impacts on price volatility 
through the vertical chain. And where it is found that volatility is not being transmitted across chain 
stages, one cannot expect that stabilizing one market will lead to stability in other related markets 
(Serra, 2011). This informs policy makers of the need for different types of interventions for different 
levels of the supply chain (Serra, 2011). The transmission of volatility from one stage to another also 
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increases the accuracy of forecasts made by agents about prices in other markets (Apergis and Rezitis, 
2003; Buguk et al., 2003). This in turn affects the hedging decisions of chain actors. According to 
Buguk et al. (2003), volatility spillover could introduce cross-hedge relationships across chain stages. 
For instance, if price volatility spills over from a chain stage where futures markets exist to a chain 
stage where such markets do not exist, actors in the latter market stage can use futures market in the 
former stage to hedge against price volatilities in their own market. 
Agricultural economists have traditionally been more interested in the chain-wide transmission of 
prices in levels than in the transmission of price volatilities. Reviews of the former stream of literature 
have been made by Meyer and Von CramonTaubadel (2004) and Frey and Manera (2007). And more 
recently, Serra and Zilberman (2013) reviewed the literature that deals with the transmission of prices 
(in levels) and price volatilities in energy-agricultural commodity markets. No review has however 
been made of studies that investigated the transmission of price volatility in food supply chains (farm-
retail). Increasing concerns about the chain wide implications of the recent rise in food price volatility 
make the review of the latter stream of literature a timely one. This review serves as guide for future 
research by discussing the data and modelling approaches used and the major findings of the literature.  
This paper proceeds in section 2.2 with general definitions and a discussion of differences in 
modelling approaches in price transmission and price volatility transmission. This is followed by a 
review of data, methods and findings of the price volatility transmission literature for food supply 
chains in section 2.3. Section 2.4 concludes the review and provides suggestions for future research.  
 
2.2. Price volatility transmission versus price transmission: definition and 
modelling issues 
 
Price transmission and price volatility transmission are similar in that they both deal with price 
linkages along the chain. However, whereas price transmission refers to the linkages between the 
conditional mean prices, price volatility transmission refers to the linkages between the conditional 
variance of prices (Natcher and Weaver, 1999). Price transmission deals more generally with the 
relationship between the predictable ‘portions’ of prices whereas price volatility transmission deals 
with the relationship between the unpredictable ‘portions’ of prices. Price volatility transmission is 
also defined as the degree to which price uncertainty in one market affects price uncertainty in other 
markets (Apergis and Rezitis, 2003). 
If prices volatilities are fully and instantaneously transmitted along the chain, one would expect a near 
to unity correlation between price volatilities at different market levels (Serra, 2011). It can be the case 
that the predictable portion of prices is perfectly transmitted whereas the unpredictable portions are 
not.  Figure 2.1 illustrates a situation that implies a perfect price transmission in levels and an 
imperfect price volatility transmission for a chain consisting of a farm and retail sector of an 
unprocessed agricultural food product (to allow direct comparison of the degree of price transmission). 
Farm and retail price predictions can be made based on market fundamentals such as past prices, the 
degree of market competition, and demand and supply conditions. 
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Figure 2.1 – Price transmission and price volatility transmission 
 
Figure 2.1 shows that the predictable portions or the conditional means of farm and retail prices follow 
each other both in the short and long run. This indicates that price transmission in levels is perfect. 
However, the graph on actual prices shows that farm prices deviate more often from the mean values 
than the retail prices do. This implies that farm prices are less predictable than retail prices, and that 
this farm price unpredictability is not translated into unpredictable retail prices. This implies imperfect 
price volatility transmission from farm to retail even though causality cannot be directly inferred from 
the Figure. 
Price transmission models (in levels) can take several specifications depending on their intended use. 
The most commonly used econometric model applied in recent papers is the vector error correction 
model (see for instance Lloyd et al., 2006; Falkowski, 2010; Kuiper and Oude Lansink, 2013) where 
the error correction mechanism was first suggested by Von-cramonTaubadel (1997). Variations of this 
model can be used to test for asymmetric price transmission (see Meyer and Von CramonTaubadel 
(2004) and Frey and Manera (2007) for a survey of asymmetric price transmission models), and to test 
for non-linearity in price dynamics (e.g. threshold vector error correction model). For applications of 
the threshold vector error correction model see for instance Goodwin and Holt (1999) and Rezitis and 
Stavropoulos (2011), as well as Brummer et al. (2009) for application of the Markov switching vector 
error correction model. A basic vector error correction model (VECM) is specified as follows for a 
hypotheticalchain consisting of two stages: 
∆𝑝1,𝑡 = 𝛼1 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖
′∆𝑝2,𝑡−𝑖
𝑟
𝑖=0 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖
′′∆𝑝1,𝑡−𝑖
𝑠
𝑖=1 − 𝛽1(𝑝1,𝑡−1 − 𝛽𝑝2,𝑡−1) + 𝑢1,𝑡    (1)  
∆𝑝2,𝑡 = 𝛼2 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖∆𝑝2,𝑡−𝑖
𝑟
𝑖=1 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖
′′′∆𝑝1,𝑡−𝑖
𝑠
𝑖=0 − 𝛽2(𝑝1,𝑡−1 − 𝛽𝑝2,𝑡−1) + 𝑢2,𝑡    (2) 
Equation (1) and (2) form the VECM and are solved simultaneously to determine the degree of price 
transmission between the two stages. In these equations,𝑝1𝑡  is the retail price at time t and  𝑝2𝑡  is the 
farm price at time t. The coefficients 𝛽𝑖
′ show the short term effects of farm price changes on current 
retail price changes, while the coefficients 𝛽𝑖
′′′ show the short-term effects of retail price changes on 
current farm price changes. The degree to which retail prices and farm prices adjust to the long-term 
15 
 
equilibrium relation are given by coefficients 𝛽1 and 𝛽2 respectively. The term in parenthesis 
represents the long-run equilibrium relation. This vector error correction model shows how the 
predictable portions of farm (past) price changes transmit to retail price changes and vice versa.  
The price volatility transmission literature commonly uses Multivariate Generalized Autoregressive 
Heteroskedasticity models (MGARCH) to model volatility transmission effects (see Table 2.1). A 
family of MGARCH models exist which, similar to price transmission models, can have different 
specifications depending on the intended use and estimation efficiencies. For the purpose of 
illustration of the difference of price transmission and price volatility transmission models, a common 
specification of an MGARCH model called the BEKK model (Baba, Engle, Kraft, Kroner, 1991) for 
two price series is provided below.  
𝑢𝑡|𝐼𝑡−1~𝑁(0,𝐻𝑡)  
𝐻𝑡 = 𝐶𝐶
′ + 𝐴′𝑢𝑡−1𝑢𝑡−1
′ 𝐴 + 𝐵′𝐻𝑡−1𝐵        (3) 
where𝐻𝑡 is a 2 x 2 variance- covariance matrix, 𝐶is a lower triangular matrix of constants,  𝐴 is a 2 x 2 
matrix of ARCH term coefficients and 𝐵 is a 2 x 2 matrix of GARCH term coefficients. The 𝐴 matrix 
is a coefficient matrix for own and cross recent shock transmission effects, while the 𝐵 matrix contains 
coefficients for own and cross past volatility transmission effects. The 𝑢𝑡 are the residuals of the 
(conditional) mean equations, which can be specified in a VECM form (Eq. 1 and 2) or other forms. It 
can be seen that the residuals 𝑢𝑡 from the (conditional) mean equations form the basis for volatility 
modelling as they represent the price changes not predicted by the (conditional) mean equations. To 
clearly see the matrix elements of the variance equation, it can be written as: 
[
ℎ11,𝑡 ℎ12,𝑡
ℎ21,𝑡 ℎ22,𝑡
] = [
𝑐11 0
𝑐21 𝑐22
] [
𝑐11 𝑐21
0 𝑐22
] + [
𝑎11 𝑎21
𝑎12 𝑎22
] [
𝑢1,𝑡−1
2 𝑢1,𝑡−1𝑢2,𝑡−1
𝑢2,𝑡−1𝑢1,𝑡−1 𝑢2,𝑡−1
2 ] [
𝑎11 𝑎12
𝑎21 𝑎22
] +
[
𝑏11 𝑏21
𝑏12 𝑏22
] [
ℎ11,𝑡−1 ℎ12,𝑡−1
ℎ21,𝑡−1 ℎ22,𝑡−1
] [
𝑏11 𝑏12
𝑏21 𝑏22
]        (4) 
The transmission of prices in levels along the chain is necessary for a market to operate efficiently 
(Chavas and Mehta, 2004), for maximising producers and consumers welfare, and for an effective 
transmission of policy induced price measures (Meyer and von Cramon-Taubadel, 2004; Vavra and 
Goodwin, 2005; Ben-Kaabia and Gil, 2007). However, price volatility transmission entails the 
transmission of risks from unpredictable price changes from one market to another (Apergis and 
Rezitis, 2003) and this transmission should rationally be minimized. Hence, awareness of these 
conflicting objectives is necessary in designing policy measures and risk management options. That is, 
the policy measures and risk management options have to be designed such that they improve the 
transmission of predictable price changes and reduce the transmission of unpredictable price changes 
along the chain. 
 
2.3. Price volatility transmission in food supply chains 
 
The reviewed studies (summarized in Table 2.1) can be classified as those that explicitly investigate 
the transmission of price volatility across chain stages, and those that only indirectly infer about it. 
Those studies that only indirectly infer about the degree of price volatility transmission either make a 
comparison between price volatilities in different stages of the chain or investigate the correlation of 
volatilities in different stages of the chain. Direct causal effects of price volatilities across chain stages 
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are not investigated in this latter stream of literature. The stream of literature that explicitly 
investigates the degree of price volatility transmission in food chains consists of eight papers and 
includes the papers by Khan and Helmers (1997), Natcher and Weaver (1999), Buguk et al. (2003), 
Apergis and Rezitis (2003), Rezitis (2010), Uchezuba et al. (2010), Rezitis and Stavropoulos (2011) 
and Khiyavi et al. (2012).  
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Table 2.1- Summary of reviewed literature 
Authors (date) Countries Products Chain stages 
Sample 
period 
Model Transmission of 
volatility 
detected 
Direction of 
detected volatility 
transmission 
Mean 
equations 
Variance 
equations 
Khan and 
Helmers (1997) 
US Feed (corn), 
beef, poultry, 
pork  
Feed-farm-
wholesale-retail 
1970-1981 … VAR Yes From feed to farm 
Natcher and 
Weaver (1999) 
US Beef Feeder cattle-
live cattle-
wholesale-retail 
1970-1983 … VAR 
specification of 
univariate 
GARCH 
Yes Bidirectional across 
all chain stages 
Buguk et al. 
(2003) 
US Catfish Feed-farm-
wholesale-retail 
1980-2000 VAR Univariate 
EGARCH 
Yes From feed to farm; 
From wholesale to 
farm; From farm to 
wholesale  
Apergis and 
Rezitis (2003) 
Greece Agricultural 
products 
Agricultural 
input-
agricultural 
output-retail 
1985-1999 VECM Variation of 
VECH model 
Yes From feed to farm; 
From consumer to 
farm 
Rezitis (2013) Greece Lamb, beef, 
pork, poultry 
Farm-retail 1988-2000 VECM Variation of 
VECH and 
BEKK 
Yes From farm to 
consumer; From 
consumer to farm 
Chavas and 
Mehta (2004) 
US Butter Wholesale-
retail 
1980-2011 VECM Cholesky 
decomposition** 
Yes N/A*** 
Zheng et al. 
(2008) 
US 45 retail food 
items 
Retail 1980-2004 AR EGARCH 
(univariate) 
Yes From farm to retail 
Mehta and 
Chavas (2008) 
Brazil-US Coffee Farm (Brazil)-
wholesale (US)-
retail (US) 
1975-2002 VAR Cholesky 
decomposition** 
Yes N/A*** 
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Table 2.1- Summary of reviewed literature (continued) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*all data frequency are monthly 
**based on effect of prices on covariance of price volatilities 
***not applicable  
****based on correlation of price volatilities
     Model   
Authors 
(date) 
Countries Products Chain stages Sample 
period 
Mean 
equations 
Variance 
equations 
Transmission 
of volatility 
detected 
Direction of 
detected 
volatility 
transmission 
Uchezuba et 
al. (2010) 
South Africa Boiler Farm-retail 2000-2008 AR EGARCH 
with spillover 
effect 
Yes From farm to 
retail 
Serra (2011) Spain Beef Farm-retail 1996-2005 VECM Univariate 
STCC- 
GARCH 
Mixed**** N/A 
Alexandri 
(2011) 
Romania Agricultural 
price indices 
Farm-retail 2006-2010 … Comparison 
of coefficient 
of variance of 
prices 
Yes N/A 
Rezitis and 
Stravapoulaus 
(2011) 
Greece Broiler Farm-retail 1993-2009 TVECM BEKK No N/A 
Rezitis 
(2012) 
Greece Beef, lamb, 
pork and 
poultry 
Farm-retail 1993-2008 AR and 
ARMA 
Diagonal 
VECH 
Yes**** N/A 
Khiyavi et al. 
(2012) 
Iran Poultry Feed-farm-
retail 
1997-2010 VECM Variant of 
VECH 
Yes From feed to 
farm; From 
retail to farm 
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These papers differ in their methodological approaches. The earliest study by Khan and Helmers 
(1997) applies a Vector Autoregressive model (VAR) on moving variances of farm, wholesale and 
retail monthly prices for US beef and pork products. Natcher and Weaver (1999) also use a VAR 
model, but apply it to the predicted conditional variances of univariate GARCH models estimated for 
the US cattle sector. They investigate volatility spillover effects for the feeder cattle-live cattle-
wholesale beef-retail beef supply chain. Buguk et al. (2003) take a different approach by estimating 
univariate exponential GARCH (EGARCH) models for three stages of the US wholesale catfish 
supply chain (Feed, farm and wholesale). In the univariate EGARCH model of each market (which 
allows testing for asymmetry in transmissions), the most recent innovations from other markets are 
included as exogenous variables that potentially cause volatility spillover. A similar approach is used 
by Uchezuba et al. (2010) who also applies univariate EGARCH models to investigate spillover 
effects in the South African farm-retail broiler chain. 
 
Apergis and Rezitis (2003), Rezitis (2010), Rezitis and Stavropoulos (2011a) and Khiyavi et al. (2012) 
share some methodology wise similarities in that they all apply standard multivariate GARCH models 
with BEKK and VECH specifications. While the BEKK specification is more parsimonious and 
assures the positive definiteness of the covariance matrix, both approaches are advantageous in the 
identification of cross-market volatility effects. The studies discussed above indicate that GARCH 
models are standard volatility modelling approaches. The reviewed literature applies these models to a 
10 to 20 years monthly time series price data. The specifications of mean equations take, in most 
cases, vector error correction and vector autoregressive forms. The use of mean equations that allow 
for non-linear price transmission is rather limited, with the paper by Rezitis and Stavropoulos (2011) 
being an exception with its application of the threshold vector error correction model (TVECM). A 
striking feature of the papers discussed above is their limited coverage in terms of country, products 
and periods of study. Six out of the eight papers are for the US and Greek markets, with the papers for 
the Greek market authored by the same individual(s). Seven out of the eight papers cover the meat 
sector (broiler, beef, pork and fish).  Only three papers have been published after the year 2000. 
A commonality of the papers that directly investigate the transmission of price volatility is that they all 
detect transmission of volatility across all or some of the chain stages (except for Rezitis and 
Stavropoulos, 2011). The transmission of feed price volatility to farm output price volatilities is 
detected by Khan and Helmers (1997),Buguk et al. (2003), Apergis and Rezitis (2003), and Khiyavi et 
al. (2012). Farm output price volatilities are also shown to respond to retail (wholesale) price 
volatilities by Natcher and Weaver (1999), Buguk et al. (2003), Apergis and Rezitis (2003), Rezitis 
(2010), and Khiyavi et al (2012). The wholesale market is considered in the transmission analysis in 
only three of the studies (Khan and Helmers, 1997; Natcher and Weaver , 1999; Buguk et al., 2003). It 
is shown in Natcher and Weaver (1999) and  Buguk et al. (2003) that wholesale price volatilities are 
affected by farm price volatilities. Only the study by Natcher and Weaver (1999) and Khan and 
Helmers (1997) investigated the wholesale-retail price volatility dynamics. Significant bidirectional 
transmission of wholesale-retail price volatility is, however detected only in Natcher and Weaver 
(1999).  
The second category of the reviewed literature includes those papers that indirectly infer about the 
transmission of price volatility across chain stages. This category is represented by the papers of 
Chavas and Mehta (2004), Zheng et al. (2008), Mehta and Chavas (2008), Serra (2011), Alexandri 
(2011) and Rezitis (2012). This category is also dominated by studies for the US and Greek markets, 
but shows some variations in the products studied. Serra (2011) analyses the Spanish producer-
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consumer beef chain using a univariate STCC-GARCH model that allows conditional correlations of 
price volatilities to vary with the economic regime that prevails at each point in time. A similar 
modelling approach is the one applied by Rezitis (2012) and consists of estimating a diagonal VECH 
approach to study producer-consumer price volatility interactions in four meat markets in Greece. The 
similarity in the approaches of Serra (2011) and Rezitis (2012) is that they both use conditional 
correlations (covariances) in volatilities to infer about price volatility transmission. However, 
correlation or covariances might not imply causality.  While Serra (2011) finds that the correlation 
between producer and consumer price volatilities is negative in the periods of the BSE crisis, Rezitis 
(2012) finds that the average conditional correlations between producer and consumer price volatility 
is positive for all meat markets (except the lamb market).Zheng et al (2008) estimate a univariate 
exponential GARCH using only prices of retail food items and make inference on how retail price 
volatilities respond to negative and positive price shocks (possibly coming from upstream farm price 
shocks). They find that retail prices respond more to positive price shocks than to negative price 
shocks. Alexandri (2011) compares farm and retail price volatilities, and concludes that both prices are 
volatile with farm price volatility being higher. Chavas and Mehta (2004) and Mehta and Chavas 
(2008) investigate the effect of changes in prices (in levels) on the covariance of price volatilities in 
two chain stages. Both studies conclude that price levels in one market determine how price volatilities 
co-vary in two markets. 
The above discussed literature challenges the common perception that farmers are the main actors in 
chain that are affected by price volatility. Typical manifestations of such perception are the numerous 
studies that investigate the effects of farm price volatility on farm supply response. The papers by Seal 
and Shonkwiler (1987), Rezitis and Stavropoulos (2009a), Rezitis and Stavropoulos (2009b), Sckokai 
and Moro (2009), Rezitis and Stavropoulos (2010a),  Rezitis and Stavropoulos (2010b),   Piot-Lepetit 
(2011), Tangermann  (2011),  Taya (2012), Rezitis and Stavropoulos (2011b),  Rezitis and 
Stavropoulos (2012) are some of the studies that explored this issue. Some insights can be drawn from 
these papers on volatility transmissions from the farm stage to the downstream stage of the chain, but 
these insights are mere implications
1
. For instance, to make volatility estimates to be incorporated in 
the broiler farm supply equation, Rezitis and Stavropoulos (2010a) estimate a univariate NAGARCH 
model that accounts for asymmetric price shocks at the farm stage, and find that farm price volatilities 
respond mainly to past positive price shocks than negative ones. This implies that the wholesale or 
retail stage faces higher farm price volatilities in times of increasing farm prices, but does not 
necessarily mean that the higher farm price volatilities are translated into higher wholesale or retail 
price volatilities.  
A largely ignored aspect in the reviewed literature is the empirical investigation of the role of 
contextual factors on the degree of price volatility transmission. Some of the studies suggest, without 
empirically testing for it, that certain factors do affect the degree of transmission. For instance, Khan 
and Helmers (1997), Apergis and Rezitis (2003) and Khiyavi et al (2012) argue that the lack of 
contract production is responsible for the transmission of consumer price volatilities to the farm sector. 
A commonly attributed factor to the low transmission of farm price volatilities to the consumer stage 
is the degree of market power exercised by retailers (wholesalers) (Zheng et al., 2008; Uchezuba et al., 
2010; Serra, 2011; Alexandri, 2011; and Rezitis, 2012). The authors argue that the downstream sector 
uses its market power to keep consumer prices stable. Such a marketing strategy is argued by some to 
be a consequence of the sensitivity of consumers to frequent price changes (Alexandri, 2011).Factors 
such as the biological nature of agricultural production (time lag in production response) and the lower 
price elasticity of farm-level demand than that of retail demand are attributed to the higher farm price 
                                                 
1
 We thank an anonymous referee for pointing out this issue. 
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volatility relative to consumer price volatility (Apergis and Rezitis, 2003; Alexandri, 2011; and 
Khiyavi et al., 2012). Further identification and empirical testing of the role of these and other factors 
can be an interesting area for future research. The use of theory and the price transmission literature 
(on price levels) can serve as a guide for the identification of potential contextual factors.  
 
2.4. Conclusions and suggestions for future research 
 
The literature on price linkages in vertical markets has mostly dealt with the transmission of prices in 
levels instead of price volatilities. The recent rise of price volatility of food and agricultural 
commodities, in particular since the mid-2000s, has raised concerns about the negative implications 
for food chain actors. Even though few studies have explicitly explored the degree of price volatility 
transmission along food supply chains, the number of studies covering the last decade is very limited.  
The studies reviewed in this paper show that price volatility transmits along food supply chains, both 
from upstream to downstream and vice versa. All studies that investigated the feed-farm linkages 
show that farm output price volatility responds to feed price volatility. The farm sector was also shown 
to be vulnerable to price volatility sourced from the (wholesale) retail sector. Even though it was 
shown that wholesale price volatilities respond to farm output price volatilities, the wholesale-retail 
price volatility linkage was practically not explored. The findings imply that price stabilization 
measures that target the chain stage that are the major source of price volatility can help stabilize 
prices for the other stages of the chain. The studies that were reviewed in this paper used a family of 
both univariate and multivariate GARCH models to model price volatility transmission. While some 
studies attempted to indirectly infer about the degree of price volatility transmission by using 
conditional correlations of price volatilities, those studies that directly investigated the degree of 
volatility transmission mostly used BEKK and VECH specifications of multivariate GARCH models. 
Given the timeliness of the topic of the analysis of volatility transmission literature, extending the 
period being investigated to the last decade is an avenue of future research. Extending the product and 
country coverage of the current literature can further help to identify the impact of product and country 
specific characteristics on the degree of volatility transmission. Current studies tend to focus mainly 
on US markets and on the meat sector. The chain stages being investigated should also be extended to 
cover the wholesale-retail price volatility linkage because the wholesale sector can play a major role in 
either dampening or stimulating the transmission of volatility between the farm and retail stages. 
Moreover, the use of higher frequency data, such as weekly data, can improve results and help detect 
short-term cross-market price volatility dynamics in vertical markets. Another highly important aspect 
that is currently not yet explored in the literature is the identification and empirical testing of the 
impact of contextual factors (such as market power, contracts in vertical markets and marketing 
strategies of the downstream sector) on the degree of price volatility transmission. While detecting 
transmission of price volatility is important, examining the role of contextual factors on transmission 
is more important in designing policy measures and risk management strategies aimed at minimizing 
the degree of transmission. The vast literature on price transmission in levels and the use of theory can 
help in the identification, modelling and empirical testing of relevant contextual factors.  
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Abstract 
This paper investigates the relationship between the transmission of price volatility and market power 
in the German fresh pork supply chain. A theoretical model underpinning this relationship is first 
provided followed by an empirical application that uses monthly farm, slaughterhouse and retail pork 
price data for the period 2000-2011. The relationship of market power with price level transmission 
and price volatility transmission in the chain are both investigated. The empirical applications consist 
of a vector error correction model and least square regressions estimated to analyse price transmission 
and price volatility transmissions, respectively. Results show that retail market power limited both 
types of transmissions. Competition inducing policy measures coupled with measures that support 
price risk management initiatives of chain actors are encouraged. 
Key words: price volatility transmission, price transmission, market power, food supply chain, 
Germany, theory 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
Since the food crisis of 2006/2007, price volatility has become a major concern of policymakers 
worldwide (Brummer et al., 2013). Although a decade has passed since the food crisis, world 
agricultural markets are still susceptible to a rise in price volatility that can be caused by supply and 
demand shocks. Factors causing supply shocks include the shifting of agricultural production to 
regions with variable yields (such as the Black sea region), climatic shocks, volatile oil prices, and 
delayed farm supply response to world demand shocks (FAO, 2011). Sources of demand shocks 
include animal health related crises (Van Asseldonk et al., 2000; Serra, 2011) and import bans by 
major importing countries in response to food safety or animal health concerns causing excess supply 
relative to demand (FAO, 2011). Due to the interconnectedness of the EU market with global 
agricultural markets as a result of successive reforms of the Common Agricultural Policy, the EU 
market is likely to be exposed to global market shocks (Tangermann, 2011). A recent example of a 
market shock is the Russian embargo on fresh produce imports from the EU which was followed by a 
drop of fresh produce prices within the EU (Kutlina-Dimitrova, 2015).   
Demand and supply shocks cause prices to be volatile and therefore unpredictable. The risk and 
uncertainty associated with volatile prices in turn increase the complexity of managerial and 
investment decisions (Piot-Lepetit, 2011; Rabobank, 2011). Assefa et al. (2016) showed through 
interviews with forty-two EU food chain actors that price volatility is a challenge not only for farmers 
but also for other actors in the chain. Price volatility at different stages of the chain is exacerbated by 
price volatility that potentially is transmitted from other stages of the chain in addition to the price 
volatility originating in own markets (Assefa et al., 2015). Price volatility can be defined as the 
“portion” of price changes that cannot be predicted by market fundamentals. The transmission of 
predictable price changes, which can also be termed as price transmission, is necessary for the efficient 
transmission of market signals as a basis for informed economic decisions (Chavas & Mehta, 2004). 
The transmission of price volatility, on the other hand, implies the transmission of risk and uncertainty 
and may have negative impacts on investments in new technologies in other stages of the chain.  
A literature review of Assefa et al. (2015) showed that several studies suggest that market structure (or 
the degree of market power in the chain) is a major determinant of price volatility transmissions.  For 
instance, Alexandri (2011) compared farm and retail price volatility of various Romanian agricultural 
products and claims that retailers might be exercising market power to keep consumer prices rigid and 
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irresponsive to farm price volatility because consumers are sensitive to frequent price changes. Serra 
(2011) investigated the Spanish beef chain and associates the low correlation between farm and retail 
price volatility during turbulent times (when BSE cases were detected) with retailers using market 
power to keep consumer prices irresponsive to farm price volatility. Another example is the study of 
Buguk et al. (2003) on the US catfish market who assert that farmers organized in cooperatives might 
be using market power to asymmetrically transmit positive input price shocks to the next stage. That 
is, farm price volatility responds to positive input price shocks more than to negative ones. Although 
these studies claim that market power might have an effect on price volatility transmissions in the 
chain, they test such claims neither theoretically nor empirically. 
The aim of this paper is to empirically investigate the effect of market power on price volatility 
transmission. The analysis focuses on three stages of the German fresh pork supply chain, i.e. farm, 
slaughterhouse and retail stages. Similar to previous studies that model price volatility transmission 
within a GARCH (generalized autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity) framework (see a review 
in Assefa et al., 2015), this chapter measures price volatility transmission in two steps. First, price 
transmission is modelled through conditional mean equations. Next, price residuals from the first step 
are used to model volatility transmissions. Empirical estimations of both types of transmissions are 
guided by a theoretical framework that relates both types of transmissions with the degree of market 
power. The classical conjectural variation approach first advanced by Appelbaum (1982) is used to 
measure market power.  
The relationship between market power and price transmission has been modelled in the price 
transmission literature (see for instance, Acharya et al., 2011; Verreth et al., 2011). However, to our 
knowledge, this paper is the first to theoretically model the relationship between both types of 
transmission and market power. Although several empirical studies investigated price volatility 
transmission in food supply chains (see Assefa et al., 2015), a theoretical underpinning for the 
empirical estimations is still lacking. The framework of Thille (2006) is extended to relate market 
power to price volatility transmission for various actors in the pork supply chain. To our knowledge, 
this paper is the first application of Thille’s (2006) framework to investigate price volatility 
transmissions along food supply chains. Market power has often been blamed to hinder the efficient 
transmission of price signals needed for informed production and investment decisions and the 
enhancement of consumers’ welfare (Meyer and von Cramon Taubadel, 2004). This paper investigates 
whether market power also hinders the transmission of price shocks along the chain.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 provides a description of the German 
pork supply chain, section 3.3 presents the theoretical framework, section 3.4 presents the empirical 
framework and section 3.5 presents the data. Results are presented and discussed in section 3.6. 
Section 3.7 concludes the chapter. 
 
3.2. The German fresh pork supply chain 
 
Germany is a major pork meat producer in the EU accounting for 23% of EU production, followed by 
France, Spain and The Netherlands, with similar shares (around 13 to 14%) (Sanjuan and Gil, 2010). 
The German fresh pork supply chain consists of five major stages, i.e. the farm, livestock wholesale, 
slaughterhouse, meat wholesale, and retail stages (Theuvsen and Franz, 2007; Schulze et al., 2007). 
German pig farmers sell their pigs directly to slaughterhouses or though livestock wholesalers. The 
latter are important intermediaries due to the relatively large number of farms and the need to “bundle” 
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large quantities of pigs (European Commission, 2010). According to the European Commission 
(2010), the meat wholesale market also supplies meat to the retail sector. Figure 3.1 shows the main 
supply linkages in the German fresh pork chain. The Figure is adapted from Theuvsen and Franz 
(2007) and from the report of the European Commission (2010). The number of chain actors per chain 
stage is reported in the Figure. The number of pig farms corresponds to the year 2013 and is obtained 
from Statistiches Bundesamt. The number of pig slaughterhouses, livestock wholesalers (aggregate 
over all types of animals) and meat wholesalers (aggregate over all types of animals) correspond to the 
year 2007 and were obtained from a report of the European Commission (2010). The report used data 
compiled from the Eurostat, FOODCOMM (2006) and Statistiches Bundesamt Deutschland (2007). 
The number of retailers in 2010 is obtained from a report of the USDA (2010) which used data from 
Euromonitor International. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1 - The German fresh pork supply chain and the number of actors per chain stage 
 
Figure 3.1 provides an indication of the relative concentration in each stage of the chain. Although a 
large number of small and medium retail stores operate in Germany, the German retail sector is highly 
concentrated. As of 2002, the concentration ratio of the ten largest firms has already reached 86% 
(Anders, 2008). Concentration at the retail stage can have implications on price competition and 
transmission in the chain. Despite the high degree of concentration, the German supermarket industry 
is characterized by an intense horizontal price competition due to the presence of hard-discounters 
such as Aldi and Lidl (Anders, 2008; Weber and Anders, 2007). The intense competition limits the 
opportunity for retailers to transmit cost price increases to consumers. Hence, retailers mark-down the 
margins of the slaughterhouses and/or processors using oligopsony market power to maintain their 
own margins (Anders, 2008; Weber and Anders, 2007). The implementation of aggressive “everyday-
low-pricing” strategies by discounters also contributes to the rigidity of consumer prices (Weber and 
Anders, 2007). Weber and Anders (2007) also argue that retailers violate the law of one price, as 
reflected in the difference in prices for the same product across different retail stores.  
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The slaughterhouse stage, although much less concentrated than the retail stage, has a concentration 
ratio of the ten largest firms equal to 38.7% as of 2008 (European Commission, 2010). According to 
Bakucs et al. (2009), the regional market shares of slaughterhouses and institutional restrictions of hog 
transport can permit slaughterhouses to exercise oligopsony power towards farmers. The German pig 
farm sector is much less concentrated than the slaughterhouse sector. One indicator is the large 
number of farms compared to the number of slaughterhouses as reported in Figure 3.1. The farm 
sector is also loosely horizontally integrated in the form of farmer cooperatives and producer 
organizations. According to Theuvsen and Franz (2007), there are two types of German livestock 
wholesalers: Private livestock traders and cooperatively managed livestock trading organizations. The 
latter type of organizations can further be categorized as producer owned livestock trading 
cooperatives and as producing and marketing associations. While the former obliges farmers to market 
all their pigs to the cooperative, the latter allows commercial independence (Theuvsen and Franz, 
2007). The distribution of farmers across the three types of wholesalers is comparable (Theuvsen and 
Franz, 2007).      
The German pork supply chain is more vertically integrated downstream (slaughterhouse - retail) than 
upstream (farm – livestock wholesale - slaughterhouse). German pig farmers generally value their 
commercial independence and engage in spot market transactions with wholesalers and 
slaughterhouses (Deimel et al., 2008; Schulze et al., 2006; European Commission, 2010). 
Nevertheless, there are some large slaughterhouses such as Westfleisch that promote marketing 
contracts with farmers, and others such as EGO Osnabrück which are owned by farmers (European 
Commission, 2010). Vertical integration is also observed at the retail stage where retailers such as 
REWE and EDEKA are integrating into the meat processing industry (European Commission, 2010). 
Fixed price contracts are common between retailers and meat companies (slaughtering and 
processing). According to a report by Rabobank (2011), stringent contracts at the retail stage limit the 
transmission of input cost shocks to the consumers. This is particularly true in times of a sudden rise in 
input costs as retailers do not frequently renegotiate contracts. As a result, the margins of 
slaughterhouses sourcing pigs in the spot market are exposed to volatility (Rabobank, 2011). 
Prices in the German pork market have generally remained stable over the last decade (as can also be 
seen from Figure 3.2 in section 3.5. Unlike the beef market, market regulation intensity on the pork 
(and poultry) market was low and limited to border protections and the occasional use of private 
storage aid (Assefa et al., 2016; Lence, 2007; Von Ledebur and Schmitz, 2012). A major source of 
price volatility in the German pig market is a demand shock caused by news of animal scares. Such 
news can originate within Germany and in other European countries, and from other meat markets (i.e. 
poultry and beef) (Serra et al., 2006). For instance, the price spike in 2001 in Germany (See Figure 3.2 
in section 3.5 ) can be partly associated with the foot and mouth disease in the UK, which caused a 
switch from beef to pork (Serra et al., 2006; Ledebur and Schmitz, 2012).  
 
3.3. Theoretical framework 
 
In this section, first the transmission of prices along the German pork supply chain is described from a 
theoretical perspective. This is followed by a theoretical framework that describes the transmission of 
price volatility along the chain. Throughout this section, a chain consisting of a farm, slaughterhouse 
and retail stage is assumed. The effects of market power in the chain are accounted for in both 
theoretical models. In line with the structure of the German pork supply chain, it is assumed that 
retailers may exercise oligopsony and oligopoly power towards slaughterhouses and consumers, 
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respectively. Slaughterhouses may exercise oligopsony power towards farmers but behave 
competitively towards retailers. A competitive farm sector is assumed. 
3.3.1. Price transmission 
 
The framework of Sexton and Zhang (2001) and Verreth et al. (2015) is followed to describe price 
transmissions theoretically. The framework starts with an inverse farm supply and an inverse 
consumer demand function specified as follows, respectively: 
𝑃𝑓 = 𝑆(𝑄𝑓 , 𝑍𝑓)           (1) 
𝑃𝑟 = 𝐷(𝑄𝑟, 𝑍𝑟)           (2) 
where, 𝑃𝑓 is the farm price of pork meat, 𝑄𝑓 is the aggregate quantity of pork meat supplied by all 
farmers expressed in kilograms of slaughter weight, 𝑍𝑓 represents exogenous supply shifters, 𝑃𝑟 is the 
consumer price of pork meat, 𝑄𝑟 is the aggregate quantity of pork meat demanded by consumers 
expressed in kilograms of slaughter weight and 𝑍𝑟 represents exogenous demand shifters. 
Following Sexton and Zhang (2001) and Verreth et al. (2015), marginal marketing and processing 
costs of retailers and processors, respectively, are assumed to be constant. The profit function of 
retailer 𝑖 is given as follows (omitting exogenous demand and supply shifters for simplification of 
notations): 
𝜋𝑖
𝑟 = 𝐷(𝑄𝑟)𝑞𝑖
𝑟 − 𝑆(𝑄𝑠)𝑞𝑖
𝑟 − 𝑐𝑖
𝑟𝑞𝑖
𝑟          (3) 
where, 𝑆(𝑄𝑠) = 𝑃𝑠 is the inverse supply function of the slaughterhouse and 𝑐𝑖
𝑟 is the unit marketing 
cost of the retailer. Averaging across retailers (i.e. 𝑞𝑖
𝑟 = 𝑞𝑟 and 𝑐𝑖
𝑟 = 𝑐𝑟), the profit maximization 
problem of a representative retailer with respect to quantity yields the following price relationship 
between the retail and slaughterhouse prices (for detailed derivations, the reader is referred to Sexton 
and Zhang (2001) and Verreth et al. (2015)): 
𝑃𝑟 (1 −
𝜃𝑟𝑐
𝜖𝑟
) = 𝑃𝑠 (1 +
𝜃𝑟𝑠
𝛾𝑠
) + 𝑐𝑟        (4) 
where, 𝜃𝑟𝑐 =
𝜕𝑄𝑟
𝜕𝑞𝑟
𝑞𝑟
𝑄𝑟
  is the average conjectural elasticity measuring the retailer’s oligopoly vis-a-vis 
consumers, 𝜖𝑟 =
𝜕𝑄𝑟
𝜕𝑃𝑟
𝑃𝑟
𝑄𝑟
 is the elasticity of consumer demand,  𝜃𝑟𝑠 =
𝜕𝑄𝑠
𝜕𝑞𝑟
𝑞𝑟
𝑄𝑠
 is the conjectural elasticity 
measuring the retailer’s oligopsony power towards the slaughterhouse and 𝛾𝑠 =
𝜕𝑄𝑠
𝜕𝑃𝑠
𝑃𝑠
𝑄𝑠
 is the elasticity 
of slaughterhouse derived supply. A value of 1 for 𝜃𝑟𝑐 and 𝜃𝑟𝑠 indicates monopoly and monopsony 
power of the retailer towards consumers and slaughterhouses, respectively. A value of 0 corresponds 
to competitive behaviour of the retailer. Values between 0 and 1 indicate retailer oligopoly and 
oligopsony power. 
The profit function of the slaughterhouse is given by 
𝜋𝑖
𝑠 = 𝐷(𝑄𝑠)𝑞𝑖
𝑠 − 𝑆(𝑄𝑓)𝑞𝑖
𝑠 − 𝑐𝑖
𝑠𝑞𝑖
𝑠          (5) 
where, 𝐷(𝑄𝑠) = 𝑃𝑠 is the inverse demand function of the slaughterhouse and 𝑐𝑖
𝑠 is the unit marketing 
and processing cost of the slaughterhouse. After aggregation of quantities and costs across 
slaughterhouses, the profit maximization problem of a representative slaughterhouse with respect to 
quantity yields the following long-term price relation between the slaughterhouse and farm prices: 
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𝑃𝑠 = 𝑃𝑓 (1 +
𝜃𝑠𝑓
𝛾𝑓
) + 𝑐𝑠           (6) 
where, 𝜃𝑠𝑓 =
𝜕𝑄𝑓
𝜕𝑞𝑠
𝑞𝑠
𝑄𝑓
 is the conjectural elasticity measuring the slaughterhouse’s oligopsony power 
towards the farmers and 𝛾𝑓 =
𝜕𝑄𝑓
𝜕𝑃𝑓
𝑃𝑓
𝑄𝑓
 is the elasticity of farm supply. A value of 1 for 𝜃𝑠𝑓 indicates 
monopsony power of the slaughterhouse towards farmers and a value of 0 indicates competitive 
behaviour. Values between 0 and 1 indicate oligopsony power of the slaughterhouse towards farmers. 
Equation (4) and (6) can be combined to yield a long-term relationship between farm and retail prices: 
𝑃𝑟 (1 −
𝜃𝑟𝑐
𝜖𝑟
) = 𝑃𝑓 (1 +
𝜃𝑠𝑓
𝛾𝑓
) (1 +
𝜃𝑟𝑠
𝛾𝑠
) + 𝑐𝑠 (1 +
𝜃𝑟𝑠
𝛾𝑠
) + 𝑐𝑟      (7) 
 
3.3.2. Price volatility transmission 
 
In this section, the framework of Thille (2006) is followed to derive a theoretical relationship between 
the degree of market power and price volatility transmissions. Because the framework of Thille (2006) 
considers only one stage in the chain (a processor), the framework is extended to the case of multiple 
chain actors. The following linear farm supply and consumer demand functions that take into account 
supply and demand shocks, respectively, are assumed: 
𝑃𝑓 = 𝑎 + 𝛼𝑄𝑓 + 𝜀𝑓           (8) 
𝑃𝑟 = 𝑏 − 𝛽𝑄𝑟 + 𝜀𝑟           (9) 
where, 𝜀𝑓 is an exogenous farm supply shock, 𝜀𝑟 is an exogenous consumer demand shock, and 𝑎, 𝑏, 
𝛼 and 𝛽 are coefficients that can be estimated. The coefficients 𝛼 and 𝛽 are the slopes of the inverse 
farm supply and inverse consumer demand curves, respectively. Equation (8) and (9) are linear 
specifications of equation (1) and (2), respectively. It is assumed that any supply or demand shock at 
the slaughterhouse stage originates from the farm sector (e.g. due to animal diseases or other 
disruptions to production) and from consumers (e.g. variations in demand due to e.g. changing 
consumer preferences, NGO campaigns on meat or animal welfare), respectively. No shocks in the 
marketing and processing costs of the slaughterhouse are assumed to occur. The same assumption 
holds for the marketing costs of the retailer. The farm supply shock 𝜀𝑓 is proxied by a farm price 
shock, and the consumer demand shock 𝜀𝑟 is proxied by a retail price shock.  
In the context of this paper, price volatility transmission refers to the extent to which price volatilities 
at different stages of the chain respond to farm and retail price shocks. To relate the degree of market 
power with price volatility transmission, the profit maximization problems of the slaughterhouse and 
the retailer should be solved for. The degree of market power is measured using the conjectural 
variation. Since farmers are assumed to behave competitively, the conjectural elasticity measuring the 
degree of farmer market power is equal to zero. Therefore, the profit maximization problem of farmers 
is not solved for. This confines the analysis of price volatility transmission to the slaughterhouse and 
retail stages. That is, the extent to which slaughterhouse and retail price volatilities respond to farm 
and retail price shocks will be investigated. 
To solve the profit maximization problem of the retailer, the inverse supply function of the 
slaughterhouse is first derived by substituting (8) into (6), and is given by:  
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𝑃𝑠 = (𝑎 + 𝛼𝑄𝑓 + 𝜀𝑓) (1 +
𝜃𝑠𝑓
𝛾𝑓
) + 𝑐𝑠          (10) 
Given the slaughterhouse derived supply function provided in (10), the profit function of the retailer is 
specified as follows: 
𝜋𝑟 = (𝑏 − 𝛽𝑄𝑟 + 𝜀𝑟)𝑞𝑟 − ((𝑎 + 𝛼𝑄𝑓 + 𝜀𝑓) (1 +
𝜃𝑠𝑓
𝛾𝑓
) + 𝑐𝑠) 𝑞𝑟 −  𝑐𝑟𝑞𝑟     (11) 
Following Thille (2006), equation (11) is first used to solve the profit maximization problem of the 
retailer with respect to quantity (𝑞𝑟) and obtain an expression for 𝑄𝑟. Substituting the resulting 
expression of 𝑄𝑟 into (9) and taking variances on both sides results in the following expression of the 
retail price volatility:   
𝜎𝑟
2 = 𝜎𝜀𝑟
2 (1 −
𝛽
𝛽+𝛼+𝛽𝜃𝑟𝑐+𝛼𝜃𝑟𝑓(1+
𝜃𝑠𝑓
𝛾𝑓
)+𝛼(
𝜃𝑠𝑓
𝛾𝑓
)
)
2
+ 𝜎
𝜀𝑓
2 (
𝛽
𝛽+𝛼+𝛽𝜃𝑟𝑐+𝛼𝜃𝑟𝑓(1+
𝜃𝑠𝑓
𝛾𝑓
)+𝛼(
𝜃𝑠𝑓
𝛾𝑓
)
)
2
(1 +
𝜃𝑠𝑓
𝛾𝑓
)
2
          
(12) 
where, 𝜎𝑟
2 is the retail price volatility (variance), 𝜎𝜀𝑟
2  is the variance of the retail price shock, 𝜎
𝜀𝑓
2  is the 
variance of the farm price shock,  𝜃𝑟𝑓 =
𝜕𝑄𝑓
𝜕𝑞𝑟
𝑞𝑟
𝑄𝑓
 is the conjectural elasticity measuring the degree of 
retailer oligopsony power towards the farmers, and 𝜃𝑟𝑐 and 𝜃𝑠𝑓 are the conjectural variations as 
defined in (4) and (6) respectively. Equation (12) reveals that, as retail market power increases (𝜃𝑟𝑐 
and 𝜃𝑟𝑓) relative to the slaughterhouse market power (𝜃𝑠𝑓), the response of the retail price volatility to 
a retail price shock (consumer demand shock) becomes much higher than the response to a farm price 
shock (farm supply shock). This is particularly true if the inverse farm supply curve is steep (i.e. large 
𝛼) and/or the inverse consumer demand curve is flatter (i.e. small 𝛽). Furthermore, it can be shown 
that a stronger slaughterhouse market power can increase the response of the retail price volatility to 
farm price shocks (due to the expression ((1 +
𝜃𝑠𝑓
𝛾𝑓
)
2
).  
In equation (12), it can further be seen that in the absence of market power in the chain (i.e. 𝜃𝑟𝑐 =
𝜃𝑟𝑓 = 𝜃𝑠𝑓 = 0), the retail price volatility depends mainly on the slopes of the inverse farm supply and 
consumer demand curves (i.e. 𝛼 and 𝛽, respectively). It can also be noted that, in the absence of 
market power, the steeper is the inverse consumer demand curve (i.e. larger 𝛽), the higher will be the 
effect of a farm price shock (farm supply shock) on retail price volatility. Also, the steeper is the 
inverse farm supply curve (i.e. larger 𝛼), the higher will be the effect of a retail price shock (consumer 
demand shock) on retail price volatility.  
To obtain an expression of the slaughterhouse price volatility, the derived demand function of the 
slaughterhouse is obtained by substituting equation (9) into (4). This leads to:  
𝑃𝑠 = (𝑏 − 𝛽𝑄𝑟 + 𝜀𝑟) (
(1−
𝜃𝑟𝑐
𝜖𝑟
)
(1+
𝜃𝑟𝑠
𝛾𝑠
)
) −
𝑐𝑟
(1+
𝜃𝑟𝑠
𝛾𝑠
)
         (13) 
Using equation (13), the profit function of the slaughterhouse can be expressed as: 
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𝜋𝑠 = ((𝑏 − 𝛽𝑄𝑟 + 𝜀𝑟) (
(1−
𝜃𝑟𝑐
𝜖𝑟
)
(1+
𝜃𝑟𝑠
𝛾𝑠
)
) −
𝑐𝑟
(1+
𝜃𝑟𝑠
𝛾𝑠
)
)  𝑞𝑠 − (𝑎 + 𝛼𝑄𝑓 + 𝜀𝑓)𝑞𝑠 −  𝑐𝑠𝑞𝑠    (14) 
Solving 𝑄𝑟 by maximizing the slaughterhouse’s profit with respect to quantity (𝑞𝑠), substituting the 
resulting expression back into equation (13), and taking variances on both sides results in the 
following equation for the slaughterhouse price volatility: 
𝜎𝑠
2 = 𝜎𝜀𝑟
2
(
 
 
 
(
(1−
𝜃𝑟𝑐
𝜖𝑟
)
(1+
𝜃𝑟𝑠
𝛾𝑠
)
) −
𝛽(
(1−
𝜃𝑟𝑐
𝜖𝑟
)
(1+
𝜃𝑟𝑠
𝛾𝑠
)
)
2
𝛽
(1−
𝜃𝑟𝑐
𝜖𝑟
)
(1+
𝜃𝑟𝑠
𝛾𝑠
)
+𝛼𝜃𝑠𝑓+𝛼
)
 
 
 
2
+ 𝜎
𝜀𝑓
2
(
 
 
𝛽(
(1−
𝜃𝑟𝑐
𝜖𝑟
)
(1+
𝜃𝑟𝑠
𝛾𝑠
)
)
𝛽
(1−
𝜃𝑟𝑐
𝜖𝑟
)
(1+
𝜃𝑟𝑠
𝛾𝑠
)
+𝛼𝜃𝑠𝑓+𝛼
)
 
 
2
      (15) 
Equation (15) shows that the response of the slaughterhouse price volatility to a retail price shock is 
much higher than the response to a farm price shock when retail market power is much higher than the 
slaughterhouse market power. This is particularly true when the inverse farm supply curve is steep (i.e. 
large 𝛼) and/or the inverse consumer demand curve is flatter (i.e. small 𝛽). The inelasticity of farm 
supply implied by a steep inverse farm supply curve causes large movements in the retail price 
whenever there is a demand shock (i.e. farm supply does not respond to the demand shock). This large 
movement or volatility in the retail price is then transmitted to the slaughterhouse stage. This is 
especially true if the retailers have strong market power.  
 
3.4. Empirical framework 
 
3.4.1. Price transmission  
 
This section investigates whether prices in the pork supply chain are transmitted consistent with a 
long-term cointegrating relationship as described by equation (4), (6) or (7). Time-series data can 
exhibit non-stationary behaviour that can lead to either a cointegrating relationship or a spurious 
regression (Brooks, 2008). Therefore, before investigating price transmissions between farm, 
slaughterhouse and retail stages, each of the price series is tested for stationarity. The Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller test, the Philips-Perron test and the Dickey-Fuller GLS test are applied to test the 
stationarity of the series. The null hypothesis in all tests is the presence of a unit root in the series (i.e. 
the series are non-stationary). If the series are all non-stationary in levels and are stationary when first-
differenced, the series are said to be integrated of order one and a linear combination of the prices may 
exist that is stationary (Brooks, 2006). This linear combination is termed as the cointegrating 
relationship that ties the price series in the long-run. If an equilibrium long-run cointegrating 
relationship(s) exist, deviations of prices from this equilibrium will be corrected in the short-run 
(Brooks, 2008).   
The Johansen test for cointegration (Johansen and Juselius, 1992) is used to test the presence of one or 
more cointegrating relationship between the price series. For price series that are integrated of order 
one, a vector error correction model (VECM) is used to model price transmissions consistent with a 
long-term cointegrating relationship. The VECM is specified as follows: 
∆𝑃𝑡 = 𝜋𝑃𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝑖
𝑝
𝑖=1 ∆𝑃𝑡−𝑖 +𝐷𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡         (16) 
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where, 𝑃𝑡 = [𝑃𝑡
𝑓 𝑃𝑡
𝑠 𝑃𝑡
𝑟]’ and 𝜀𝑡 = [𝜀𝑡
𝑓 𝜀𝑡
𝑠 𝜀𝑡
𝑟]’. 
In equation (16), 𝜋 is a 𝑘 × 𝑟 matrix where 𝑘 is the number of price series (here 3) and 𝑟 is the rank of 
the matrix 𝜋 which is also the number of cointegrating vectors. In equation (16), 𝜋 = 𝛼𝛽 where 𝛼 is a 
𝑘 × 𝑟 matrix of adjustment coefficients of each price series to deviations from the long-run 
cointegrating vectors and 𝛽 is a 𝑟 × 𝑘 matrix of cointegrating vectors.  
A maximum of two cointegrating vectors is possible for the three price series (i.e. farm, slaughter and 
retail prices). In the theoretical framework, possible cointegrating vector(s) between the prices are 
given by equations (4), (6) and (7). More specifically, if the series are found to be cointegrated, the 
matrix 𝛽𝑃𝑡−1 can take the form of one or two of the following equations: 
𝑃𝑡−1
𝑟 (1 −
𝜃𝑟𝑐
𝜖𝑟
) − 𝑃𝑡−1
𝑠 (1 +
𝜃𝑟𝑠
𝛾𝑠
) − 𝑐𝑟        (17) 
𝑃𝑡−1
𝑠 − 𝑃𝑡−1
𝑓 (1 +
𝜃𝑠𝑓
𝛾𝑓
) − 𝑐𝑠           (18) 
𝑃𝑡−1
𝑟 (1 −
𝜃𝑟𝑐
𝜖𝑟
) − 𝑃𝑡−1
𝑓 (1 +
𝜃𝑠𝑓
𝛾𝑓
) (1 +
𝜃𝑟𝑠
𝛾𝑠
) − 𝑐𝑠 (1 +
𝜃𝑟𝑠
𝛾𝑠
) − 𝑐𝑟      (19) 
In (17), (18) and (19), the terms in parentheses and the constants 𝑐𝑟 and 𝑐𝑠 are coefficients to be 
estimated. If the terms in parentheses are different from 1, it implies the presence of market power in 
the respective chain stages. For instance, in equation (19), if the term (1 −
𝜃𝑟𝑐
𝜖𝑟
) is different from 1, it 
implies the existence of retailer oligopoly power towards consumers. In equation (16), short-run price 
dynamics are captured by the 𝑖 coefficients. The lag length 𝑝 to capture short-run dynamics is 
determined by using various information criteria. A Granger causality test is conducted on the 𝑖 
coefficients to see if prices transmit in the short-run from one stage of the chain to another. 
Deterministic terms such as trends and seasonality are captured by the coefficients matrix .  
3.4.2. Price volatility transmission 
 
The theoretical models in equation (12) and (15) are empirically estimated to investigate the responses 
of slaughterhouse and retail price volatilities to farm and retail price shocks. In equation (12) and (15), 
the right hand terms other than 𝜎𝜀𝑟
2  and 𝜎𝑓
2 are coefficients to be estimated. In line with the theoretical 
models in (12) and (15), the retail price volatility is measured as the variance in the retail price. At 
time 𝑡, the retail price volatility 𝜎𝑟
2 in equation (12) is given by the square in the change in the retail 
price 𝜎𝑟,𝑡
2 = (∆𝑃𝑡
𝑟)2. Similarly, at time 𝑡, the slaughterhouse price volatility 𝜎𝑠
2 in equation (15) is 
given by 𝜎𝑠,𝑡
2 = (∆𝑃𝑡
𝑠)2. The retail price shock is proxied by the residual term 𝜀𝑡
𝑟 in the retail price 
equation of equation (16) and its variance is given by 𝜎𝜀𝑡𝑟
2 = (𝜀𝑡
𝑟)2  (i.e. 𝜎𝜀𝑟
2  in equation (12) and (15)).  
Similarly, the variance in the farm price shock 𝜎
𝜀𝑓
2  is given by  𝜎
𝜀𝑡
𝑓
2 = (𝜀𝑡
𝑓)2 (i.e. 𝜎
𝜀𝑓
2  in equation (12) 
and (15)) where 𝜀𝑡
𝑓
 is the residual term in the farm price equation of equation (16). The residual terms  
𝜀𝑡
𝑟 and 𝜀𝑡
𝑓
 are assumed to have a mean of zero.  
Equation (12) and (15) are estimated using OLS. More formally, the estimated equations are specified 
as follows: 
𝜎𝑟,𝑡
2 = 𝑎𝑟𝜎𝜀𝑡𝑟
2 + 𝑏𝑟𝜎𝜀𝑡
𝑓
2 + 𝑢𝑟,𝑡          (20) 
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𝜎𝑠,𝑡
2 = 𝑎𝑠𝜎𝜀𝑡𝑟
2 + 𝑏𝑠𝜎𝜀𝑡
𝑓
2 + 𝑢𝑠,𝑡          (21) 
In the above equations, 𝑎𝑟 and 𝑎𝑠 are coefficients measuring the effects of the variance in retail price 
shocks on slaughterhouse and retail price volatilities, respectively. The effects of the variance in farm 
price shocks on slaughterhouse and retail price volatilities are measured by the coefficients 𝑏𝑟 and 𝑏𝑠, 
respectively. In line with the theoretical models in equation (12) and (15), the test for the presence of 
market power in the German fresh pork supply chain is made by investigating whether retail and 
slaughterhouse retail price volatilities respond more to retail price shocks than to farm price shocks. 
More specifically, 𝑎𝑟 significantly larger than  𝑏𝑟, and 𝑎𝑠 significantly larger than  𝑏𝑠 may indicate 
that retail market power is larger than slaughterhouse market power. 
 
3.5. Data 
 
The empirical framework is applied using monthly price data from January 2000 to December 2011 
along the German fresh pork supply chain. Monthly farm pig prices are obtained from the Federal 
Institute of Agriculture and Food in Bonn (Bundesanstalt für Landwirtschaft und Ernährung). The 
farm prices are a weighted average price of all slaughter pigs in Germany (according to European 
carcass classes S,E,U,R,O,P). Slaughterhouse pork prices are proxied by wholesale pork prices per kg 
collected on the meat wholesale market in Hamburg (FleischGroßmarkt Hamburg). These prices are a 
simple average of prices of different pork cuts. The retail price data from 2004 to 2011 are collected 
by the GfK - consumer panel. The pre-2004 retail prices were collected through special price 
collectors from the Agricultural Market Information Company in Bonn who visited several stores in 
Germany to collect product prices. The retail prices are a simple average of different pork cuts. While 
the farm and slaughterhouse prices exclude VAT, the retail prices include VAT. All prices are 
expressed in euro per kilogram. Table 3.1 below presents the summary statistics of prices. The 
evolution of prices over time is presented in Figure 3.2. 
 
Table 3.1 – Summary statistics of farm, slaughterhouse and retail prices 
 Farm (𝑃𝑡
𝑓
) Slaughterhouse (𝑃𝑡
𝑠) Retail (𝑃𝑡
𝑟) 
 Mean (€/kg)1  1.41  2.02  5.83 
 Maximum (€/kg)  1.99  2.70  6.47 
 Minimum (€/kg)  1.02  1.60  5.29 
 Std. Dev.  0.16  0.23  0.26 
 Observations  144  144  144 
1
Prices are in euro per kilogram of slaughter weight  
  
36 
 
 
Figure 3.2 –Monthly plots of prices in the German fresh pork supply chain 
 
3.6. Results and discussion 
 
3.6.1. Price transmission  
 
Table 3.2 reports the results of the unit root tests. All three tests show that the null of non-stationarity 
could not be rejected at the 1% critical level for all prices in levels. Unit root tests on first differences 
show that all three prices are stationary in first differences at the 1% critical level, implying that the 
three price series are integrated of order one. It further implies that a linear combination of the three 
prices may exist that is stationary.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11
Farm Slaughterhouse Retail
Pr
ic
es
 in
 E
ur
o/
kg
Years
37 
 
Table 3.2 – Unit root tests 
Unit root tests
1 
Farm
2
  Slaughterhouse  Retail  
In levels:    
Augmented Dickey-Fuller -3.92** -2.85 -2.49 
Philips-Perron -3.83** -3.33 -2.79 
Dickey-Fuller GLS -2.84 -2.64 -2.08 
In first differences:    
Augmented Dickey-Fuller -10.33* -12.35* -12.83* 
Philips-Perron -10.57* -12.39* -12.83* 
Dickey-Fuller GLS -7.48* -3.74* -11.74* 
1
All unit root tests in levels include a trend and an intercept. The trend is removed for tests on first differences 
for all tests except for the Dickey-Fuller GLS test on farm and slaughterhouse first differences. Lag lengths were 
selected using the Schwartz information criterion. The asterisks * and ** refer to significance at the 1% and 5% 
levels, respectively.  
2
For farm price levels, the null of non-stationarity was not rejected at the 1% level of significance in case of the 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller and the  Philips-Perron tests 
 
A Johansen cointegration test was conducted to check the presence of cointegrating relations. To select 
the lag length for the test, a VAR in levels was first estimated and its lag length was selected based on 
various information criteria. The final prediction error, Akaike information criterion and Hannan-
Quinn information criterion all suggested a lag length of two (results can be obtained from the authors 
upon request). The cointegration test was therefore conducted using a lag length of one (one lag less 
than the VAR in levels). The results of the Johansen cointegration test on the presence of cointegrating 
relations are reported in Table 3.3. 
Table 3.3 – Johansen cointegration test 
No. of cointegrating relations
1 
Trace statistic Max-Eigen statistic 
None 64.14 45.73 
At most 1 18.40 13.06
ǂ 
At most 2 5.34  5.34 
1
The test was conducted by including a constant in the cointegrating relations and in the VAR. The 
ǂ 
sign 
indicates the value of the test statistic at which the null hypothesis is accepted.  
In the Johansen cointegration test, constants were included in the VAR to account for linear trends in 
the series. Constants were included in the cointegrating relations in line with the theoretical 
cointegrating relations provided in equations (4), (6) and (7). Results for the trace statistic imply that 
all three series are stationary in levels. This contradicts results of the unit root tests reported in Table 
3.2. Results for the maximum eigenvalue statistic suggest that there is one cointegrating relation. We 
opt for the result provided by the max. eigenvalue statistic as this is in line with the unit root tests. The 
estimation result of the VECM with one cointegrating relation is provided in Table 3.4.   
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The VECM was first estimated with a lag length of one and seasonality terms. Nevertheless, since the 
Lagrange Multiplier autocorrelation test suggested the presence of autocorrelation in the residuals, a 
lag length of five was added to the model. According to Parker and Shonkwiler (2014), the German 
hog cycle has an approximate duration of four years. However, price cycles were not taken into 
account in the model due to the short length (11 years) of the data series available for this paper. 
Results should therefore be interpreted with caution. Seasonality terms in Table 3.4 are particularly 
significant in the farm and retail price equations. Since the 12
th
 month was dropped from the 
equations, the seasonality coefficients can be interpreted as the change of prices relative to the 12
th
 
month. The results in the farm equation show that farm prices increase in the 2
nd
 and 6
th
 month relative 
to the 12
th
 month. This can be associated with the tightening up of supply in those months. However, 
retail prices are significantly lower in all months relative to the 12
th
 month. This latter result can be 
associated with the large demand for pork meat the 12
th
 month (for instance due to Christmas 
holidays) and therefore high prices relative to the rest of the year. Because the Johansen cointegration 
test suggested one cointegrating relation, a Likelihood Ratio coefficient restriction test was applied to 
the VECM to identify the cointegrating relation suggested by theory (given by equation (4), (6) or (7)). 
The result of this test (obtainable upon request from the authors) identified equation (7) as the long-run 
cointegrating relation.   
Results in Table 3.4 show that the retail and farm prices are cointegrated and therefore are driven by 
similar forces in the long-run. This result indicates that retail and farm prices are the main price setters 
in the chain. The result is plausible due to the fact that pig prices are the main reference prices for pork 
meat prices in the chain. The high concentration of the retail sector (Anders, 2008) suggests this chain 
actor can be considered as a price setter. As shown in Table 3.4, the adjustment coefficients 
(coefficients on 𝛽𝑃𝑡−1 in Table 3.4) indicate that retail price deviations from the long-run equilibrium 
relation (𝑝𝑡−1
𝑟 = 3.06 𝑝𝑡−1
𝑓 + 1.52 ) are corrected every month. However, monthly farm price 
deviations from the long-run equilibrium are not corrected each month as indicated by the non-
significant adjustment coefficient in the farm price equation. This result indicates the important role 
that the retail sector plays in maintaining the long-term price equilibrium relation. In Table 3.4, the 
adjustment coefficient in the slaughterhouse price equation is statistically significant and positive. The 
sign of the adjustment coefficient indicates that at time 𝑡 − 1, when the farm price increases 
(decreases) relative to the equilibrium relation, the slaughterhouse price also increases (decreases); 
however, the slaughterhouse price decreases (increases) back at time 𝑡. The result indicates a 
contemporaneous relationship between the farm and slaughterhouse prices.  
The cointegrating vector 𝑝𝑡−1
𝑟 − 3.06 𝑝𝑡−1
𝑓 − 1.52 can also be estimated without normalizing with 
respect to any price. Such estimation gives the cointegrating vector 3.42𝑝𝑡−1
𝑟 = 10.48𝑝𝑡−1
𝑓 + 5.20. 
This vector results from estimating equation (7) of the theoretical framework. Since we have (1 +
𝜃𝑠𝑓
𝛾𝑓
) (1 +
𝜃𝑟𝑠
𝛾𝑠
) ≠ 1 (i.e. 10.48), this suggests the presence of oligopsony power in the German pork 
chain (either slaughterhouse towards farm or retail towards slaughterhouse or both). Similarly, since 
(1 −
𝜃𝑟𝑐
𝜖𝑟
) ≠ 1 (i.e. 3.42), this suggests the presence of oligopoly power of the retailer towards 
consumers. The result on oligopsony power confirms Anders (2008) and Weber and Anders (2007) 
who state that German retailers may be using market power to mark-down margins of slaughterhouses. 
The result also supports the assertion made by Bakucs et al. (2009) that slaughterhouses possess 
regional market power towards farmers. Although the role of livestock wholesalers was not modelled 
in this paper, the above result also indicates that the price pressure that slaughterhouses put on farm 
prices could not be curtailed by German livestock wholesalers who act as intermediaries between the 
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farm and slaughterhouse stages. It should however be noted that, although the theoretical model 
presented in equation (7) makes a distinction between the oligopsony power exercised at the 
slaughterhouse level from that exercised at the retail level, the estimated empirical model cannot make 
that distinction (i.e. the term (1 +
𝜃𝑠𝑓
𝛾𝑓
) (1 +
𝜃𝑟𝑠
𝛾𝑠
) in equation (16) is a single parameter). The presence 
of oligopoly power of retailers towards consumers is rather unexpected given the strong price 
competition that exists between retailers (Anders, 2008; Weber and Anders, 2007). The result 
indicates that, although retailers compete on keeping prices as low as possible, they still charge prices 
above marginal costs. Had the German retail market been perfectly competitive, a rational expectation 
would be that retailers would charge a price equal to marginal cost. 
Table 3.4 – Price transmission (VECM) 
Independent variables
1 
∆𝑃𝑡
𝑓   ∆𝑃𝑡
𝑠 ∆𝑃𝑡
𝑟 
𝛽𝑃𝑡−1 0.02 (0.02)  0.06 (0.03)** -0.13 (0.02)** 
∆𝑝𝑡−1
𝑓    0.40 (0.14)**  0.61 (0.20)**  0.19 (0.14) 
∆𝑝𝑡−1
𝑠    -0.17 (0.09) -0.30 (0.12)**  0.02 (0.10) 
∆𝑝𝑡−1
𝑟    -0.21 (0.08)** -0.11 (0.12) -0.34 (0.09)** 
∆𝑝𝑡−5
𝑓    0.01 (0.13)  0.13 (0.19)  0.05 (0.14) 
∆𝑝𝑡−5
𝑠    0.25 (0.09)**  0.18 (0.12)  0.06 (0.09) 
∆𝑝𝑡−5
𝑟    -0.02 (0.08) -0.03 (0.11) -0.17 (0.08) 
𝑆1 -0.04 (0.03) -0.17 (0.04)** -0.17 (0.03)** 
𝑆2 0.06 (0.03)** -0.02(0.04) -0.13 (0.03)** 
𝑆3 0.04 (0.03) -0.00 (0.04) -0.13 (0.03)** 
𝑆4 -0.01 (0.03) -0.03 (0.04) -0.07 (0.03)** 
𝑆5 0.05 (0.03)  0.02 (0.04) -0.08 (0.03) 
𝑆6 0.09 (0.03)**  0.06 (0.04) -0.12 (0.03)** 
𝑆7 0.01 (0.03) -0.02 (0.04) -0.15 (0.03)** 
𝑆8 0.03 (0.03)  0.04 (0.04) -0.15 (0.03)** 
𝑆9 -0.01 (0.03)  0.02 (0.04) -0.14 (0.03)** 
𝑆10 -0.05 (0.03) -0.05 (0.04) -0.14 (0.03)** 
𝑆11 0.01 (0.03)  0.00 (0.04) -0.11 (0.03)** 
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 -0.01 (0.02)  0.01 (0.03)  0.12 (0.02)** 
Cointegrating vector 
(𝛽𝑃𝑡−1) 
𝑃𝑡−1
𝑟 − 3.06∗∗ 𝑃𝑡−1
𝑓 − 1.52  
        (−9.61) 
1
The asterisk ** indicates significant values at the 5% level. Standard errors are in parentheses. A lag length of 1 
was first selected based on the suggestion of three information criteria (i.e. final prediction error, Akaike 
information criterion and Hannan-Quinn information criterion). A lag length of 5 was added to remove 
autocorrelation in the residuals.  
In Table 3.4, seasonality terms are significant particularly in the farm and retail price equations. Since 
the 12
th
 month (December) was dropped from the equations, the seasonality coefficients can be 
interpreted as the change of prices relative to prices in December. The results in the farm price 
equation show that farm prices increase in the 2
nd
 (February) and 6
th
 (June) months relative to farm 
prices in the December. The higher farm prices in February and June can be associated with the low 
supply of pigs in those two periods (post-Christmas and Easter holidays, respectively). Retail prices on 
the other hand drop in those two months compared to prices in the 12
th
 month. The lower retail prices 
in those two months can be due to promotional price reductions by retailers to induce an increase in 
consumer demand.  
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Granger causality tests were conducted to test for short-run price transmission. The results of these 
tests are reported in Table 3.5 below. The tests show that, in the short-run, prices transmit from the 
farm to the slaughterhouse stage and vice versa. However, no short-run transmission is detected 
between the slaughterhouse and retail prices. The latter result can be attributed to the use of long-term 
contracts between slaughterhouses and retailers. The absence of transmission from the slaughterhouse 
to the retail stage also confirms the finding on the rigidity of retail prices advanced by Weber and 
Anders (2007). The Granger causality test shows that retail prices are not affected by short-term 
changes in farm prices. In Table 3.4, it was shown that retail prices correct price deviations from the 
long-run equilibrium relation. Coupled with the result from the Granger causality tests, this suggests 
that the retail price only corrects its own deviations from the equilibrium and does not adjust to the 
deviations of the equilibrium farm price. A rather surprising result is the short-run transmission of 
prices from the retail to the farm stage given the presence of slaughterhouses as intermediaries. This 
result is possibly caused by the presence of retailers like REWE and EDEKA that have integrated 
backwards to the slaughtering and processing stages (European Commission, 2010) and therefore deal 
directly with farmers.   
Table 3.5 – Granger causality test results 
 
To farm
1 
To slaughterhouse  To retail 
From farm NA
2 
10.11** 1.67 
From slaughterhouse 3.65* NA 0.05 
From retail  6.28** 0.82 NA 
1
The asterisk ** indicates significant values at the 5% level. Standard errors are in parentheses. Reported values 
are Wald statistics.  
2
NA: Not applicable 
 
3.6.2. Price volatility transmission 
 
Estimation results of equation (20) and (21) are reported in Table 3.6 below. The results show that 
retail price shocks significantly affect retail price volatility. However, farm price shocks do not 
significantly affect retail price volatility. Moreover, the magnitude of the coefficient on retail price 
shocks (𝜎𝜀𝑟,𝑡
2 ) is much larger than that on farm price shocks (𝜎
𝜀𝑓,𝑡
2 ). As suggested in the theoretical 
framework (equation (12) and (15)), these results suggest that German retailers may be possessing 
stronger market power relative to slaughterhouses. The results also imply a rather steep inverse farm 
supply curve, which in turn implies a price inelastic farm supply. This assertion is consistent with the 
findings of Bakucs et al. (2009) on the price inelasticity of farm pig supply in Germany. The absence 
of farm price shock transmission to the retail stage can be an indication of the limited price negotiation 
power of slaughterhouses. This can be detrimental to slaughterhouses in case of a sudden increase in 
farm prices as margins can be squeezed. It was hypothesized based on equation (12) that a stronger 
slaughterhouse market power can increase the response of the retail price volatility to farm price 
shocks. Results in Table 3.6 indicate however that German slaughterhouses may not possess enough 
countervailing power. Consumers can benefit from the non-transmission of farm price shocks as prices 
will be stable. However, they can loose from the non-transmission of sudden farm price drops. 
Similar to the retail price volatility equation, the magnitude of the coefficient on retail price shocks 
(𝜎𝜀𝑟,𝑡
2 ) is much larger than that on farm price shocks (𝜎
𝜀𝑓,𝑡
2 ) in the slaughterhouse price volatility 
equation. The coefficient on farm price shocks is also not statistically significant. These results 
provide further evidence that German retailers may be possessing stronger market power relative to 
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slaughterhouses. The results also provide further evidence that farm supply is inelastic. According to 
Rabobank (2011), retailers renegotiate contracts with their suppliers mainly in case of a sudden rise in 
input costs. In contrast, results of this chapter suggest that retailers may not be renegotiating contracts 
in response to input price shocks. Contrasting the results in Table 3.6 with those in Table 3.5, the fact 
that “predictable” farm price changes (Table 3.5) transmit in the short-run to the slaughterhouse stage 
while the “unpredictable” farm price changes (Table 3.6) do not can be an indication that retailers may 
be renegotiating contracts with slaughterhouses only in responses to “predictable” farm price changes. 
Results show on the other hand that retailers may be renegotiating contracts in response to sudden 
demand shocks as evidenced by the response of slaughterhouse price volatility to retail price shocks. 
While the transmission of a sudden drop in the retail price may harm slaughterhouses and farmers, the 
transmission of a sudden increase in retail prices can benefit them.  
The non-transmission of farm price volatility to the retail stage is in line with assertions made in 
previous studies (for instance, Alexandri (2011) and Serra (2011))  It should be noted however that the 
theoretical relationship between market power and price volatility transmission is valid under 
restrictive conditions. Such conditions include for instance the linear specification of the inverse farm 
supply and consumer demand functions. The elasticities of consumer demand and farm supply also 
determine the theoretical relationship between market power and price volatility transmission. To our 
knowledge, this chapter is the first to examine price volatility transmission along the German fresh 
pork supply chain. Nevertheless, results of this paper can still be contrasted to the claims made by 
Weber and Anders (2007) about the rigidity of German meat retail prices. While this chapter finds that 
German retail pork prices are rigid to farm price shocks (see Table 3.6), it finds that they are not rigid 
to retail price shocks (proxy for consumer demand shocks). Therefore, this paper did not support the 
finding of Weber and Anders (2007) that German retail meat prices are rigid. The difference in the 
approach followed in the two papers should however be noted. The approach of Weber and Anders 
(2007) consisted of calculating the number of weeks meat prices in retail stores remain unchanged 
while this paper investigated the response of retail (and slaughterhouse) price volatility to retail and 
farm price shocks. The extent to which price volatility transmits in the chain can also depend on 
whether the food product is a premium or a bulk product (Assefa et al., 2016). Assefa et al. (2016) 
showed that price increases in premium products can easily be transmitted to consumers. Therefore, 
the transmission of farm price shocks can be detected if one used data for premium pork cuts. 
Although this chapter did not distinguish between types of meat cuts, differentiating the price 
volatility transmission analysis between premium and bulk products can be an interesting avenue for 
future research. 
Besides implying the degree of market power in the chain, results reported in Table 3.6 also indicate 
that demand shocks are important sources of price volatility in the German fresh pork supply chain. 
The fact that retail price shocks transmit to the upstream stages of the chain (slaughterhouse, farm) 
shows that these upstream stages can be easily exposed to price shocks caused by news on animal 
health scares. News of food scares results in consumer panic and loss of confidence in the safety of 
consuming meat products (Feindt and Kleinschmit, 2011; Kupferschmidt, 2011; Serra, 2011; Thomson 
et al., 2012) and therefore in lower meat prices. The transmission of the sudden drop in retail prices 
can in turn be harmful to farmers. One point worth noting is the low R
2
 of the slaughterhouse volatility 
equation. The low R
2 
is an indication that additional factors unaccounted in the model cause the 
slaughterhouse price volatility to increase. Other factors can include input costs other than pigs. 
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Table 3.6 - Price volatility transmission (OLS) 
Independent variables
1 
𝜎𝑟,𝑡
2  𝜎𝑠,𝑡
2  
𝜎𝜀𝑟,𝑡
2  1.57(0.37)** 1.27(0.58)** 
𝜎
𝜀𝑓,𝑡
2  0.40 (0.39) 0.63 (0.80) 
R
2 
0.41 0.02 
1
The asterisk ** indicates significant values at the 5% level. Standard errors are in parentheses. The equation for 
the retail price variance included a one lag moving average term (𝑢𝑟,𝑡−1) to correct for autocorrelation of 
residuals. Standard errors for the retail price variance equation are White robust standard errors. 
 
3.7. Conclusions  
 
This paper investigated the relationship between price volatility transmission and market power in the 
German fresh pork supply chain. The empirical analysis used monthly farm, slaughterhouse and retail 
prices. Price transmission along the chain was investigated by estimating a vector error correction 
model. Next, price volatility transmissions were investigated through least square regressions using 
price residuals from the first step. Estimation was based on theoretical models developed in order to 
relate both types of transmissions with the degree of market power. Results from the price 
transmission analysis showed that, while farm and slaughterhouse prices transmitted bi-directionally in 
the short-run, retail prices were found to be irresponsive to short-term price changes coming from the 
farm and slaughterhouse stages. The results further established a long-run cointegrating relationship 
between the farm and retail prices indicating that the two prices followed the same long-run trend. The 
slaughterhouse price adjusted to this equilibrium relationship. The analysis on price volatility 
transmissions showed that both slaughterhouse and retail price volatilities do not respond to farm price 
shocks. However, price volatilities in both stages responded to retail price shocks.  
The price transmission analysis suggested the existence of slaughterhouse oligopsony and retail 
oligopsony/oligopoly power. Although German retailers operate in a market that is characterised by 
strong price competition, the cointegration analysis revealed that retailers have oligopoly market 
power and may therefore be charging consumer prices above marginal costs. The cointegration 
analysis also showed that oligopsony power results in the marking down of input prices. Market power 
in the German fresh pork supply chain was also reflected in the results from the price volatility 
transmission analysis. Results indicated that retailers might be using market power to curtail the 
transmission of farm price shocks while they transmit retail price shocks backwards into the chain. 
Retail market power limits the transmission of both price and price volatility transmission in the chain. 
Although the transmission of price volatility is undesirable, the non-transmission of price volatility can 
also be undesirable. For instance, while the non-transmission of a sudden farm price drop to 
consumers can harm consumers, the non-transmission of a sudden consumer price rise to the farm 
stage can harm farms. Therefore, a competitive market whereby both predictable and non-predictable 
price signals flow though the chain should be encouraged. The negative effects of price volatility 
transmissions can be minimized through policy measures that support the price risk management 
initiatives of chain actors. 
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Abstract 
Agricultural prices in European food markets have become more volatile over the past decade 
exposing agribusinesses to risk and uncertainty. This chapter goes beyond the farm stage and explores 
through interviews the price risk perceptions and management strategies in multiple stages of the food 
supply chain. Respondents were farmers, wholesalers, processors, and retailers in six European food 
supply chains. Results show that price risk management strategies in EU food chains are diverse and 
well beyond traditional instruments such as futures and forward contracts. We further find that 
deviations of prices by more than 10 to 15 % from expected levels were perceived as price volatility 
by a majority of the chain actors. The qualitative exploratory and comparative approaches followed in 
this chapter provide new insights on price risk management, a deeper understanding of price risk 
perceptions and highlights the interrelation of price risk management decisions with other business 
decisions. 
Keywords: Price risk, perceptions, management strategies, European Union, exploratory, interviews, 
food supply chains. 
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
Prices in European agricultural markets have become increasingly volatile in the past decade 
(Tangermann, 2011). The decoupling of farm income supports through successive reforms of the 
Common Agricultural Policy has led to a market oriented EU (European Union) farm sector that is 
increasingly exposed to market price volatility (Bardaji et al., 2011). Price volatility implies 
uncertainty which may in turn lead to reduced investment in productive inputs and reduced supply by 
farmers (Seal and Shonkwiler, 1987; Rezitis and Stavropoulos, 2009; Sckokai and Moro, 2009). The 
negative effects of price volatility also extend to actors in the downstream stages of food supply 
chains. According to a report by Rabobank (2011), the downstream stages of the food supply chain are 
increasingly faced with price and supply uncertainty and are obliged to alter their sourcing strategies to 
mitigate the negative effects. Food security of consumers spending a large share of their income on 
food is also threatened by price volatility (Hernandez et al., 2013). The above assertions suggest that 
managing the risk from price volatility should be done at all levels of the food supply chains. 
Risk perception and management among farmers has been extensively investigated within the current 
literature (see for instance Martin, 1996; Meuwissen et al., 2001; Hall et al., 2003; Bergfjord, 2009). 
Although the literature found that farmers perceive price risk as an important source of agricultural 
risk, it failed to explore the price risk management strategies farmers adopt in practise. This is because 
the studies relied on structured questionnaires that pre-specified strategies instead of asking farmers 
which strategies they use in practise. The pre-specified strategies are in general limited to traditional 
instruments such as hedging in derivative markets, forward contracts, and diversification. To our 
knowledge, the studies by Heyder et al. (2010) and of von Davier et al. (2010) were the only ones that 
addressed price risk and its management in downstream stages of the food supply chain. Similar to the 
farm level studies, these two studies also failed to explore actual price risk management practises as 
they also relied on structured questionnaires. Furthermore, the structured questionnaires generally 
ascribe a particular strategy to a particular source of risk (e.g. futures contracts for volatile prices) 
(Van Winsen et al., 2013). This undermines the discovery of other strategies that would not normally 
be considered solutions to that particular source of risk while they could in fact be solutions. A more 
48 
 
open-ended exploratory approach to data collection could uncover price risk management strategies 
previously unexplored in previous quantitative studies.   
Although assessing farmers’ risk perception in a categorical and quantitative manner is analytically 
convenient, it is unnatural for farmers to think about risk in this manner (Van Winsen et al., 2013). 
Price risk perception can be better understood with more open-ended approaches to data collection. 
Although it is generally agreed that price volatility implies risk, it is not clear whether it is perceived 
as such by food chain actors. This paper will explore through forty-two semi-structured interviews the 
price volatility perceptions and management strategies of farmers, wholesalers, processors and 
retailers in six EU food supply chains. The six chains are the Bulgarian wheat, French wheat, German 
pork, Dutch cheese, Dutch tomato, and Spanish tomato supply chains. Actors’ price risk perception is 
explored with respect to two elements. The first is the percentage price deviation from expected values 
which actors perceive as price volatility. The second element concerns the factors that determine 
whether perceived price volatility is perceived as risky. Exploring actors’ perceptions of price risk 
helps to better understand actors’ choices of price risk management strategies.  
The benefits of qualitative exploratory research for the field of agricultural risk management are 
demonstrated in this chapter. By qualitatively exploring food chain actors’ price risk management 
strategies, this chapter informs quantitative risk management research on previously unexplored and 
non-traditional price risk management practises. Future studies can then investigate the adoption level 
of the explored strategies through large scale surveys that use an up-to-date list of price risk 
management strategies in their questionnaires. The usefulness of comparative methodological 
approaches in risk management studies are further demonstrated in this chapter. The comparison of 
perceptions and strategies across different food chains and different stages of the chains highlights the 
context specific nature of price risk management. Findings of this research are also informative to 
policy makers. Chain actors’ price risk perceptions can help define ‘excessive’ level of price volatility 
needed for policy intervention. On the other hand, gaps in the identified strategies inform policy 
makers of where in chain policy intervention is needed.     
In the remainder of this paper, section 4.2 briefly discuss related agricultural risk management 
researches, section 4.3 details the methodological approaches used in this chapter, section 4.4 presents 
the results and section 4.5 discusses the results. Section 4.6 concludes the chapter and draws research 
and policy implications. 
 
4.2. Previous research 
 
Previous research on risk perceptions and management strategies in the agricultural sector has mainly 
focused on the farm stage. Wilson et al. (1987) defined risk perception as “the awareness of the factors 
in the social and economic environment that create risk and the degree to which one factor is more 
critical than the other”. This definition is shared by most of the studies that investigated farmers’ risk 
perceptions. The methodological approach these studies followed is to list a set of possible sources of 
agricultural risks and ask farmers to rate the importance of each source of risk using Likert scales (for 
instance, Martin (1996), Meuwissen et al. (2001), Hall et al. (2003), Bergfjord (2009), Wilson et al. 
(1987), Patrick et al. (1985), Knutson et al. (1998), Greinier et al. (2009)). A common finding of these 
studies is the high score that farmers assign to price risk (for instance, Meuwissen et al. (2001), 
Bergfjord (2009), Wilson et al. (1987), Patrick et al. (1985), Knutson et al. (1998)). The inconsistency 
in the terminologies the authors use to define price risk reflects, nevertheless, a lack of agreement 
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about what price risk really is. Some of the terms used by the authors are “price changes” (Martin, 
1996), “declining prices” (Greinier et al., 2009), and “price volatility” (Morales et al., 2009). What 
farmers perceive as price risk therefore remains unclear. 
The above cited studies adopted a similar approach to assess farmers’ risk management strategies. 
Farmers were presented with a list of pre-specified risk management strategies and asked to rate the 
importance or the relevance of each strategy using Likert scales. The main price risk management 
strategies these studies considered were forward contracts, futures and options, and off-farm and on-
farm diversification. The scores assigned to the risk sources and those assigned to the risk 
management strategies were then compared. Surprisingly, many authors did not find a match between 
the score assigned to price risk and those assigned to the considered price risk management strategies 
(for instance, Martin (1996), Meuwissen et al. (2001), Hall et al. (2003); Bergfjord (2009)). Although 
price risk ranked at the top of the list of risk sources, the importance or relevance scores assigned to 
the listed price risk management strategies were unexpectedly low. This raises the question whether 
the strategies considered are indeed the strategies farmers adopt to deal with price risk. The structured 
nature of the questionnaires used in these studies restricts the identification of the possible set of 
strategies that farmers use in practice. 
The only two studies that investigated the price risk perceptions and management strategies of actors 
downstream from the farm stage are those of Heyder et al. (2010) and von Davier et al. (2010). Heyder 
et al. (2010), who surveyed German agribusiness firms, used actors’ expectations of price volatility 
developments in the next five years as a measure of perceived price risk. Similar to farm-level studies, 
a set of pre-defined price risk management strategies were presented to the actors who then had to 
evaluate the relevance of each strategy using Likert scales. The study by von Davier et al. (2010) 
relied on a media content analysis to identify perceptions about causes and developments of price risk 
and suggested management strategies. A limitation of both studies is that they failed to explore actual 
management strategies adopted by firms. Another limitation is that these studies did not investigate the 
actual levels of price volatility that chain actors perceived as risky.  
In summary, previous research provides limited evidence on actual price risk perceptions and 
management strategies in the chain. The reliance on structured questionnaires limits the opportunity to 
explore actual practices. The downstream sector of the chain has remained overlooked in previous 
research, as the focus has been mainly on the farm sector. These gaps in the literature are addressed in 
this research by following an exploratory methodological approach and by including the downstream 
stages of the chain in the analyses. 
 
4.3. Materials and methods 
 
4.3.1. Exploration through in-depth interviews 
 
Exploration is used as a methodological approach “when a group, process, activity or situation has 
received little or no systematic empirical scrutiny or has been largely examined using prediction and 
control rather than flexibility and open-mindedness” (Stebbins, 2001). Previous research has given 
little attention to the price risk perceptions and management strategies of actors in food supply chains. 
At the farm stage, the structured nature of the questionnaires distributed to farmers restricts the 
identification of the set of strategies farmers adopt in practice. An exploratory approach was therefore 
deemed appropriate to investigate chain actors’ price risk perceptions and management strategies. 
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Data was collected using in-depth interviews with semi-structured questions. Some structure was 
imposed on the questions to guide the interview process and keep the focus on the key topics that were 
the subjects of the investigation. The imposed structure also assured some consistency in the questions 
across respondents. The questions, nevertheless, allowed some room for probing and in-depth inquiry. 
Probing was facilitated by including ‘non-standardized’ or semi-structured questions. Non-
standardization in interviews is “most helpful when exploring new topics, sensitive [...] issues, and 
when the businesses are highly variable in their characteristics” (Healey and Rawlinson, 1993). The 
newness of the topic of price risk perceptions and management strategies, the sensitive nature of 
disclosing price related business strategies, and the wide ranging types of companies included in this 
chapter justified the use of semi-structured interviews. 
 
4.3.2. Sample selection 
 
A sample was constructed with representatives from five EU countries, four types of food products, 
four stages of the food supply chain, and different types of agribusinesses. Although the selected 
sample is not a statistically representative one, it accounts for the diversity in EU food chains in terms 
of chain structure and type of agribusinesses. The process of selecting respondents followed a series of 
steps. In the first step, we selected four classes of food products, namely, meat, dairy, cereals, and 
vegetables. Next, we selected food chains per class of food product, i.e. the fresh pork, cheese, wheat-
bread, and fresh tomato supply chains. The selection of these chains further distinguishes between 
supply chains of fresh and processed food products.  
In a third step, selected indicators were used to choose the EU countries for which the above food 
supply chains will be investigated. The final food chains selected were the Dutch cheese, Dutch 
tomato, German pork, French wheat, Bulgarian wheat, and Spanish tomato supply chains. The 
indicators used to select these chains were the shares of area used for tomatoes in total land for fresh 
vegetables, shares of pig production in total livestock production, shares of cheese production in raw 
milk collected, and shares of wheat in total cereal production. Data compiled from the Eurostat on 
production and area of agricultural land during the period 2006 to 2013 was used to calculate the 
indicators. These indicators were used to rank the countries and determine the level of importance of 
each product in each country.  
The fourth step in the sample selection process involved the selection of individual firms along each of 
the selected chains. Prior to selecting the firms, interviews were conducted with experts in each of the 
six supply chains. The expert interviews inquired about the key characteristics of the investigated 
supply chains. Respondent firms were then selected by taking into account these chain characteristics. 
The key chain characteristics that guided the selection of the respondents were membership in a 
cooperative/producer organization (for farms), ownership structure (private versus cooperative for the 
wholesale and processing sectors), size of farm/firm, and export orientation.  The experts were also 
asked to provide contact addresses of potential interviewees. Additional addresses of interviewees 
were obtained through a snowball process where the initial respondents were asked if they knew other 
people who would be interested in participating in the interviews.   
The respondents were selected along the four stages of the food supply chain, i.e. farm, wholesale, 
processing and retail. The initial objective was to select at least two respondents per chain stage to 
diversify the respondents based on the above characteristics (for example, one farmer who is member 
of a cooperative versus one who is not). It was not, however, possible to reach any respondents for 
some of the chain stages. In particular, German pig slaughterhouses/processors and retailers were often 
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not willing to participate, most likely because price related strategies are confidential in these 
companies. The respondents at the farm stage were farm owners, whereas the respondents at the other 
stages were more diverse and included general managers, sales managers, sourcing managers, and 
financial directors. The sample selection process resulted in the selection of a total of 42 people for the 
interviews. The respondents were 15 farmers, 15 wholesalers, 9 processors, and 3 retailers. Table 4.1 
and 2 summarize the characteristics of the participant farms and companies, respectively. 
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Table 4.1 - Characteristics of participant farms  
 
 BW
1
 (n=2) FW (n=2) GP (n=2) DC (n=3) DT (n=3) ST (n=3) 
Farm
2
 size       
Total land size 
 (in ha) 
      
<100 1 0     
100 – 150 0 1     
>150 1 1     
Number of fattening 
pig places 
      
< 2000   1    
>2000   1    
Number of milking 
cows 
      
< 100    0   
100 -150    1   
>150    2   
Size of greenhouse 
area (in ha) 
      
<10     3 1 
10-15     0 1 
> 15     0 1 
Member of a 
cooperative 
      
Yes 1 2 0 3 2 1 
No  1 0 2 0 1 2 
1
 BW: Bulgarian wheat chain, FW: French wheat chain, GP: German pork chain, DC: Dutch cheese chain, DT: Dutch tomato chain, ST: Spanish tomato chain 
2
 Farmers source pig feed in GP and cattle feed in DC. Farmers sell wheat in BW and FW, pigs in GP, milk in DC and tomatoes in DT and ST. 
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Table 4.2 - Characteristics of participant wholesalers, processors and retailers 
 
 Wholesale
1
 (n=15)  Processing
2
 (n=9)  Retail
3
 (n=3) 
 BW 
n=3 
FW 
n=1 
GP 
n=2 
DC 
n=3 
DT 
n=2 
ST
 
n=4 
 BW
 
n=3 
FW 
n=1 
DC 
n=5 
 DC 
n=1 
ST
 
n=2 
Cooperative 
structure 
             
Yes 0 1 1 0 0 3  1
 
0 4  0 0 
No 3 0 1 3 2 1  2 1 1  1 2 
Number of 
employees 
             
< 50 0 1 2 0 0 1  0 0 0  0 1 
50 - 250 0 0 0 2 2 0  2 0 3  0 0 
<250 3 0 0 1 0 3  1 1 2  1 1 
Involved in 
exports 
             
Yes 3 0 0 3 2 3  0 1 4  0 0 
No 0 1 2 0 0 1  3 0 1  1 2 
1
 BW: Bulgarian wheat chain, FW: French wheat chain, GP: German pork chain, DC: Dutch cheese chain, DT: Dutch tomato chain, ST: Spanish tomato chain. Wholesalers 
source wheat grain in BW and FW, pigs in GP, cheese in DC, and tomatoes in DT and ST. Wholesalers sell wheat grain in BW and FW, pigs in GP, cheese in DC, and 
tomatoes in DT and ST. One of the wholesalers is a large Dutch cooperative buying tomatoes from Spain. The suppliers in Spain are not a member of the Dutch cooperative. 
2
Processors source wheat grain (n=2) in BW and in FW, and milk in DC. Processors sell wheat flour (n=2) and bread (n=1) in BW, wheat flour in FW, and cheese in DC.  
3
Retailers source cheese in DC and tomatoes in ST. Retailers sell cheese in DC and tomatoes in ST. One of the retailers is a British supermarket buying tomatoes from Spain. 
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4.3.3. Interview questions 
 
The interview questions consisted of four major blocks, with two structured and two semi-structured 
blocks of questions. The first block was an introductory block that used structured questions to inquire 
about characteristics such as farm size, company size, farmer cooperative membership, and legal form 
(cooperative/non-cooperative) of companies. In the second block of the interview, structured questions 
were used to evaluate how challenging the respondents have found various sources of business risks in 
the past 5-7 years. Likert scales from 1 (= extremely challenging) to 7 (= not challenging at all) were 
used for this purpose. The aim of this second block was to determine how challenging price volatility 
was relative to other business risks. The list of business risks presented was related to the sourcing and 
selling activities of the farms and companies. 
  The third block of the interview consisted of questions about the actors’ perceptions of price risk and 
the fourth block consisted of questions about the strategies used by the actors to manage the risk from 
price volatility. Both blocks of questions were made semi-structured to get a deep understanding of 
actors’ perceptions and management strategies. The semi-structured nature of the questions further 
allowed the questions to be refined as the interviews progressed. To gain an understanding of their 
perception of price risk, the respondents were asked to provide the percentage price deviation from an 
expected price level which they perceived as price volatility. Actors were asked to give the percentage 
price deviations with respect to the periods that prices are mostly set in the respective chains (i.e. 
daily, weekly or monthly). They were then asked to indicate the strategies they would use if faced with 
the indicated or a higher level of price volatility.  
The interview responses revealed that actors’ strategic responses to price volatility depended not only 
on the level of price volatility faced but also on whether such level of price volatility is perceived as 
risky. The interview questions were thus refined to include questions on the factors that determine the 
riskiness of a certain level of price volatility. Actors were not always able to think of strategies they 
would use to specifically manage the risk from price volatility. Further probing questions on actors’ 
past experiences with price volatility were therefore needed to get a deeper understanding of actors’ 
strategic choices. The chain actors were probed on whether they have faced price volatility in the past 
and on the strategies they have used to manage the risk from price volatility.  
The interviews were conducted between January and July 2014. The questions were sent one day in 
advance to the interviewees to allow them to prepare prior to the interviews. Each interview lasted 
between forty-five minutes and one hour and a half. The interviews were conducted by the authors 
with accompanying translators in some cases. The responses were audio-recorded and transcribed on 
the same day the interviews took place. 
 
4.3.4. Analysis  
 
We used content analysis of the interview transcripts to describe the price risk perceptions and 
management strategies of the food chain actors. This type of research design is usually appropriate 
when existing theory or research literature on a phenomenon is limited (Hsieh and Shannon, 2005). 
The process of content analysis includes open coding, creating categories and abstraction Elo and 
Kyngas (2008). Elo and Kyngas (2008) define open coding as the writing of notes and headings to 
describe the content of the interview transcripts. They define abstraction as the naming of the 
55 
 
categories and sub-categories of notes and headings generated in the open coding process. The nature 
of content analysis is therefore such that a pre-defined conceptual framework is not used to guide the 
research. In this chapter, content analysis is used to identify the factors that determine whether a 
certain level of price volatility is perceived as risky and to identify the categories of strategies actors 
use to manage the risk from price volatility.  
 
4.4. Results 
 
4.4.1. Price risk perceptions 
 
The degree to which various business risks have been a challenge to each actor in the past 5-7 years is 
shown in Table 4.3. The risks relate to business-to-business input sourcing and output selling 
activities. The ‘challenging’ or ‘C’ columns of Table 4.3 reveal that price volatility has been a prime 
challenge for a majority of the actors. This Table further emphasizes that price volatility is not the sole 
concern of farmers as is often believed. An interesting finding is the comparable scores the majority of 
the actors assigned to high input/low output prices and input/output price volatility. The following 
subsections describe and compare actors’ perceptions of price risk.  
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Table 4.3 - Number of actors who rated each business risk as challenging (C), moderately  challenging (MC), or not challenging (NC) 
 
 Farm 
1 
(n=15)
 
Wholesale
2
 (n=15)
 
Processing
3 
(n=9)
 
Retail
4 
(n=3)
 
 C
 
MC NC C MC NC C MC NC C MC NC 
Input sourcing related risks
             
High input prices 3 2 0 6 4 5 4 2 3 2 1 0 
Instability in volume of input supply 0 0 5 6 2 7 4 1 4 1 0 2 
Low volume of input supply 0 0 5 4 1 10 4 0 5 1 0 2 
Low quality of input supply 0 1 4 3 2 10 1 1 7 1 0 2 
Inconsistent quality of input supply 0 1 4 6 1 8 2 1 6 1 0 2 
Poor on-time delivery of inputs purchased 0 0 5 3 2 10 1 0 8 1 0 2 
Tracing and tracking challenges 0 0 5 1 0 14 2 0 7 1 0 2 
Detection of diseases in inputs 0 0 5 3 1 11 1 0 8 1 0 2 
Input price volatility 1 0 4 8 2 5 6 0 3 1 1 1 
Imbalance of market power with input suppliers 1 0 4 5 5 5 1 0 8 1 0 2 
Output selling related risks 
 
           
Low output prices 9 2 4 10 1 3 6 1 1 Ni
5 
Ni Ni 
Instability in demand volume 3 1 11 5 3 6 3 1 4 Ni Ni Ni 
Low demand volume 3 0 12 6 1 7 5 0 3 Ni Ni Ni 
Lack of capacity to fill high demand volume 0 2 13 2 1 11 1 1 6 Ni Ni Ni 
Lack of capacity to fill high quality specifications of customers 1 1 13 2 1 11 1 0 7 Ni Ni Ni 
Instability in quality specifications demanded by customers 3 0 12 4 0 10 0 1 7 Ni Ni Ni 
Output price volatility 8 2 5 7 1 6 6 2 0 Ni Ni Ni 
Imbalance of market power with customers 6 1 8 6 1 7 3 0 5 Ni Ni Ni 
Poor on-time payment for deliveries 1 0 14 5 1 8 4 1 3 Ni Ni Ni 
1
Highlighted in bold are the number of farmers, wholesalers, processors and retailers who found high input/low output prices and input/output price volatility as challenging. 
C: Challenging (=1, 2, 3 in Likert scale), MC: Moderately challenging (= 4 in Likert scale), NC: Not challenging (= 5, 6, 7 in Likert scale). Input sourcing related challenges 
were not inquired in the case of wheat and tomato farmers 
2
One of the wholesalers was not familiar with the selling related challenges of the company as the company sold its output to the parent company. 
3,4 
The selling related challenges were not inquired for companies (bakery and retailers) selling directly to final consumers.  
5
Not inquired. 
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Table 4.4 - Percentage deviations in prices perceived as price volatility 
 
 Farm Wholesale
 
Processing Retail 
Percentage deviation
1  Wheat grain:10% 
 Pig feed:10% 
 Pigs:10% 
 Cattle feed: 15% 
 Milk: 10% 
 Tomatoes: 20% 
 Wheat grain: 10% 
 Pigs: 10% 
 Cheese:10% 
 Tomatoes: 20% 
 Wheat grain and 
flour: 10% 
 Milk and Cheese2: 
10% 
 
 Cheese: 3% 
 Tomatoes: 20% 
1 
Percentage deviations from an expected price level that exceed the specified percentages are perceived as price volatility by the chain actors. The percentages are averages 
across respondents, rounded to the nearest decimal. Percentages are expressed relative to the price settlement period in each chain, namely monthly in the Dutch cheese chain 
and weekly in the rest of the chains.  
2
Note that only one cheese processor perceived a price deviation greater than 20% as volatility, the rest of the processors perceived a price deviation less than 5% as volatility. 
 
Table 4.5 - Persistence of price volatility perceived as risky  
 
Farm
1 
Wholesale Processing Retail 
 A year or a production cycle2 
(DC, DT, BW, GP, ST) 
 Depending on stock level and 
position in forward contract
3
 
(FW) 
 Depending on stock level and 
position in forward contract (BW, 
DC, FW) 
 One week and longer2(GP, DT, ST) 
 Depending on stock level 
and position in forward 
contract (BW, DC) 
 
 A year (DC, 
ST) 
1
 BW: Bulgarian wheat chain, FW: French wheat chain, GP: German pork chain, DC: Dutch cheese chain, DT: Dutch tomato chain, ST: Spanish tomato chain. 
2
 Price volatility is perceived as risky if a high input or low output price level persists for the specified period or longer.  
3
 Price volatility is perceived as risky when output prices drop (input prices rise) and stay low (high) during the period that input prices (output prices) are fixed through 
contracts at a high (low) level. It is perceived as risky when output prices drop while there are goods in stoc
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a. Percentage price deviations perceived as price volatility 
 
Simple averages of the percentage price deviations which chain actors perceived as price volatility 
were calculated per chain and chain stage. Table 4.4 provides a summary of the average percentages 
per chain and chain stage. Deviations of prices by more than 10-15% from their expected levels were 
perceived as price volatility by a majority of respondents. Actors in the Dutch and Spanish tomato 
chains were an exception to this, as the majority perceived a price deviation higher than 20% as price 
volatility. Similarly, Dutch dairy farmers argued that feed prices (maize in particular) are volatile if 
prices deviate by more than 20% from their expected values. Recurring and large changes in the prices 
of fresh tomatoes and cattle feed explain the price volatility perceptions of the tomato and dairy 
farmers. 
Actors specified percentage price deviations with respect to the periods that prices are set in the 
respective chains.  In the Dutch cheese supply chain this period is monthly. Although cheese prices are 
set for a longer time period (exceeding one month), Dutch cheese processors, wholesalers, and 
retailers form cheese price expectations on a monthly basis because milk prices serve as reference 
prices for cheese. In the tomato and pork chains prices are mostly set on a weekly basis. In the wheat 
supply chains, although high frequency trading can take place at the wholesale stage, weekly price 
expectations seem to be the norm.  
A comparison across chain stages shows some similarities and differences in the specified 
percentage price deviations. On average, the percentage price deviations (Table 4.4) are rather 
comparable across chain stages and chains. An examination of the percentages specified at the level of 
the individual respondent reveals some differences in perceptions.  Processors and retailers seem to 
perceive lower percentages of price deviations as price volatility compared to farmers and wholesalers. 
For example, a deviation greater than 5% in grain and flour prices was perceived as price volatility by 
a Bulgarian and a French wheat miller. Similarly, the Dutch retailer indicated that a deviation higher 
than 3% in cheese prices is perceived as price volatility. 
 
 
b. Factors determining the riskiness of price volatility 
 
Persistence of price volatility 
 
Price volatility, defined as a percentage price deviation from the expected level, is not perceived as 
risky by all interviewed actors. The persistence of price deviation was found to be one of the factors 
that determine whether price volatility is perceived as risky. The degree of persistence perceived as 
risky is summarized in Table 4.5 per chain and chain stage. A finding common to most of the 
interviewed farmers is that a high input price or low output price persisting for at least one year or 
production cycle (i.e. a year for wheat and dairy farmers, and one production cycle for pig and tomato 
farmers) is perceived to be more risky than weekly or monthly changes in prices. A situation perceived 
to be even more risky is when a persistent high output price level (or low input price level) 
unexpectedly changes to a persistent low output price level (or high input price level) between years or 
production cycles. When such reversals in price levels occur, it becomes challenging for farmers to 
reverse major investments made during good price years. Though undesirable, more frequent price 
changes (within the year or production cycle) were seen as less risky because farmers cannot easily 
respond to these changes anyway. Similar to farmers, retailers tended to be more concerned about 
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changes in yearly prices. Their reasoning is that higher frequency price changes can compensate each 
other during the year. This reasoning was also shared by some of the interviewed farmers.  
Price changes occurring during the year were found to be more of a challenge for the wholesale 
and processing stages. This is particularly true for the wheat and cheese wholesalers and processors. 
Fixed-price sales contracts that are not matched with fixed-price purchase contracts (and vice versa) 
and storage are the main causes of this challenge. For instance, it is risky when output prices drop and 
stay low during the period that an input price is fixed at a high level through a contract (and vice versa 
for input prices). Sudden drops in output price are also risky for goods in stock. Cooperative German 
pig, Spanish tomato, and Dutch tomato wholesalers were concerned about both weekly changes and 
persistent changes in the pig and tomato prices received by their member farmers. 
 
Reason of price volatility 
 
According to the interviewees, the reasons why prices deviate from their expected levels also 
determined whether price volatility is perceived as risky. Price changes caused by sudden and major 
changes in local weather conditions and changes in global demand and supply conditions (caused for 
instance by conflicts in major producing countries or by border restrictions of major importing 
countries) were seen as worrying by actors in the cheese and wheat supply chains. Actors in the 
tomato supply chains mainly considered price changes caused by sudden and major changes in local 
weather conditions as risky ones. In the pork supply chain, the most challenging price changes were 
those caused by animal health related crises. Predictable seasonal price changes and price changes 
believed to have arisen from speculation were not considered as risky by most of the actors.  
 
Stability in margins 
 
In addition to the above factors, the direction of the price deviation determined the riskiness of price 
volatility. The interviews revealed that actors are more concerned about downside price changes 
(increase in input price or decrease in output price) than price volatility in the sense of fluctuations 
(both upside and downside) in prices. Moreover, stability in margins was found to be more important 
than stability in prices. All interviewed actors argued that a sudden and large decrease in an output 
price is not a concern if it is matched by a proportionate and immediate decrease in the input price 
(and vice versa). In practice, this rarely happens due to a number of factors, such as time lags in 
production, contracts (either on the buying or selling side), and the influence of retailers on prices.  
 
 
4.4.2. Price risk management strategies 
 
Strategies actors use to manage risk can be classified in several ways. Waters (2007) for instance 
provides eight categories of risk management strategies used by managers. The eight categories are 
ignoring risk, reducing the probability of risk, reducing the consequence of risk, transferring risk, 
making contingency plans, adapting to risk, opposing a change and moving to another environment. 
Hardaker et al. (2004) classified farm level risk management strategies into two broad categories and 
further sub-categories. The two broad categories are on-farm strategies and strategies to share risks 
with others. In this paper, we provide our own classification of price risk management strategies. The 
categories provided emerged from the content analysis of the interview transcripts. Four categories of 
price risk management strategies were identified: Survival, adaptive, control and hedging strategies. 
Each category of strategy is briefly described below. Table 4.6 lists the management strategies 
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classified in each strategy category. The number of actors that adopted each category of strategy is 
presented in Table 4.7.  
 
Survival strategies 
 
Survival strategies are strategies aimed at minimizing losses, such as reducing physical production and 
major investments, improving efficiency, and diversification. These strategies, which are mainly long-
term strategies, were mostly adopted by farmers.  As farmers cannot easily respond to short-term price 
changes, a majority of them concentrated their strategies on price changes that persist for at least one 
year or production cycle. Producers of storable products, as French wheat farmers in our sample 
attested, can be considered an exception to this as their ability to store wheat gives them the flexibility 
to decide when and how to sell. The interviewed Bulgarian wheat farmers, on the other hand, indicated 
a limited capacity to store wheat during the year. Survival strategies were also adopted by cooperative 
pig and tomato wholesalers. The only strategy these wholesalers can adopt to minimize the losses of 
member farmers in times of sudden price drops is to wait one more week before selling farmers’ pigs 
and tomatoes to processors and retailers, respectively. Keeping pigs and tomatoes for a longer period 
of time can result in further losses in the values of the produce. 
 
Adaptive strategies 
 
The focus of strategies in this category is on flexibility, following the market, and securing a stable 
margin regardless of price movements Most of the interviewed wholesalers and processors, except for 
cooperative pig and tomato wholesalers, adopted adaptive strategies. Setting buying and selling prices 
on the same day, linking output prices to input prices, and avoiding open long-term fixed price 
forward contracts are some of the major adaptive strategies these actors adopted. The focus is on 
flexibility achieved through quick adaptation to market price movements. Not only was there an 
interest for flexible prices but also for flexible production. For instance, a Bulgarian wheat baker 
argued that switching from flour to bread production can be a solution in times of big drops in grain 
prices, and from bread to flour in case of big rises in grain prices. The aim of this strategy is to avoid 
the drop in bread sales during bread price increases as bread is a staple product in Bulgaria. A 
specialty cheese processor argued that switching from processing milk to processing more volumes of 
cheese can be a solution to manage the risk from milk price volatility. In case of a large drop in milk 
prices, it becomes profitable to process more cheese than processing and selling milk because of the 
value that cheese adds to the low priced milk.  
 
Control strategies 
 
Strategies in this category focus on achieving price stability by taking control over prices. The 
expected interest in control strategies through price-fixing contracts and vertical integration was not 
found among most of the chain actors. This is particularly true for wholesalers and processors. Interest 
in contracts and vertical integration was however found among farmers (for instance, Dutch dairy, 
German pig, and French wheat farmers). Producing and trading premium products is another way of 
exercising control over prices. Examples include the production of specialty cheese by cheese 
processors, and the production and trading of tomatoes with no pesticide residues and of tomatoes of 
specialty varieties by tomato farmers, wholesalers, and retailers. Many of the interviewed actors 
argued that prices of premium products are not as volatile and low as standard products. This 
argument prevailed in particular among actors downstream from the farm stage. For retailers, 
transmitting sudden increases in input prices is easier when the product is a premium product. 
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Improved marketing of produce through promotion and better services to fill customers’ needs is 
another method to add value to the product and command higher and more stable prices. In the Dutch 
tomato chain, product value addition is achieved through closer collaboration between growers’ 
associations and the retail sector.  
 
Hedging strategies 
 
Although hedging through futures and option contracts is a widely accepted price volatility 
management strategy, its use was limited among the interviewed actors. Interest to use these 
instruments in the future was, nevertheless, expressed by a German pig farmer, a French wheat farmer, 
a Bulgarian wheat wholesaler, a pig wholesaler, a Dutch cheese wholesaler, and a Dutch cheese 
processor. The absence of active futures markets for these products in the respective countries was 
mentioned as the main reason for the current non-use of these instruments. Except for one German pig 
farmer and one French wheat farmer who currently use options, no mention of interest in hedging with 
futures and options was made by any of the remaining interviewed farmers. 
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Table 4.6 - Price volatility management strategies  
 
SC
1 
Farm Wholesale Processing Retail 
Survive   Substitute or cut production (DC, ST, BW) 
 Substitute expensive ingredients (DC) 
 Increase production efficiency, reduce costs and 
increase productivity (DC, BW, DT)  
 Avoid major investments (DC) 
 Wait a bit and sell at whatever price (ST, GP, 
BW) 
 Diversify production (BW, FW) 
 Promote product by producer organizations in 
times of sudden price drop caused by excess 
production (DT) 
 Ask farmers to wait a week or two weeks 
more before harvesting  the plant
2
 (ST) 
 Agree with competitors to throw away excess 
production and raise back prices (ST
2
, DT) 
 Increase production efficiency of member 
farmers
2
(ST) 
 Diversify suppliers (ST) and buyers (DT)2 
 Sell quickly at whatever price2 (GP, DC)  
 Sell excess production  through retail 
promotion (ST, DT
2
) 
 Cut purchases during overproduction as prices 
are too low to sell back (ST) 
 Diversify 
production 
(DC) 
 Cut 
production 
(BW) 
 
 Diversify 
suppliers 
(ST) 
1
SC: Strategy category. Note that BW: Bulgarian wheat chain, FW: French wheat chain, GP: German pork chain, DC: Dutch cheese chain, DT: Dutch tomato chain, ST: 
Spanish tomato chain. 
2
Strategies used by cooperative wholesalers, whose main objectives are to minimize the losses that member farmers face in times of sudden drop in prices. 
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Table 4.6 - Price volatility management strategies (Continued) 
 
SC Farm Wholesale Processing Retail 
Adapt  Shorter 
contracts with 
small 
quantities per 
contract (FW) 
 Closely follow 
market 
development, 
improve price 
predictions and 
concentrate 
production in 
high price 
weeks (ST, 
DT) 
 Shorter contracts (DC) 
 Renegotiate fixed price contracts 
(DC) 
 Long-term contracts with flexible 
output prices (DC) 
 Buy aggressively in case of price 
spikes (due to shortages) and wait 
when prices are too low (BW) 
 Take risk by taking a long or short 
position to profit from cheese price 
volatility (DC) 
 Secure supply at whatever price 
(ST, BW) 
 Agree on buying and selling price 
on same day (BW) 
 Sell majority of grain right after 
purchasing it during harvest (FW) 
 Closely follow market 
development and improve price 
predictions (DT, BW, DC) 
 Use milk pools to set output prices3 (DC) 
 Shorter sales contracts (DC) 
 Contracts with flexible output prices (flexible with milk 
prices; use output price bands to share price risk with 
retailer; cost-plus pricing)  (DC) 
 Switch production among alternative products (DC, BW) 
 Adjust production volume (BW) 
 Agree on input and output price on same day (FW, BW) 
 Avoid storage/buy only for daily needs (BW) 
 Transmit price changes (BW) 
 Buy spot milk to take advantage of volatility (sudden 
drop in milk prices) instead of buying from own 
cooperative member farmers (DC) 
 Renegotiate fixed price contracts (DC) 
 Secure supply at 
whatever price 
(DC) 
 Transmit price 
changes (price 
decreases in 
particular due to 
competition) 
(DC, ST) 
3
A cooperative producing only cheese can pay farmers a competitive milk price that is based on a ‘weighted-average’ of final dairy prices of competitors 
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Table 4.6- Price volatility management strategies (Continued) 
 
SC Farm Wholesale Processing Retail 
     
Control  Fixed price forward contract for inputs (DC, 
GP) 
 Fixed price forward contract for outputs (FW, 
DT
4
) 
 Forward integration to process own milk4 (DC) 
 Backward integration to produce own maize 
(DC) 
 Improve output quality (BW4, DT, ST) 
 Closer relationship with retailers for improved 
product development and with long-term fixed 
price contracts
4
 (DT) 
 Better marketing/promotion of produce by 
producer organization  to add value to the 
produce (DT) 
 Trade quality produce (ST, BW) 
  Fixed price forward sales contract with 
100% advance payment
4
 (BW) 
 Fixed price forward contract for outputs 
(ST) 
 Pay farmers an average of 2 weeks’ prices 
(GP) 
 Merger among wholesalers to gain more 
market power and secure higher output 
price
4
 (DT) 
 Closer relationship with retailers for better 
marketing/promotion of produce to  add 
value to the produce (DT) 
 Produce quality 
product (DC, 
BW) 
 Do not 
overreact: fix 
milk price at 
moderate level 
(DC) 
 Store (BW) 
 Secure quality 
product (DC, 
ST) 
 Fixed price 
purchase 
contract (ST) 
4
Strategies not yet implemented, but planned for the future. 
 
 
 
Table 4.6 - Price volatility management strategies (Continued) 
 
4
Strategies not yet implemented, but planned for the future 
 
 
 
SC Farm Wholesale Processing Retail 
Hedge  Hedge in futures market (GP4, FW) 
 Use average seasonal price offered by 
cooperatives (FW) 
 Hedge in futures market4 
(DC, GP, BW) 
 Use options (FW) 
 Hedge in future market4 (DC) 
 Over-the-counter contracts for 
milk
4
 (DC) 
 None 
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Table 4.7 - Number of actors per strategy category and chain stage 
 
Strategy
1
 category Farm (n=15) Wholesale (n=15) Processing (n=9) Retail (n=3) Total 
Survival  13 7 2 0 12 
Adaptive 2 10 9 3 24 
Control 5 4 3 1 13 
Hedging 3 3 1 0 7 
1
Note that one actor can use a combination of strategies 
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4.5. Discussion 
 
This chapter demonstrated how open-ended approaches to data collection can be used to explore non-
traditional developments in agricultural price risk management practises. Most of the previous 
quantitative risk management studies have considered traditional instruments such as hedging in 
derivative markets, forward contracts, and diversification as the main instruments farmers use to 
manage price risk (for instance in Martin (1996), Meuwissen et al. (2001), Hall et al. (2003), 
Bergfjord, 2009). This chapter showed that a notable development in farmers’ strategies is to create 
added value through selection of better varieties to plant, production with less pesticide residues, 
product promotion, and collaboration with the retail sector to develop improved products. Prices of 
premium products are perceived to be more stable than standard quality products. Another 
development is the avoidance of long-term fixed price contracts particularly by wholesalers and 
processors. Although long-term contracts are often argued to minimize risk and uncertainty (for 
instance in Heyder et al. (2010)), this chapter finds the contrary. In this chapter we find that chain 
actors perceive fixed price long-term contracts as risky if one is not able to secure such contracts both 
on the input and output sides.  
Besides uncovering developments in price risk management practises, this chapter also showed that 
price risk management strategies are diverse and interrelated with other business decisions. At the 
farm stage, price risk management affects investment decisions (i.e. increasing production efficiency, 
reducing costs and increasing productivity), product development decisions (i.e. improving output 
quality) and decisions on vertical and horizontal collaborations (i.e. closer relationship with retailers 
for improved product development). Production decisions of processors are also affected by price risk 
management strategies (i.e. cut production, adjust production). At the wholesale stage, it was found 
that collaboration decisions are affected by price risk management strategies (i.e. Sell excess 
production  through retail promotion, merger among wholesalers to gain more market power and 
secure higher output price,
 
closer relationship with retailers for better marketing/promotion of produce 
to  add value to the produce). 
The semi-structured interviews also allowed for the flexibility to have a deeper understanding of chain 
actors’ risk perceptions. This is in contrast with previous quantitative risk management studies which 
measured risk perceptions by rating the relative importance of different agricultural risks through 
Likert scales (for instance, Martin (1996), Meuwissen et al. (2001), Hall et al. (2003), Bergfjord 
(2009), Wilson et al. (1987), Patrick et al. (1985), Knutson et al. (1998), Greinier et al. (2009)). This 
chapter went beyond showing the relative importance of price risk and identified the factors that 
determined whether price volatility is perceived as risky. Through a closer investigation of the 
identified factors, one can further detect a link between price risk perceptions and the adopted 
management strategies. Concern about the persistence of price changes in the long run, as opposed to 
monthly or weekly price changes during the year or production cycle, can explain why most farmers 
adopt long-term strategies (that include diversification, achieving cost efficiency and quality product 
development). Wholesalers and processors, on the other hand, worry about monthly or weekly price 
changes from expected prices, and therefore choose flexibility to manage the risk from these price 
changes. 
This chapter showed through a comparative approach that the choice of price risk management 
strategies is context specific. While farmers’ strategies tend to fit more within the ‘survival’ category, 
those of wholesalers and processors fit more into the category of ‘adaptive’ strategies. Strategies also 
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differed across chains. While Dutch tomato farmers are inclined towards strategies that require closer 
horizontal and vertical collaborations, Spanish tomato farmers tend to adopt more individual 
strategies. In the wheat chain, Bulgarian wheat farmers’ strategies are limited to long-term strategies 
implemented on an annual basis (i.e. crop diversification, cutting production, planting new varieties). 
French wheat farmers on the other hand use also short-term strategies such as short-term contracts. 
Although this chapter did not quantify the impact of chain characteristics on the choice of price risk 
management strategies, it provides the basis on which such studies can be conducted in the future. A 
wider sample could be used to test the statistical generalizability of the results. 
Despite the small sample used, this chapter has demonstrated the relevance of the qualitative and 
exploratory methodological approach for agricultural risk management research. It provided new 
insights in risk management practises, a deeper understanding of risk perceptions and highlighted the 
interrelation of risk management decisions with other business decisions. Such benefits could also 
extend to the wider field of agricultural research. A natural extension of this research could be to test 
whether the strategies identified in this chapter apply to a wider sample of food chain actors. Future 
research could also test the effectiveness of the identified strategies in reducing the risk from price 
volatility. 
 
4.6. Conclusions and implications 
 
Food and agricultural commodity prices have been increasingly volatile both at the global and EU 
levels since the last decade. Although the current literature proposes alternative strategies to deal with 
price risk, the proposed strategies have often targeted the farm stage. The scope of the proposed 
strategies has also been limited to few strategies with forward contracts, futures, options and 
diversification being the main ones. In this chapter, we took a broader approach and explored the 
strategies used both at the farm and beyond the farm stages of the food supply chain. The strategies 
were explored by conducting forty-two in-depth interviews with farmers, wholesalers, processors, and 
retailers in six EU food-supply chains. The chain actors’ perceptions of price risk were also explored 
during the interviews to gain a better understanding of actors’ choices of price risk management 
strategies. The two key perception elements explored were the percentage price deviation which actors 
perceived as price volatility and the factors that determined whether price volatility is perceived as 
risky.  
Results show that a deviation in prices by more than 10 to 15% from their expected levels is perceived 
as price volatility by a majority of the respondents. Three main factors determined whether chain 
actors perceived price volatility as risky: the persistence, the reason and the stability of margins. 
Whereas farmers and retailers perceive persistent price deviations as risky, wholesalers and processors 
perceive short-term price changes occurring during the year or production cycle as risky. Farmers’ 
strategies are mostly survival strategies through output and cost reduction in response to adverse price 
movements. Wholesalers and processors focus on adaptive strategies that allow them to secure stable 
margins regardless of price movements. Retailers’ main focus is to secure a continuous supply of 
quality produce for their customers rather than to reduce price volatility. Overall, this chapter 
highlighted the diversity in perceptions and strategies along EU food chains and challenged current 
assumptions that price risk management strategies are limited to few traditional instruments.  
This chapter has several implications for agricultural risk management research. First, it demonstrated 
the benefits of qualitative exploratory research to discover current and new practises in agricultural 
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risk management. Second, it showed that a qualitative approach can highlight the interrelation of price 
risk management practises with other business decisions. Third, the chapter showed that a comparative 
methodological approach can be used to stress the context specific nature of agricultural risk 
management decisions.  This chapter has also policy implications. The 10 to 15% price deviation 
perceived as price volatility provides an important signal for price stabilizing policy interventions in 
agricultural markets. Some strategy gaps could be filled with policy interventions. Areas for policy 
support include the further encouragement of cooperation among farmers and along the chain (inter-
professional organizations), the establishment of futures markets where such markets are missing, and 
the timely dissemination of improved and accessible market price data and predictions. Such price data 
could be used to support chain actors’ production and sales decisions, as well as contract decisions. 
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Abstract 
Price volatility implies risk and may be undesirable from managerial and investment perspectives. 
Current literature on the effectiveness of strategies to manage price volatility mainly focuses on the 
farm stage and considers only a few farm-level strategies. This paper outlines a method to investigate 
the effectiveness of price volatility management strategies for different actors along the food supply 
chain and for a broader set of strategies. The paper first develops a decision rule, based on the mean-
variance utility framework, for the implementation of a strategy. The price volatilities the chain actor 
faces with and without a strategy are then compared to evaluate the effectiveness of a strategy in 
reducing the price volatility faced by the chain actor. The method is illustrated using price data for the 
Spanish fresh tomato and French wheat supply chains.  
Key words: Effectiveness, strategies, price volatility, food chains 
 
 
5.1. Introduction 
 
The rise in price volatility since the 2007/2008 food price crisis has sparked considerable research 
interest in the impacts of price volatility on food chain actors. Assefa et al. (2016) have shown that the 
impacts of price volatility are not limited to farmers but also extend to the rest of the supply chain. For 
instance, García-Germán et al. (2013) shows the impacts of price volatility on consumers through a 
literature review. Price volatility implies uncertainty and thus may be undesirable for managers and 
investors (Piot-Lepetit, 2011; Rabobank, 2011); the risk from price volatility has to therefore be 
properly managed. Supply chain actors use diverse strategies to manage the risk from price volatility 
(Assefa et al., 2016). Insight into the effectiveness of these strategies could help chain actors to choose 
strategies to reduce their exposure to price volatility.   
A large body of literature exists on the effectiveness of strategies to manage price volatility (or price 
risk) for farmers. Neyhard et al. (2013), for instance, studied the effect of a combination of futures, 
options and cash markets on the financial performance of dairy farms and concluded that the cash 
market provides a natural hedge for farm income. The effectiveness of futures and options was also 
investigated by Manfredo et al (2003) for grain farmer cooperatives. Their study also included over-
the-counter contracts and yield insurance. The best strategies were put options and a combination of 
put options, futures contract and yield insurance (Manfredo et al., 2003). The effectiveness of forward 
contracts has also been studied. For example, Bielza et al. (2007) investigated the effect of a cash 
forward contract between a potato cooperative and its member farmers on the risk exposure of the 
cooperative. The authors concluded that such an instrument is effective when combined with hedging 
in the futures market. Kimura and Anton (2010) explored the effect of forward contracts on the income 
variability of crop farmers. They found that forward contracts reduce the price risk faced by the 
farmer. 
Existing literature on the effectiveness of price volatility management strategies (PVMS) mainly 
focuses on the farm stage. A review by Assefa et al. (2015), however, has shown that price volatility 
transmits along the chain, thereby increasing the risks faced by other food chain actors. This suggests 
the need to evaluate the effectiveness of strategies for different actors in the chain. Another limitation 
of the current literature is the focus on storable products, such as grains (Manfredo et al., 2003) and 
potatoes (Bielza et al., 2007), and on products traded in the futures market, such as milk (Neyhard et 
al., 2013).A final limitation is that the strategies covered by the current literature are limited to 
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options, futures and forward contracts, whereas supply chain actors adopt a broader range of strategies 
to manage the risk from price volatility (Assefa et al., 2016).  
This chapter addresses the above limitations by outlining a method to investigate the effectiveness of 
PVMS for different actors in food supply chains. The method accommodates strategies not currently 
addressed in the literature. Effectiveness is assessed by comparing the price volatility when no PVMS 
is implemented (the base scenario) with the price volatility when a PVMS is implemented.  
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 5.2 describes the conceptual framework 
that guides the research and section 5.3 describes the method to evaluate the effectiveness of PVMS. 
Section 5.4 presents the data used and the scenarios to illustrate the method described in section 5.3. 
Section 5.5 presents the results. Section 5.6 discusses the results and the method, and makes 
concluding remarks.  
  
5.2. Conceptual framework 
 
Consistent with a mean-variance decision framework, a chain actor is assumed to implement a PVMS 
if the utility from implementing a strategy is higher than the utility derived when no PVMS strategy is 
implemented. The utility from implementing a strategy is specified as: 
𝑈𝑠 = 𝑃
𝑠𝑄𝑠 − 𝐶(𝑄𝑠) − 𝑆(𝑄𝑠) −
1
2
𝛼𝑄𝑠2𝑉𝑝
𝑠,         (1) 
where, for the scenario where strategy s is implemented, 𝑈𝑠 is the utility, 𝑃
𝑠 is the output price the 
chain actor faces, 𝑄𝑠 is the quantity of product sold, 𝐶(𝑄𝑠) is the total production cost, 𝑆(𝑄𝑠) is the 
cost of strategy s, 𝛼 is the coefficient of risk aversion, and 𝑉𝑝
𝑠 is the variance of the output price. The 
utility derived when no strategy is implemented is given by: 
𝑈𝑏 = 𝑃
𝑏𝑄𝑏 − 𝐶(𝑄𝑏) −
1
2
𝛼𝑄𝑏
2
𝑉𝑝
𝑏,         (2) 
where, for the base scenario when no strategy is implemented, 𝑈𝑏 is the utility, 𝑃
𝑏 is the output price, 
𝑄𝑏 is the quantity of product sold, 𝐶(𝑄𝑏) is the total production cost, and 𝑉𝑝
𝑏 is the variance of the 
output price.  
The chain actor decides to implement a strategy if: 
𝑃𝑠𝑄𝑠 − 𝐶(𝑄𝑠) − 𝑆(𝑄𝑠) −
1
2
𝛼𝑄𝑠2𝑉𝑝
𝑠    > 𝑃𝑏𝑄𝑏 − 𝐶(𝑄𝑏) −
1
2
𝛼𝑄𝑏
2
𝑉𝑝
𝑏 .       (3) 
The chain actor is assumed to implement a PVMS if the utility from implementing a strategy is higher 
than the utility from not adopting a strategy. The drop in base price that induces the chain actor to 
implement a strategy, termed the threshold price drop, is determined by first expressing the utility 
under the base scenario in terms of an expected base price and a price drop from the expected base 
price, as follows: 
𝑈𝑏 = 𝐸(𝑃
𝑏)(1 − 𝐷)𝑄𝑏 − 𝐶(𝑄𝑏) −
1
2
𝛼𝑄𝑏
2
𝑉𝑝
𝑏,         (4) 
where 𝐸(𝑃𝑏) is the expected price in the base scenario and 𝐷 is the actual percentage by which the 
price drops from its expected level in the base scenario. The product 𝐸(𝑃𝑏)(1 − 𝐷) is the price the 
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chain actor faces in the base scenario, i.e., 𝑃𝑏 in equation (3). To find the threshold price drop that 
triggers a strategy, equation (4) can be substituted in the right-hand side of equation (3) to obtain the 
following expression for 𝐷: 
𝐷 >
−𝑃𝑠−𝐶(𝑄𝑏)+
1
2
𝛼𝑄𝑠𝑉𝑝
𝑠−
1
2
𝛼𝑄𝑏𝑉𝑝
𝑏 +𝐶(𝑄𝑠)+𝑆(𝑄𝑠)
𝐸(𝑃𝑏)
+ 1.        (5) 
The term on the right-hand side of equation (5) shows the maximum percentage by which base prices 
can drop from their expected level without triggering the implementation of a PVMS. If the percentage 
price drop exceeds the term in the right-hand side of equation (5), the implementation of a strategy is 
triggered. This term is the threshold price drop (𝐷𝑇) and can be denoted as: 
 𝐷𝑇 = 
−𝑃𝑠−𝐶(𝑄𝑏)+
1
2
𝛼𝑄𝑠𝑉𝑝
𝑠−
1
2
𝛼𝑄𝑏𝑉𝑝
𝑏 +𝐶(𝑄𝑠)+𝑆(𝑄𝑠)
𝐸(𝑃𝑏)
+ 1.       (6) 
The threshold price drop is expressed as a percentage. Equation (6) shows that the higher the cost of 
the strategy (𝑆(𝑄𝑠)) or the price volatility under strategy s (𝑉𝑝
𝑠), the higher the 𝐷𝑇. In other words, a 
costly strategy and a strategy resulting in a high level of price volatility will discourage the chain actor 
from implementing a strategy. In this situation, the chain actor will tolerate a large 𝐷𝑇. It can also be 
noted from equation (6) that a risk-loving chain actor (large 𝛼) will tolerate a large 𝐷𝑇.  
Noting that the threshold 𝐷𝑇 establishes a minimum base price, equation (5) implies that a strategy is 
implemented if: 
𝐸(𝑃𝑏)(1 − 𝐷) < 𝐸(𝑃𝑏)(1 − 𝐷𝑇),          (7) 
where 𝐸(𝑃𝑏)(1 − 𝐷) = 𝑝𝑏 is the actual base price and 𝐸(𝑃𝑏)(1 − 𝐷𝑇) is the minimum expected base 
price; the chain actor will decide to implement a strategy for any price less than this minimum. Note 
that equation (7) implies 𝐷 > 𝐷𝑇, which in turn implies equation (5). 
 
5.3. Method 
 
The effectiveness of PVMS in reducing the price volatility faced by a chain actor was computed in 
three steps. In step 1, base prices were calculated. Next, in step 2, prices faced under alternative PVMS 
were calculated. Finally, in step 3, the volatility of base prices was compared with the volatility of 
prices under alternative PVMS.  
Step 1: Base prices 
Base prices were calculated for a given time period and represent the prices chain actors would face if 
they sold their produce at spot prices during the considered period. Base farm output prices were set 
equal to national averages of historical spot prices (equation 8). This assumes that historical farm 
output prices do not reflect the pricing strategies used by individual farmers. Farmers generally operate 
in competitive markets with a large number of suppliers and there is limited opportunity for an 
individual farmer to influence market prices through his or her strategies. More formally, base farm 
output prices are given by:  
𝑝𝑓,𝑡
𝑏,𝑖 = 𝑝𝑓,𝑡
𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑡,𝑖
,             (8) 
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where, for product 𝑖 at time 𝑡, 𝑝𝑓,𝑡
𝑏,𝑖
 is the base farm output price and 𝑝𝑓,𝑡
𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑡 ,𝑖
 is the historical spot farm 
output price.  
In the base scenario, the intermediate stage (wholesaler or processor) buys its agricultural input from 
the farm stage at the base farm output price and sells its output to the retail stage at the base 
intermediate output price. Unlike the farm stage, the base output price at the intermediate stage was 
not set equal to historical prices. The output market of the intermediate stage is generally non-
competitive due to increased concentration at the retail stage. The retail stage may have significant 
market power that enables it to influence the output prices of the intermediate stage by using pricing 
strategies aimed at lowering and stabilising its own input price (Weber and Anders, 2007; Anders, 
2008). The wholesale and processing stages, which in general are more concentrated than the farm 
stage, may also have market power that enables them to influence their output prices through their 
pricing strategies (Bakucs and Ferto , 2009). If historical intermediate prices were used as base prices, 
then the volatility observed in these base prices will be a reflection of existing pricing strategies and of 
market power in the chain. To “remove” the effects of existing strategies and market power on base 
price volatility, a solution is to recalculate base intermediate output prices using farm base prices and 
an average marketing margin. Base output prices at the wholesale and processing stages are given by: 
𝑝𝑤,𝑡
𝑏,𝑖 = 𝑝𝑓,𝑡
𝑏,𝑖 +𝑀𝑤𝑓,𝑡
𝑖  ,  and            (9) 
𝑝𝑝,𝑡
𝑏,𝑖 = (𝑝𝑓,𝑡
𝑏,𝑖 × 𝐶𝑅𝑝𝑓
𝑖 ) + 𝑀𝑝𝑓,𝑡
𝑖  ,          (10) 
where, for product 𝑖 at time 𝑡, 𝑝𝑤,𝑡
𝑏,𝑖
 is the base output price for the wholesaler, 𝑝𝑝,𝑡
𝑏,𝑖
 is the base output 
price for the processor, 𝑀𝑤𝑓,𝑡
𝑖  is the wholesale-farm marketing margin, 𝑀𝑝𝑓,𝑡
𝑖  is the processing-farm 
marketing margin and 𝐶𝑅𝑝𝑓
𝑖  is the fixed conversion ratio of farm output to processor output.  
In the base scenario, the retail stage buys its agricultural input from the intermediate stage (either 
wholesaler or processor) at intermediate base output prices and sells its output to consumers at base 
retail prices. Base retail prices are calculated using base intermediate output prices and are given by: 
𝑝𝑟,𝑡
𝑏,𝑖 = 𝑝𝑤,𝑡
𝑏,𝑖 +𝑀𝑟𝑤,𝑡
𝑖 , or           (11) 
𝑝𝑟,𝑡
𝑏,𝑖 = 𝑝𝑝,𝑡
𝑏,𝑖 +𝑀𝑟𝑝,𝑡
𝑖 ,           (12) 
where, for product 𝑖 at time 𝑡, 𝑝𝑟,𝑡
𝑏,𝑖
 is the base retail price, 𝑀𝑟𝑤,𝑡
𝑖  is the retail-wholesale marketing 
margin and 𝑀𝑟𝑝,𝑡
𝑖  is the retail-processing marketing margin.  
The marketing margins can be fixed either in absolute terms or in percentage terms during the given 
period. To check the sensitivity of results to the calculation of the margin, both types of margins were 
considered. Absolute and percentage margins were calculated as follows: 
𝑀𝑗𝑘,𝑡
 𝑖 = 𝑀𝑗𝑘
 𝑖 =
∑ (𝑝𝑗,𝑡
ℎ,𝑖−𝑝𝑘,𝑡
ℎ,𝑖)𝑡
𝑇
  for absolute margin, and       (13) 
𝑀𝑗𝑘,𝑡
𝑖 = 𝑝𝑘,𝑡
𝑏,𝑖 × (1 + 𝑅𝑗𝑘
𝑖 )  for percentage margin,        (14) 
where, 𝑅𝑗𝑘
𝑖 =
∑ ((𝑝𝑗,𝑡
ℎ,𝑖−𝑝𝑘,𝑡
ℎ,𝑖)/𝑝𝑘,𝑡
ℎ,𝑖)𝑡
𝑇
 . 
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Note that historical prices (i.e. 𝑝𝑗,𝑡
ℎ,𝑖
 and 𝑝𝑘,𝑡
ℎ,𝑖
) are used to calculate the average percentage or absolute 
margin. In the above equations, 𝑀𝑗𝑘,𝑡
𝑖  does not vary over 𝑡 in the case of the absolute margin, but does 
vary over 𝑡 in the case of the percentage margin. The fixed absolute margin is given by 𝑅𝑗𝑘
𝑖 . The 
period for which margins and prices are calculated is given by 𝑇.  
 
Step 2: Prices under alternative PVMS 
Chain actors are assumed to buy their inputs at base prices but implement a PVMS to manage output 
price volatility. Following the conceptual framework, a strategy is triggered whenever the drop in base 
output price is greater than the threshold price drop, i.e., 𝐷 > 𝐷𝑇. If the drop in base prices is less than 
or equal to the threshold price drop, i.e. 𝐷 ≤ 𝐷𝑇, the chain actor faces base prices. In practice, data are 
not available for 𝐷𝑇. An alternative approach is to ask chain actors to indicate the average percentage 
price drop from expected spot (base) prices that would trigger them to implement a strategy. The 
threshold price drop obtained in this manner is assumed to take into account all the variables in the 
right-hand side of equation (6).  
Each period 𝑡 (𝑡 reflects a time period, i.e. week, month or year), the chain actor decides whether to 
implement a strategy. Two types of PVMS are modelled in this paper. The chain actor manages price 
volatility by implementing strategies that either (1) adjust the timing of sales or (2) adjust the selling 
price. When a strategy of type 1 is implemented at time 𝑡, the chain actor manages price volatility by 
not selling the output in that period and therefore does not face any price in that period. When a 
strategy of type 2 is implemented at time 𝑡, the chain actor sells the output at a new price instead of 
selling at the prevailing base output price. The new price is calculated from the base output price and 
other factors that could determine the new price. The following conditions summarise the 
determination of output prices under alternative PVMS.  
Type 1 strategy 
If 𝑝𝑗,𝑡
𝑏,𝑖 < 𝐸(𝑝𝑗,𝑡
𝑏,𝑖) ∗ (1 − 𝐷𝑇,𝑖), then postpone sales. Otherwise, the actor faces 𝑝𝑗,𝑡
𝑏,𝑖
. 
Type 2 strategy 
If 𝑝𝑗,𝑡
𝑏,𝑖 < 𝐸(𝑝𝑗,𝑡
𝑏,𝑖) ∗ (1 − 𝐷𝑇,𝑖), then the actor faces 𝑝𝑗,𝑡
𝑠,𝑖 = 𝑓(𝑝𝑗,𝑡
𝑏,𝑖, 𝑥). Otherwise, the actor faces 𝑝𝑗,𝑡
𝑏,𝑖
 . 
In the above conditions, for product 𝑖, actor 𝑗 and time 𝑡, 𝑝𝑗,𝑡
𝑏,𝑖
 is the base output price, 𝐸(𝑝𝑗,𝑡
𝑏,𝑖) is the 
expected base output price, and 𝐷𝑇,𝑖 is the threshold price drop for product 𝑖. The output price faced 
can be equal to the base price (𝑝𝑗,𝑡
𝑏,𝑖
 ) or to the price faced if a strategy is implemented ( 𝑝𝑗,𝑡
𝑠,𝑖
 ). The term 
𝐸(𝑝𝑗,𝑡
𝑏,𝑖) ∗ (1 − 𝐷𝑇,𝑖) indicates the minimum expected base price that chain actors are willing to receive 
without implementing any strategy. Note that if a strategy of type 1 is implemented, no price is faced 
at time 𝑡 because the chain actor postpones sales. For strategies of type 2, other factors determining the 
new output price are denoted by 𝑥.  
The expected base output price 𝐸(𝑝𝑗,𝑡
𝑏,𝑖) is the trend predicted base output price. It was calculated by 
first regressing the base prices calculated in step 1 (𝑝𝑗,𝑡
𝑏,𝑖
) on a constant and a trend. The estimated 
coefficients were then used to calculate the trend predicted expected price 𝐸(𝑝𝑗,𝑡
𝑏,𝑖). 
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Step 3: Price volatility under the base scenario and PVMS  
The effectiveness of a PVMS was computed by comparing base price volatilities and price volatilities 
under alternative PVMS for the selected time period. The volatility measures were computed using 
price residuals instead of prices. The price residuals are price deviations from the trend predicted 
prices. The computation of price residuals is shown in equation (15) for base prices and in equation 
(16) for prices under alternative PVMS: 
𝑟𝑗,𝑡
𝑏,𝑖 = 𝑝𝑗,𝑡
𝑏,𝑖 − 𝐸(𝑝𝑗,𝑡
𝑏,𝑖),           (15) 
𝑟𝑗,𝑡
𝑠,𝑖 = 𝑝𝑗,𝑡
𝑠,𝑖 − 𝐸(𝑝𝑗,𝑡
𝑠,𝑖),           (16) 
where, for product 𝑖, actor 𝑗 and time 𝑡, 𝑟𝑗,𝑡
𝑏,𝑖
 is the residual of the base output price, 𝐸(𝑝𝑗,𝑡
𝑏,𝑖) is the trend 
predicted base price as defined in step 2, 𝑟𝑗,𝑡
𝑠,𝑖
 is the residual of the price under strategy s, and 𝐸(𝑝𝑗,𝑡
𝑠,𝑖) is 
the trend predicted price under strategy s, which was obtained by regressing the prices obtained in step 
2 (𝑝𝑗,𝑡
𝑠,𝑖
) on a constant and a trend. 
Five measures of volatility were calculated using the residuals from equations (15) and (16): the 
coefficient of variation, the skewness, the kurtosis, and the 5
th
 and 95
th
 percentiles. The coefficient of 
variation was calculated as the ratio of the residuals’ standard deviations to the mean of the trend 
predicted prices. The 5
th
 and 95
th
 percentiles were also expressed as a ratio by dividing each by the 
mean of the trend predicted prices.  
Basing volatility measures on price residuals expresses volatility as the deviation of prices from 
predictable price trends. The coefficient of variation indicates the average deviation from the mean 
price, whereas the skewness indicates the upside or downside risk of prices. For output prices, a large 
value of positive skewness is desirable as this implies that the chain actor has a probability of 
receiving extremely high prices for output. The kurtosis indicates the peak around the mean and the 
fatness of the tails. For output prices, high kurtosis implies higher risk. Although the majority of the 
prices are concentrated around the mean, the probability of receiving extreme prices (high or low) is 
also higher. The 5th and 95th percentiles together indicate the range in which 90 per cent of all price 
residuals fall.. A narrower range between the 5
th
 and 95
th
 percentiles is desirable as it implies less 
variation in prices. Higher 5
th
 and 95
th
 percentiles are also desirable for output prices.  
 
5.4. Data and scenarios 
 
5.4.1. Data 
 
The method described above was applied to data from the Spanish fresh tomato and French wheat 
supply chains. The two chains differ in the storability of the products. The storability of a product can 
influence the type of PVMS implemented. Weekly farm and wholesale tomato price data for the 
period January 2005 to December 2014 were obtained from the website of the Spanish Ministry of 
Agriculture, Food and Environment (Ministerio de Agricultura, Alimentacion y Medio Ambiente). For 
the French wheat supply chain, monthly wheat and flour prices for the period January 2005 to 
December 2014 were obtained from the website of the French Ministry of Agriculture, Agrifood and 
Forestry (Ministère de l'agriculture, de l'agroalimentaire et de la forêt). In addition, daily futures price 
data for wheat traded in MATIF for the period were obtained from www.quandl.com for the period 
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April 2003 to September 2012. The threshold price drops that trigger the implementation of a PVMS 
were obtained from Assefa et al. (2016): a 20% drop for the Spanish tomato chain and a 10% drop for 
the French wheat chain. Descriptive statistics of prices are shown in Table 5.1. 
 
Table 5.1 – Descriptive statistics of prices for the Spanish tomato and French wheat supply chains 
 
 Spanish tomatoes spot prices French wheat spot prices French wheat 
futures 
 
Farm Wholesale Farm (wheat) Processor (flour) 
 Mean
 
0.532 0.958 0.175 0.514 0.159 
 Median 0.510 0.910 0.180 0.540 0.146 
 Maximum 1.300 2.350 0.280 0.580 0.292 
 Minimum 0.220 0.480 0.100 0.410 0.099 
 Std. Dev. 0.182 0.260 0.053 0.058 0.043 
 Number of 
observations 
521 521 120 120 19449 
Note: All prices are in euro/kg 
 
5.4.2. Scenarios 
 
The prices under the base and alternative (PVMS) scenarios are defined below for the Spanish tomato 
and French wheat supply chains. The PVMS and the assumptions used to calculate prices were derived 
from the interviews conducted by Assefa et al. (2016).  
Spanish tomatoes 
Base scenario 
In the base scenario, farmers and wholesalers are assumed to sell their outputs at weekly base (spot) 
prices, denoted by 𝑝𝑓,𝑡
𝑏,𝑠𝑡
 for farmers and 𝑝𝑤,𝑡
𝑏,𝑠𝑡
 for wholesalers. Farm base prices were set equal to the 
weekly historical farm prices for the period January 2005 to December 2014. Wholesale base prices 
were calculated using equation (9). An absolute margin of 𝑀𝑤𝑓
 𝑠𝑡 = 0.42 and a percentage margin of 
𝑅𝑤𝑓
 𝑠𝑡 = 0.44 were calculated using weekly historical farm and wholesale prices for the period January 
2005 to December 2014 (i.e. using equations (13) and (14), respectively).  
PVMS 
Two PVMS are illustrated for the farm stage and one for the wholesale stage. Prices under these 
strategies were computed for the period January 2005 to December 2014. The strategy type (type 1 or 
2) is indicated in parentheses next to each strategy. The threshold price drop that triggers a strategy 
was set to 𝐷𝑇,𝑠𝑡 = 0.2.  In the strategies presented below, 𝑡 (1, 2,..., 52) represents a particular week in 
a year and a production year spans from October to September. The first week of October is denoted 
by 𝑡 = 1 and the last week of September by 𝑡 = 52. 
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Farm strategy 1 - Cut tomato plant after April (Type 1): 
Spanish tomato prices significantly drop between May and September because of imports from the 
Netherlands. In this strategy, the farmer sells at base prices between October and April but cuts the 
tomato plant after April if the base price is less than the minimum expected base price. If the base 
price is greater than this minimum, the farmer continues selling at weekly base prices until the farmer 
decides to cut the plant or until the next harvest (October), whichever comes first. The output price the 
farmer faces during the production year is given by the following conditions: 
For 𝑡 ∈ [𝑂𝑐𝑡, . . . , 𝐴𝑝𝑟], the farmer faces 𝑝𝑓,𝑡
𝑏,𝑠𝑡
. 
For 𝑡 ∈ [𝑀𝑎𝑦, . . . , 𝑆𝑒𝑝], if 𝑝𝑓,𝑡
𝑏,𝑠𝑡 < 𝐸(𝑝𝑓,𝑡
𝑏,𝑠𝑡) ∗ (1 − 0.2) then the farmer cuts the plant and does not 
face any price until the start of the next harvest in October. Otherwise, the farmer continues facing 
𝑝𝑓,𝑡
𝑏,𝑠𝑡
.  
Farm strategy 2 - Wait and sell (Type 1): 
During the year (October to September), the farmer waits one week before harvesting the tomatoes if 
the base price in that week is less than the minimum expected base price. The farmer harvests the 
tomatoes the following week because the tomatoes can be damaged if left longer on the plant. The 
output price the farmer faces during the production year is given by the following conditions: 
For 𝑡 ∈ [𝑂𝑐𝑡, . . . , 𝐴𝑝𝑟], if 𝑝𝑓,𝑡
𝑏,𝑠𝑡 < 𝐸(𝑝𝑓,𝑡
𝑏,𝑠𝑡) ∗ (1 − 0.2),  then the farmer leaves the tomatoes on the 
plant and therefore does not face any price in that week. Otherwise, the farmer faces 𝑝𝑓,𝑡
𝑏,𝑠𝑡
.  
Wholesale strategy 1 - Annual contract (Type 2): 
At the beginning of October each year, the wholesaler enters into an annual sales contract with the 
retailer (for the period from October to September) if the wholesaler expects that base tomato prices 
will drop during the year below the minimum expected price level. If the average of the base price in 
the previous year was less than the average of the expected base price of the previous year minus a 
threshold price drop, then the wholesaler expects the same to happen in the current year and therefore 
decides to enter into a contract. The contract price is set equal to the base price in the first week of 
October of the year the contract is entered into. The output price the wholesaler faces during the year 
is given by the following conditions: 
If  
∑ 𝑝𝑤,𝑡−𝑧
𝑏,𝑠𝑡52
𝑧=1
52
<
∑ 𝐸(𝑝𝑤,𝑡−𝑧
𝑏,𝑠𝑡 )52𝑧=1
52
∗ (1 − 0.2), then  the wholesaler faces 𝑝𝑤,𝑡
𝑠,𝑠𝑡 = 𝑝𝑤,𝑡=1
𝑏,𝑠𝑡
 for the whole year.  
Otherwise, the wholesaler faces 𝑝𝑤,𝑡
𝑏,𝑠𝑡
 during the year. 
In the above condition, 𝑝𝑤,𝑡=1
𝑏,𝑠𝑡
 is the base price in October of the year the contract is entered into. 
French wheat 
Base scenario 
In the base scenario, wheat farmers and flour processors are assumed to sell their outputs at monthly 
base (spot) prices denoted by 𝑝𝑓,𝑡
𝑏,𝑓𝑤
 for farmers and 𝑝𝑝,𝑡
𝑏,𝑓𝑤
 for processors. Farm base prices were set 
equal to monthly historical farm prices for the period January 2005 to December 2014. Processor base 
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prices were calculated using equation (10). An absolute margin of 𝑀𝑝𝑓
 𝑓𝑤 = 0.27 and a percentage 
margin of 𝑅𝑝𝑓
 𝑓𝑤 = 1.26 were calculated using monthly historical farm and processor prices for the 
period January 2005 to December 2014. The (farm) wheat to (processing) flour conversion ratio was 
set to 𝐶𝑅𝑝𝑓
𝑓𝑤 = 1.4. In the strategies presented below, 𝑡 (1, 2,..., 12) represents a particular month in a 
year and a production year spans from July to June. 
PVMS 
Two PVMS are illustrated for the farm stage and one for the processing stage. Prices faced under these 
strategies were computed for the period January 2005 to December 2014. The threshold price drop that 
triggers a strategy was set at 𝐷𝑇,𝑓𝑤 = 0.1. 
Farm Strategy 1 - Annual contract with futures prices (Type 2): 
In July (harvest) each year, the farmer decides whether to sell all of next year’s harvest through a 
contract with the processor. If the base price in July of the current year is less than its minimum 
expected level, then the farmer expects the same to happen next July and therefore decides to enter 
into a contract to fix the price of next year’s harvest. The contract price is equal to the current July 
price of a futures contract expiring next harvest. The farmer is assumed to sell all the output through 
the contract. If the farmer does not enter into a contract, then the farmer stores next year’s harvest and 
sells it at next year’s monthly base prices. The price the farmer faces next year is given by the 
following conditions:  
If  𝑝𝑓,𝑡=7,𝑐𝑦
𝑏,𝑓𝑤 < 𝐸(𝑝𝑓,𝑡=7,𝑐𝑦
𝑏,𝑓𝑤 ) × (1 − 0.1), then the farmer faces 𝑝𝑓,𝑡
𝑠,𝑓𝑤 = 𝐹𝑓,𝑡=7,𝑐𝑦
𝑓𝑤
 for next year’s 
harvest. Otherwise, the farmer faces 𝑝𝑓,𝑡
𝑏,𝑓𝑤
 during the next year. 
In the above conditions, 𝑝𝑓,𝑡=7,𝑐𝑦
𝑏,𝑓𝑤
 is the base price in July of the current year, 𝐸(𝑝𝑓,𝑡=7,𝑐𝑦
𝑏,𝑓𝑤 ) is the trend 
prediction of the July price of the current year, and 𝐹𝑓,𝑡=7,𝑐𝑦
𝑓𝑤
 is the nearby futures price at the time of 
hedging (Average of the daily futures prices in July of the current year).  
Farm strategy 2 - Hedge in the futures market (Type 2): 
In July each year, the farmer decides whether to hedge next year’s harvest in a futures market. If the 
price in the current July is less than its minimum expected level, then the farmer expects the same to 
happen next July and therefore decides to hedge next year’s harvest in a futures market. The farmer is 
assumed to hedge the entire harvest. If the farmer does not hedge, then the farmer stores next year’s 
harvest and sells it at next year’s monthly base prices. The price the farmer faces next year is given by 
the following conditions: 
If  𝑝𝑓,𝑡78,𝑐𝑦
𝑏,𝑓𝑤 < 𝐸(𝑝𝑓,𝑡=7,𝑐𝑦
𝑏,𝑓𝑤 ) × (1 − 0.1), then the farmer faces 𝑝𝑓,𝑡
𝑠,𝑓𝑤 = 𝑝𝑓,𝑡=7,𝑛𝑦
𝑏,𝑓𝑤 + 𝐹𝑓,𝑡=7,𝑐𝑦
𝑓𝑤 −
𝐹𝑓,𝑡=7,𝑛𝑦
𝑓𝑤
 for next year’s harvest.  Otherwise, the farmer faces 𝑝𝑓,𝑡
𝑏,𝑓𝑤
 during the next year. 
 In the above conditions, 𝑝𝑓,𝑡=7,𝑛𝑦
𝑏,𝑓𝑤
 is the base price in July of next year and 𝐹𝑓,𝑡=7,𝑛𝑦
𝑓𝑤
 is the nearby 
futures price at the time of next year’s harvest (Average of the daily futures prices in July of next 
year).  
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Processor strategy 1 - Six-month contract (Type 2):   
Each month of the year, the processor decides whether to sell flour at monthly base prices or to fix 
prices for the next six months by entering into a contract with the retailer. If the average of the base 
prices in the previous six months is less than the average of the expected base prices in the previous 
six months minus a threshold price drop, then the processor expects the same to happen in the next six 
months and therefore decides to enter into a contract. The contract price is set equal to the base price at 
the time the contract is entered into. If the processor does not enter into a contract, the processor faces 
the monthly base prices. The output price the processor faces during the year is given by the following 
conditions: 
If  
∑ 𝑝𝑝,𝑡−𝑧
𝑏,𝑓𝑤6
𝑧=1
6
<
∑ 𝐸(𝑝𝑝,𝑡−𝑧
𝑏,𝑓𝑤
)6𝑧=1
6
∗ (1 − 0.1) , then  the processor faces  𝑝𝑝,𝑡
𝑠,𝑓𝑤 = 𝑝𝑝,𝑡=𝑐𝑚
𝑏,𝑓𝑤
 for the next six 
months. Otherwise, the processor faces 𝑝𝑝,𝑡
𝑏,𝑓𝑤
 for the next six months. 
In the above conditions, 𝑝𝑝,𝑡=𝑐𝑚
𝑏,𝑓𝑤
 is the base price in the month the contract is entered into. 
 
5.5. Results 
 
The effectiveness of PVMS was evaluated for the Spanish tomato and French wheat chains by 
comparing the base scenario and alternative strategies across different volatility measures. Results for 
the Spanish tomato chain (Table 5.2) are presented first, followed by results for the French wheat 
chain (Table 5.3). 
Spanish tomato chain 
 
Table 5.2 - Price volatility under the base scenario and PVMS: Spanish fresh tomato chain 
Strategies Mean
 
CV Skewness Kurtosis 5
th
 
percentile 
95
th
 
percentile 
Farm:       
Base scenario 0.53 0.34 0.94 4.38 -0.48 0.62 
Cut tomato plant 
after April 
0.58 0.33 0.70 3.60 -0.47 0.67 
Wait and sell 0.57 0.30 0.89 4.47 -0.46 0.59 
Wholesale:       
Absolute margin:       
Base scenario 0.95 0.18 0.90 4.24 -0.24 0.31 
Annual contract 0.95 0.18 0.90 4.25 -0.25 0.33 
Percentage 
margin: 
      
Base scenario 0.76 0.32 0.90 4.24 -0.46 0.59 
Annual contract 0.75 0.32 0.99 4.51 -0.45 0.61 
Note: Mean: mean of the trend predicted prices; CV: 
coefficient of variation of residuals
mean of trend predicted prices
; skewness: skewness of 
residuals; kurtosis: kurtosis of residuals, 5
th
 percentile: 
5th percentile of residuals
mean of trend predicted prices
; 95
th
 percentile: 
95th percentile of residuals
mean of trend predicted prices
. 
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The farm strategy of waiting and selling performs better than the base scenario in terms of a higher 
mean price, a lower CV and a higher 5
th
 percentile. The range within which prices deviate from 
expected level (range between the 5
th
 and 95
th
 percentile) is also narrowest for the strategy of waiting 
and selling (i.e. difference between the absolute value of 0.46 and 0.59). The skewness is highest for 
the base scenario, indicating that a farmer can receive extremely high prices if no PVMS is 
implemented. In contrast, considering the distribution of price residuals (i.e. kurtosis), cutting the 
tomato plant if prices drop significantly after April is a better strategy as it lowers the probability of 
extremely low prices. A risk-averse farmer would choose such a strategy.   
The wholesale strategy of entering into an annual contract performs similarly to the base scenario, in 
particular if margins are fixed in absolute terms. This result indicates that the use of contracts was 
rarely triggered during the sample period (i.e. 2005-2014). As a check, the average historical 
wholesale price, the average base wholesale price with absolute margin and the average base 
wholesale price with percentage margin were calculated and compared for the 2005-2014 period. The 
comparison showed that the average historical price was equal to the average base wholesale output 
price with absolute margin. This indicates that the use of an absolute margin to calculate wholesale 
prices is more consistent with how prices are set by Spanish tomato wholesalers. 
French wheat supply chain 
Table 5.3 - Price volatility under the base scenario and PVMS: French wheat chain 
Strategies Mean
 
CV Skewness Kurtosis 5
th
 
percentile 
95
th
 
percentile 
Farm:       
Base scenario 0.18 0.27 0.38 2.63 -0.31 0.60 
Annual contract with 
futures prices 
0.15 0.18 0.83 3.07 -0.20 0.39 
Hedge in futures 
market 
0.15 0.18 0.83 3.07 -0.21 0.40 
Processor:       
Absolute margin:       
Base scenario 0.53 0.13 0.02 1.92 -0.18 0.21 
Six-month contract 0.54 0.13 0.17 2.39 -0.19 0.22 
Percentage margin:       
Base scenario 0.60 0.26 0.02 1.92 -0.36 0.43 
Six-month contract 0.60 0.26 0.14 2.36 -0.42 0.48 
Note: Mean: mean of the trend predicted prices; CV: 
coefficient of variation of residuals
mean of trend predicted prices
; skewness: skewness of 
residuals; kurtosis: kurtosis of residuals, 5th percentile: 
5th percentile of residuals
mean of trend predicted prices
; 95th percentile: 
95th percentile of residuals
mean of trend predicted prices
.
 
Table 5.3 shows that the two farm strategies perform similarly. The mean price, the CV, the skewness, 
the kurtosis and the 5
th
 percentile are almost the same across these two strategies. Both strategies have 
a lower mean than the base scenario. This indicates that wheat prices are much higher during the year 
than at harvest time. Both strategies reduce the CV relative to the base scenario, indicating that prices 
vary less at harvest time than during the year. Although both strategies result in a lower mean price 
than in the base scenario, the farmer still has a non-zero probability of receiving higher prices under 
these two strategies as indicated by the skewness, which is much higher than in the base scenario. 
Both strategies would be attractive to a risk-averse farmer, as both result in a lower CV and narrower 
range between the 5
th
 and 95
th
 percentiles.  
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The results for the processor show that the six-month contract performs similarly to the base scenario 
in terms of the mean price, the CV, and the 5
th
 and 95
th
 percentiles. However, the contract results in 
higher kurtosis and skewness of residuals. This indicates that, although there is a probability of facing 
extreme output prices if contracts are used (as indicated by the higher kurtosis), these extreme values 
are positively skewed. That is, the processor has a non-zero probability of facing extremely high prices 
for flour. Similar to the Spanish tomato chain, a comparison was made between average base flour 
prices and average historical flour prices. The comparison revealed that French wheat processors set 
flour prices with absolute margins on wheat prices. 
 
5.6. Discussion and conclusions 
 
This paper developed a method to evaluate the effectiveness of PVMS in reducing the price volatility 
faced by food supply chain actors. Using the mean-variance utility framework, a simple trigger rule 
was developed for the implementation of a PVMS. The trigger rule consists of setting a threshold price 
drop from an expected base (spot) price; prices less than this threshold price drop trigger the chain 
actor to implement a strategy. An average percentage that represents this threshold can be directly 
enquired from chain actors and implicitly takes into account other decision variables that influence 
utility, such as the average cost of a strategy, the quantity produced and sold, the production costs and 
the risk attitude of the chain actor. The decision rule adopted in this paper is particularly useful in 
cases of limited data availability. 
It should be noted however, that the threshold price drops considered in this paper did not account for 
differences in the decision variables across strategies and chain actors. Taking into account differences 
in costs across strategies requires the determination of a threshold price drop for each strategy. 
Whereas a costly strategy would result in a higher threshold price drop (i.e. a chain actor can tolerate a 
larger drop in spot prices), a less costly strategy would result in a lower threshold price drop. 
Similarly, the threshold price drop would be lower for a risk-averse chain actor and higher for a risk-
loving chain actor. Future research could take into account differences in threshold price drops by 
enquiring about chain actors’ risk attitudes and about the threshold price drop that would trigger them 
to implement a specific strategy. Enquiring about the threshold price drop for each strategy has the 
added benefit of accommodating a diverse set of strategies. Furthermore, Assefa et al. (2016) have 
shown that food chain actors consider implementing a strategy when the drop in prices is persistent, 
i.e., when prices remain below a threshold level for a certain period of time. This duration could also 
be enquired for each strategy.  
An advantage of the method outlined in this paper is that it can accommodate non-traditional PVMS, 
such as waiting a week and then selling tomatoes or cutting the tomato plant to minimise losses. The 
method is also appropriate for traditional strategies, such as hedging in futures markets and contracts. 
The paper has further shown that the method is suitable to evaluate the effectiveness of strategies for 
both storable (e.g., tomatoes) and non-storable (e.g., wheat) products. For instance, the strategy of 
waiting a week and then selling tomatoes follows from the non-storable nature of tomatoes. Likewise, 
the storable nature of wheat facilitates the existence of futures markets for wheat. 
The results from the Spanish tomato and French wheat chains have shown that long-term contracts do 
not necessarily lead to lower price volatility compared with selling in the spot market. In other studies, 
forward contracts have been shown to reduce price volatility (Heyder et al., 2010; von Davier, 2010; 
Kimura and Anton, 2010).  The effectiveness of contracts depends on the way contract prices are set 
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by the actors and this may explain the different findings between studies. Future research could test 
the sensitivity of results to alternative specifications of contract prices. Various volatility measures 
(i.e., CV, kurtosis, skewness, 5
th
 and 95
th
 percentiles) and mean prices were used to evaluate the 
effectiveness of strategies. Although some of the strategies performed better on some measures, they 
performed worse on other measures, thereby making it difficult to choose a strategy. In such a case, 
information about the risk attitude of the chain actor can provide additional information to support the 
choice of strategy.  
This paper did not explicitly account for the effect of market power at the processing and wholesale 
stages on price volatility. The paper assumed that price volatility at these two stages only depended on 
the spot price volatility in the farm sector (base farm price volatility) and on the PVMS the actors 
implemented. In practice, the presence of market power at the processing, wholesale and retail stages 
can alter the effectiveness of PVMS. For example, powerful retailers wish to maintain stable and low 
consumer prices (Rabobank, 2011) and may therefore not increase the prices that wholesalers or 
processors receive when input costs at these two stages increase. This implies that the wholesale or 
processing output price volatilities calculated using the method described in this paper are likely to be 
lower if the presence of market power at the retail stage is taken into account. Modelling the joint 
effects of market power and PVMS on price volatility is an interesting avenue for further research. It 
should also be noted that, even in the absence of market power, the replication of a strategy by several 
chain actors can alter the effect of the strategy on price volatility. For instance, if all Spanish tomato 
farmers decided to adopt the strategy of waiting one week before selling their tomatoes, then prices 
would drop even more in the week that farmers sell their tomatoes, thereby exacerbating price 
volatility. Modelling the complex pricing interactions of chain actors is an interesting avenue for 
future research. 
A final point concerning this method is the relationship between PVMS for inputs and outputs. This 
paper assumed that actors implement a strategy only to manage output price volatility. Although this 
may reflect reality, relaxing this assumption may lead to a more comprehensive evaluation of the 
effectiveness of a strategy. Assefa et al. (2016) indicated, for instance, that one of the interviewed 
French flour processors altered its wheat purchase strategies as a result of contracts with the retailer. 
To avoid a squeeze in margin caused by a rise in wheat prices during the contract period, the processor 
altered its strategy from buying wheat during the contract period to buying wheat at the time the 
contract was entered into. Such a strategy is expected to affect the volatility of both wheat prices and 
flour prices faced by the processor.  
This paper developed a method to evaluate the effectiveness of PVMS for different actors in a food 
supply chain. The method was illustrated using data from the Spanish fresh tomato and French wheat 
supply chains. The paper also highlighted issues that should be considered in the evaluation of 
strategies along the chain. The method accommodates traditional strategies, such as forward and 
futures contracts, as well as non-traditional strategies, such as those that involve the timing of sales. 
Given that price volatility affects all actors in the food supply chain and that the strategies used by 
chain actors to manage the risk from price volatility are quite diverse (Assefa et al., 2016), further 
research that builds on the method outlined in this paper is necessary. The empirical tractability of the 
method makes it useful for food chain actors and policy makers. Food chain actors can apply the 
method to evaluate the effectiveness of their own strategies. Policy makers can use the method to 
identify chain stages where PVMS are ineffective in reducing price volatility; policy measures can 
then be designed to support these chain stages.     
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Abstract 
This paper calculates premium rates for an agricultural revenue insurance contract for Dutch ware 
potato farmers. Premium rates are calculated for groups of farms categorised according to farms’ 
expected yields and yield variances. The analysis uses balanced panel data on ware potato output and 
inputs from 56 specialised Dutch arable farms and prices of ware potato futures contracts traded in the 
European Energy Exchange, for the period 2010 to 2014. First, a Just-Pope production function is 
estimated to predict each farm’s expected yield and yield variance, which are later used to group farms 
into four categories (i.e. high expected yield, low expected yield, high relative variance and low 
relative variance). Next, the dependencies between prices and yields in each category are modelled 
with a Gaussian and a t copula. Results show that the Gaussian copula best represented the 
dependencies between prices and yields. Estimated premium rates differed across the categories: 
32.1% on guaranteed revenue per hectare for the high expected yield category, 22.2% for low 
expected yield, 33.1% for high relative variance, and 24.0% for the low relative variance category. 
The results imply that charging the same average premium rate to all Dutch ware potato farms can lead 
to adverse selection. Furthermore, using farm-level yields results in higher premium rates than if 
yields are aggregated over farms. 
Key words: Revenue insurance, premium rate, adverse selection, copula, farm heterogeneity, Dutch 
potato  
 
6.1. Introduction  
 
The income of farmers within the European Union (EU) has become increasingly volatile because of 
increases in both price and yield volatility. The increased price volatility can be attributed to the 
continuous liberalisation of EU agricultural markets, combined with decreasing price support (Assefa 
et al., 2016). Although the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) of the EU has traditionally used 
various measures to stabilise prices, the situation has changed over recent decades as various trade 
agreements have required a gradual liberalisation of the EU agricultural market (Meuwissen et al., 
2011; Severeni and Cortignani, 2011). The increase in yield volatility is a result of recurrent extreme 
weather events and more regulated use of herbicides, medicines and vaccines (El Benni et al., 2016). 
Private insurance is available to farmers to cope with yield losses, in addition to the ad hoc disaster 
relief assistance provided by governments for extreme production losses (Bielza et al., 2007a). EU 
agricultural insurance schemes mainly focus on protecting against yield risk and no insurance schemes 
exist that protect farmers against price risk (Osama Ahmed and Teresa Serra, 2015; Bielza et al., 
2007a; European Commission, 2007). Meuwissen et al. (2003, 2008) have attributed the absence of 
revenue or income insurance in the EU to a combination of demand-side factors, such as the existence 
of ad hoc disaster relief within the CAP, and supply-side factors, such as the presence of asymmetric 
information and systemic risks.  
In the current CAP (2014-2020), the European Commission recognises the need to subsidise income 
insurance to help farmers cope with both yield and price volatility (Severeni and Cortignani, 2011; 
Perez Blanco et al., 2014; El Benni et al., 2016). The risk management toolkit contains animal and 
plant insurance (art.37), mutual funds for animal and plant diseases and environmental incidents 
(art.38), and income stabilisation tools (art.39) in the form of mutual funds to address income volatility 
(European Commission, 2016a). In Article 39, income refers to the sum of revenues the farmer 
receives from the market, including any form of public support, deducting input costs (European 
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Commission, 2016a). The case of the Netherlands shows that, despite the legal provisions to support 
the total income of farms in mutual funds, current mutual funds insure mainly against weather and 
disease risks (Meuwissen et al., 2013). It should be noted that few revenue insurance initiatives have 
existed in the EU. A private company in the United Kingdom launched a revenue insurance scheme 
for cereals in 1998, based upon yield statistics from the Home-Grown Cereals Authority and prices of 
LIFFE commodity futures (Bielza et al., 2007a; Meuwissen et al., 2003). However, since the uptake 
was minimal, the scheme was cancelled in the subsequent season (Bielza et al., 2007a). A possible 
reason for the low uptake may have been farmers’ unfamiliarity with derivative types of contracts 
(Meuwissen et al., 2003).  
A proper calculation of premium rates is critical for the efficient implementation of any insurance 
program (Tejeda and Goodwin, 2008). Under- and overvalued premium rates can distort the insurance 
market and may pose a risk to the economic sustainability of insurance programmes (Ahmed and 
Serra, 2015). For an agricultural revenue insurance contract, proper modelling of the dependence 
between prices and yields is necessary for a proper valuation of premium rates. A further aspect for 
consideration is the calculation of premium rates that accurately reflect an individual farmer’s risk 
level. Premium rates calculated in such a manner reduce the problem of adverse selection. Adverse 
selection refers to a situation where mainly farms with higher likelihoods of loss remain in the 
insurance pool because low-risk farms are overcharged and high-risk farms are under-charged 
(Goodwin, 2001; Bielza et al., 2007a). In crop insurance programmes, the problem of adverse 
selection is associated with the actuarial practice of calculating premium rates using the average yield 
in the farm’s geographical area as the insurable yield (Goodwin, 1994). This leads to premium rates 
that are not commensurate with farmers’ likelihoods of losses (Goodwin, 1994). One solution to this 
problem is to use the individual farm’s actual production history when determining the insurable yield 
(Goodwin, 1994). Another solution is to classify farms into homogeneous risk groups (Glauber, 2004). 
Goodwin (1994) proposes the use of observable characteristics (e.g. input use, crop diversification and 
farm size ) that affect yield risk to assign farms to homogenous risk groups. 
A recent development in the agricultural insurance literature is the application of copulas to model 
dependencies between yields of different crops, i.e. yields of the same crop in different geographical 
areas, and between prices and yields. Copulas are flexible instruments that can capture the joint 
distribution of variables without a priori knowledge of and restrictions on the marginal distributions of 
each variable (Tejeda and Goodwin, 2008). Unlike simple correlation coefficients, such as Spearman’s 
rank correlation and Kendall’s tau, copulas account for the state-dependent nature of the dependencies 
between variables by capturing dependencies in the tails of the distributions (Zhu et al., 2008). Only a 
few studies have applied copulas to rate agricultural revenue insurance contracts. For the US market, 
Goodwin and Hungerford (2014) and Zhu et al. (2011) applied copulas to county-level crop yields and 
futures prices of corn and soybeans. Similarly, Ghosh et al. (2011) applied copulas to county-level 
corn yields and futures prices. To the best of our knowledge, the study by Ahmed and Serra (2015) is 
the only study that has applied copulas to rate an agricultural revenue insurance contract within the 
EU. Their case studies focused on the Spanish orange and apple markets. All these studies used 
aggregate yield data instead of farm-level data to evaluate premium rates, which can lead to the 
problem of adverse selection. Related to the use of aggregated yield data, a further limitation of these 
studies is that the premium rate calculations do not account for the risk heterogeneity of farms.  
The objective of this chapter is to calculate premium rates that account for farm risk heterogeneity for 
an agricultural revenue insurance contract in the Dutch ware potato sector. The EU ware potato sector 
is a free market with no market regulations that influence market prices (European Commission, 
2016b). This makes EU ware potato farmers more susceptible to price volatility than farmers in 
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regulated markets, such as grains (Melyukhina, 2011). Given the policy support for income 
stabilisation tools for mutual funds, current  Dutch mutual funds could benefit from the provision of 
revenue insurance contracts to their member farmers. The implementation of such schemes can be 
facilitated by the existence of futures contracts for ware potatoes traded in the EEX, which can provide 
objective reference prices to rate agricultural revenue insurance contracts.   
The chapter models the joint dependence of prices and yields using copulas and the premium 
calculations account for possible risk heterogeneity that may exist among Dutch potato farms. This 
chapter uses farm-level data to calculate premium rates, enabling a more accurate assessment of the 
loss likelihoods of individual farms. To account for the risk heterogeneity of farms, premium rates are 
calculated for homogeneous risk groups of farms. Categorisation of farms is based on yield variances 
and expected yields, as both determine the farms’ likelihoods of losses. Farms’ expected yields and 
yield variances are derived from the estimation of a Just-Pope production function, thereby providing 
a theoretical basis for the estimation of expected yields and variances.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 6.2 provides a brief description of the EU 
and Dutch ware potato sectors. Section 6.3 provides the methods. Section 6.4 presents the data 
employed. Section 6.5 presents and discusses the results and section 6.6 concludes the chapter.  
 
6.2. The potato sector in the EU and the Netherlands 
 
Major producers of ware potato in the EU are Germany, the Netherlands, France, the UK and Belgium 
(termed the EU-5) (European Commission, 2007; Bunte et al., 2009). Although Poland has long been 
a major producer, the long-term decline in its production has strengthened the market position of the 
EU-5. The concentration of ware potato in the EU-5 can be attributed to the production cost advantage 
of the region and because these countries are situated near big concentrations of consumers (European 
Commission, 2007). No common market organisation exists within the EU for the ware potato sector 
(European Commission, 2007; Bielza et al., 2007b), which is the most competitive sector in EU 
agriculture (European Commission, 2016b). The sector has not benefited from any CAP interventions, 
either in the form of price support or coupled direct subsidies (European Commission, 2007); however 
it is eligible for decoupled direct payments under the Single Area Payment Scheme (European 
Commission, 2007). The absence of regulation in the potato market results in potato prices being more 
volatile than prices of other crops, such as grains (Melyukhina, 2011). In addition, potato markets are 
poorly integrated due to their perishable nature, which limits their transportability (Meuwissen et al., 
2011). Potato prices are therefore also more volatile than the prices of commodities with highly 
integrated markets, which can benefit from negative correlation of yields in widely dispersed places 
(Meuwissen et al., 2011). According to Bielza et al. (2007b), ware potato growers can be exposed to 
an inter-seasonal price coefficient of variation that ranges from 30% to 70% (Bielza et al., 2007b).   
Potato is one of the most important arable crops in the Netherlands and the most susceptible to 
weather conditions (Langeveld et al., 2003). Ware potatoes are usually planted in April and harvested 
in October, and cultivated on both sandy and clays soils (Langeveld et al., 2003). Major weather risks 
affecting potato yields are frosts that occur around the planting season and wet conditions at harvest 
time (Botzen et al., 2010; Langeveld et al., 2003). Ware potatoes are produced within a multi-crop 
rotational plan by arable farms (Botzen et al., 2010; Ogurtsov et al, 2007). Rotation helps to enhance 
the fertility of the soil on which potato is grown and to reduce weeds (European Commission, 2007). 
Using panel data from 97 Dutch arable farms covering a period of six years (2002-2007), Melyukhina 
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(2011) have shown that price risk is more prominent in Dutch arable farming than yield risk. The 
research attributed the relatively low yield risk to the mild climatic conditions in the Netherlands and 
the advanced production technologies used. The research further found that Dutch ware potato prices 
exhibit large variability compared to crops such as sugar that have rigid price regulations.  
Contracts between potato growers and the downstream stages of the chain are widely used to manage 
price volatility in the Dutch potato sector (European Commission, 2007; Bunte et al., 2009). The 
contracts establish a minimum guaranteed price, which may be subject to price revisions within a 
certain price band (European Commission, 2007). Insurance contracts are also used to manage income 
risk. Perils covered under yield insurance contracts for arable crops include extreme precipitation, hail, 
storm and brownrot (Ogurtsov et al., 2009; Meuwissen et al., 2013). Although futures markets could 
have been a solution to manage potato price volatility, the use of this instrument among Dutch potato 
farmers is very limited. The futures markets for potatoes and hogs that operated in the Amsterdam 
exchange ceased to operate in June 2006 because of a lack of market liquidity (European Commission, 
2007; Melyukhina, 2011). Futures contracts for ware potato are currently traded in the European 
Energy Exchange (EEX) in Leipzig, Germany.  
 
6.3. Method 
 
The following steps were taken to calculate the revenue insurance premium rates for Dutch ware 
potato farms. First, farms were categorised according to their expected yields and yield variances. The 
Just-Pope (1978) production function provides the theoretical basis needed to compute the expected 
yields and yield variances. Next, premium rates were computed for each category of farms. The 
theoretical framework underlying the Just-Pope production function is presented in section 3.1. This is 
followed by the empirical frameworks to estimate the Just-Pope production function (section 3.2.1), to 
categorise the farms (section 3.2.2) and to calculate the premium rates for each category of farms 
(section 3.2.3).  
 
6.3.1. Theoretical framework – Just-Pope production function  
 
The Just-Pope production function is specified as  
 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝑓(𝑋𝑖𝑡) + 𝜀𝑖𝑡√ℎ(𝑋𝑖𝑡) ,           (1) 
 
where 𝑌𝑖𝑡 is the output of farm 𝑖 at time 𝑡, 𝑓(𝑋𝑖𝑡) is expected output, which can take any functional 
form, 𝑋𝑖𝑡 are the inputs used by farm 𝑖 at time 𝑡, and  𝜀𝑖𝑡√ℎ(𝑋𝑖𝑡) is the stochastic part of the output. 
Specifying 𝜀𝑖𝑡√ℎ(𝑋𝑖𝑡) = 𝑢𝑖𝑡, the output variance is given as  
 
var(𝑌𝑖𝑡) = var(𝑢𝑖𝑡) = 𝐸(𝑢𝑖𝑡
2 ) = 𝐸 (𝜀𝑖𝑡
2 √ℎ(𝑋𝑖𝑡)
2
) = 𝜎𝜀
2ℎ(𝑋𝑖𝑡) = ℎ(𝑋𝑖𝑡).      (2) 
 
In equation (2), the variance of the stochastic term 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is given by 𝜎𝜀
2 = 1 and its mean by 𝐸(𝜀𝑖𝑡) = 0. 
The output variance as a function of inputs is given by ℎ(𝑋𝑖𝑡), where ℎ can take any functional form. 
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The Just-Pope production function allows the effects of inputs on expected output to differ from the 
effects of inputs on output variance (Gardebroek et al., 2010), that is 
𝜕𝑓(𝑋𝑖𝑡)
𝜕𝑋𝑖𝑡
≠
𝜕ℎ(𝑋𝑖𝑡)
𝜕𝑋𝑖𝑡
.  
 
 
6.3.2. Empirical framework 
 
a. Estimation of a Just-Pope production function 
 
A quadratic specification was chosen to estimate equation (1). A quadratic specification enables the 
inclusion of inputs with zero values, unlike the translog or the log-linear specification. Moreover, 
unlike the linear specification, the quadratic specification has a theoretical underpinning because it can 
capture possible non-linear relationships between inputs and output levels (i.e. output levels may start 
decreasing if input level applications exceed a certain threshold). The quadratic specification of 
equation (1) is given by 
 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + ∑ 𝛼𝑘𝑋𝑘𝑖𝑡
5
𝑘=1 + ∑ ∑ 𝛼𝑘𝑗
5
𝑗=1 𝑋𝑘𝑖𝑡𝑋𝑗𝑖𝑡
5
𝑘=1 + 𝜃1𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃2𝑡𝑖𝑡
2 + ∑ 𝜑𝑘𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑋𝑘𝑖𝑡
5
𝑘=1 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡.   (3) 
 
Equation (3) was estimated using fixed-effect estimation to capture the effects of unobserved farm-
specific characteristics that affect output, such as soil quality and management. In equation (3), 𝑌𝑖𝑡 is 
the ware potato output of farm 𝑖 observed in year 𝑡, 𝛼𝑘 are coefficients that indicate the effects of 
inputs on the output of farm 𝑖 at time 𝑡, and 𝑋𝑘𝑖𝑡 (or 𝑋𝑗𝑖𝑡) indicate the inputs used by each farm. Based 
on previous econometric studies of arable farms (e.g. Gardebroek et al (2010) and Tiedmann and 
Latacz-Lohmann (2013)), five inputs were included in the analysis, i.e. seedling (𝑘 = 1), protection 
(𝑘 = 2), energy (𝑘 = 3), fertiliser (𝑘 = 4) and ware potato land area (𝑘 = 5). All five inputs used in 
the estimation of equation (3) were used only for potato production. The time trend is given by 𝑡 and 
reflects technological changes. The coefficients 𝛼𝑘𝑗 indicate the effects of the interactions between 
inputs, and 𝜑𝑘 indicate the interactions between inputs and the time trend. Production theory states 
that output is increasing in inputs. 
 
A translog specification was used to model the output variance ℎ(𝑋𝑖𝑡). The translog specification of 
ℎ(𝑋𝑖𝑡) in equation (2) is given by 
 
𝑙𝑛|𝑢𝑖𝑡| = 𝛽 + ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝑙𝑛𝑋𝑘𝑖𝑡
6
𝑘=1 + ∑ ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝑗
6
𝑗=1 𝑙𝑛𝑋𝑘𝑖𝑡𝑙𝑛𝑋𝑗𝑖𝑡
6
𝑘=1 + ∑ 𝛾𝑝𝐷𝑝𝑖𝑡
10
𝑝=1 .     (4)
                 
A fixed-effect approach was not used to estimate equation (4), in order to be able to investigate the 
effect of farm location on output variance. This was of interest because geographical locations 
generally form the basis to construct farm insurance pools. The effects of location-specific factors, 
such as weather conditions and soil quality, were captured by including location dummies. The 
translog specification provides positive values for |𝑢𝑖𝑡|, which were used to categorise farms based on 
yield variances. In equation (4), the location dummies are given by 𝐷𝑝𝑖𝑡, with 𝐷𝑝𝑖𝑡 = 1 for location 𝑝 
and 0 otherwise. Eleven provinces were included: Drenthe, Flevoland, Friesland, Gelderland, 
Groningen, Limburg, Noord-Brabant, Noord-Holland, Overijssel, Zeeland and Zuid-Holland. Zuid-
Holland  was used as a reference. The effect of each location is given by 𝛾𝑝. The effects of crop 
diversification, 𝑙𝑛𝑋6𝑖𝑡 (i.e. 𝑘 = 6), were also included in the variance equation. Diversification is 
measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman index. The inputs, 𝑋𝑘𝑖𝑡 for 𝑘 = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, are as defined in 
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equation (3). Crop diversification was expected to have an increasing effect on output variance 
because farms that diversify may take more risky production decisions due to the opportunity to 
compensate output losses in one crop by gains from another crop. 
 
 
b. Farm categorisation 
 
The first step to categorise farms was to calculate each farm’s predicted expected output (i.e. ?̂?𝑖𝑡) and 
predicted output variance (i.e. 𝑙𝑛|𝑢𝑖𝑡|̂ ) using the coefficients estimated in equations (3) and (4). The 
predicted absolute values of the residuals were retrieved by taking the exponential of the predicted 
output variance (i.e. exp(𝑙𝑛|𝑢𝑖𝑡|̂ ) = |?̂?𝑖𝑡|  ). Next, the predicted expected outputs ( ?̂?𝑖𝑡) were divided 
by potato land area to obtain the expected yields, denoted as ?̂?𝑖𝑡
𝑒 =
?̂?𝑖𝑡
𝑋5𝑖𝑡
. The predicted absolute values 
of the residuals (|?̂?𝑖𝑡| ) were also divided by potato land area and then by expected yield to obtain the 
ratio of yield variance to expected yield. This ratio is denoted as ?̂?𝑖𝑡
𝑣𝑎𝑟 = 
|?̂?𝑖𝑡|   
𝑋5𝑖𝑡
?̂?𝑖𝑡
𝑒 . Since the ratio is a 
relative measure of variance, it enables the comparison of farms based on their yield variances. In the 
remainder of this chapter, this ratio is referred to as the relative variance.  
 
Premium rate simulations were conducted for a reference year 𝑇. Four categories of farms were 
identified: farms with high expected yield, low expected yield, high relative variance and low relative 
variance. The conditions for categorising a farm in each of the four categories are given by:  
 
If ?̂?𝑖𝑇
𝑒 > ?̂?𝑇
𝑒, then farm i was categorised as a high expected yield farm;    (5) 
 
If ?̂?𝑖𝑇
𝑒 ≤ ?̂?𝑇
𝑒, then farm i was categorised as a low expected yield farm;      (6) 
 
If ?̂?𝑖
𝑣𝑎𝑟 > ?̂?𝑣𝑎𝑟, then farm i was categorised as a farm with a high relative variance; and  (7) 
 
If  ?̂?𝑖
𝑣𝑎𝑟 ≤ ?̂?𝑣𝑎𝑟, then farm i was categorised as a farm with a low relative variance.    (8) 
 
In conditions (5) and (6), ?̂?𝑖𝑇
𝑒  indicates the expected yield of farm 𝑖 in year 𝑇 and ?̂?𝑇
𝑒 indicates the 
average of the expected yields of all farms in year 𝑇. In conditions (7) and (8), ?̂?𝑖
𝑣𝑎𝑟 indicates the 
relative variance of farm 𝑖 averaged over 𝑡 (i.e. average of ?̂?𝑖𝑡
𝑣𝑎𝑟over 𝑡) and ?̂?𝑣𝑎𝑟 indicates the relative 
variance averaged over 𝑖 and 𝑡 (i.e. average of ?̂?𝑖𝑡
𝑣𝑎𝑟 over 𝑖 and 𝑡). Note that the relative yields of a 
farm for all the years (and not only for year 𝑇) were used to categorise farms based on their relative 
yields.  
 
 
c. Premium rate calculations per category  
 
Premium rates were calculated for a reference year 𝑇 for each of the four categories defined in 
equations (5) to (8). For comparison, an average premium rate for all farms was also calculated. Prior 
to simulating the premium rates, the realised yields for the reference year 𝑇 and the realised log price 
returns were calculated as  
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?̃?𝑖𝑇 = ?̂?𝑖𝑇
𝑒 × (1 +
𝑢𝑖𝑡
𝑋5𝑖𝑡
?̂?𝑖𝑡
𝑒 )  and         (9) 
?̃?𝑡 = log (
𝐹𝐻,𝑡
𝐹𝑃,𝑡
).              (10) 
In equation (9), ?̃?𝑖𝑇 is the realised yield for farm 𝑖 for year 𝑇, ?̂?𝑖𝑇
𝑒  is the expected yield in year 𝑇, and 
?̂?𝑖𝑡
𝑒  is the expected yield in year 𝑡. This is given by  ?̂?𝑖𝑡
𝑒 =
?̂?𝑖𝑡
𝑋5𝑖𝑡
, where ?̂?𝑖𝑡 is predicted by equation (3). 
Note that 
𝑢𝑖𝑡
𝑋5𝑖𝑡
?̂?𝑖𝑡
𝑒  is used in equation (9) instead of ?̂?𝑖𝑡
𝑣𝑎𝑟, where 𝑢𝑖𝑡 is the actual residual derived from 
equation (3). This was because ?̂?𝑖𝑡
𝑣𝑎𝑟 does not distinguish between positive and negative residuals; this 
distinction was needed to generate the realised yields. In equation (10), ?̃?𝑡 is the log price return in year 
𝑡, 𝐹𝐻,𝑡 is the price of a futures contract expiring in the harvest month of year 𝑡, and 𝐹𝑃,𝑡 is the planting 
price of a futures contract expiring in the harvest month of year 𝑡.  
The dependence structure of realised yields (?̃?𝑖𝑇) and log price returns (?̃?𝑡) was represented by a 
copula. An m-dimensional copula given by 𝐶(𝐹1(𝑥1), 𝐹2(𝑥1),… , 𝐹𝑚(𝑥𝑚)) is defined as any 
multivariate distribution function in the unit hypercube [0; 1]𝑚 with uniform 𝑈[0; 1] marginal 
distributions (Zhu et al., 2008; Goodwin and Hungerford, 2014; Ahmed and Serra, 2015). The 
marginal distributions of 𝑥1, 𝑥2, … , 𝑥𝑚 are given by 𝐹1(𝑥1), 𝐹2(𝑥2), … , 𝐹𝑚(𝑥𝑚) respectively, where 𝑥 
can refer to any variables for which the dependence structure is of interest (i.e. realised yields (?̃?𝑖𝑇) 
and log price returns (?̃?𝑡) in this chapter). According to Sklar’s (1959) theorem, every joint distribution 
𝐹(𝑥1, 𝑥2, … , 𝑥𝑚) with marginal distribution functions 𝐹1, 𝐹2, … , 𝐹𝑚 can be written as  
𝐹(𝑥1, 𝑥2, … , 𝑥𝑚) = 𝐶(𝐹1(𝑥1), 𝐹2(𝑥1),… , 𝐹𝑚(𝑥𝑚); 𝜃),        (11) 
where 𝜃 is a vector of dependence parameters of the copula that measure the dependence between the 
marginals (Zhu et al, 2008). 
The vector of dependence parameters 𝜃 was estimated in two steps. In a first step, the marginal 
distributions of the log returns and the realised yields were determined. Following Goodwin and 
Hungerford (2014), rank based empirical distributions were used to represent the marginal 
distributions. To generate the empirical distribution, each data series was first ranked from the smallest 
to the largest value across time. Then the following equation was used to generate the empirical 
distribution of each variable: 
?̂?𝑚,𝑡(𝑥𝑚,𝑡) =
1
𝑁
∑ 1{𝑥𝑚 ≤ 𝑥𝑚,𝑡}
𝑁
𝑡=1 ,         (12) 
where ?̂?𝑚,𝑡(𝑥𝑚,𝑡) is the empirical marginal distribution of 𝑥𝑚 (i.e. log price returns or realised yields), 
𝑁 is the total number of years, and 1{𝑥𝑚 ≤ 𝑥𝑚,𝑡} is the indicator function, with 1{𝑥𝑚 ≤ 𝑥𝑚,𝑡} is 1 if 
𝑥𝑚 ≤ 𝑥𝑚,𝑡 and 0 otherwise. 
In the second step, the vector of copula parameters 𝜃 was estimated by fitting a copula to the 
underlying marginal distributions obtained in equation (12). A Gaussian and a t copula were selected 
because they allow for possible negative correlations between prices and realised yields. Furthermore, 
the t copula allows for tail dependence between prices and realised yields whereas the Gaussian copula 
does not.  
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Following Goodwin and Hungerford (2014), a distribution of premium rates was obtained by first 
randomly drawing (with replacement) two farms from the farms available in a category (e.g. farms 
with high expected yields). Then either a Gaussian or t copula was fitted to the marginal distributions 
of the realised yields (?̃?𝑖𝑇) of the selected two farms and the log price returns (?̃?𝑡) (i.e. a three-
dimensional copula). From the fitted copulas, 500 realised log price returns and 500 realised yields 
were simulated for each farm for year 𝑇 by assuming a normal distribution for both log price returns 
and realised yields. The simulated realised yields for year 𝑇 are denoted by ?̌?𝑖𝑇 and the simulated 
futures prices at harvest for year 𝑇 are given by   
?̌?𝐻,𝑇 = exp(?̌?𝑡) ∗ 𝐹𝑃,𝑇.            (13) 
In equation (13), ?̌?𝐻,𝑇 is the simulated harvest price for year 𝑇, ?̌?𝑡 denotes the simulated log price 
return, and 𝐹𝑃,𝑇 is the observed planting price of a futures contract expiring in the harvest month of 
year 𝑇. The premium rates for the two randomly selected  farms were calculated as  
𝑃𝑅1,𝑇 =
𝐸[(?̂?1𝑇
𝑒 ×𝐹𝑃,𝑇− ?̌?1𝑇×?̌?𝐻,𝑇)𝐼(?̌?1𝑇×?̌?𝐻,𝑇≤?̂?1𝑇
𝑒 ×𝐹𝑃,𝑇)]
?̂?1𝑇
𝑒 ×𝐹𝑃,𝑇
  and     (14) 
𝑃𝑅2,𝑇 =
𝐸[(?̂?2𝑇
𝑒 ×𝐹𝑃,𝑇− ?̌?2𝑇×?̌?𝐻,𝑇)𝐼(?̌?2𝑇×?̌?𝐻,𝑇≤?̂?2𝑇
𝑒 ×𝐹𝑃,𝑇)]
?̂?2𝑇
𝑒 ×𝐹𝑃,𝑇
,        (15) 
where 𝑃𝑅1,𝑇 is the premium rate for farm 1, ?̂?1𝑇
𝑒  is farm 1’s guaranteed yield and also the farm’s 
expected yield for year 𝑇,  is the coverage rate (assumed at 75%), 𝐹𝑃,𝑇 is the guaranteed price, ?̌?1𝑇 is 
the simulated yield of farm 1, and 𝐼 is an indicator equal to 1 if ?̌?1𝑇 × ?̌?𝐻,𝑇 ≤ ?̂?1𝑇
𝑒 × 𝐹𝑃,𝑇 and 0 
otherwise. Similarly, 𝑃𝑅2,𝑇 is the revenue insurance premium rate for farm 2,  ?̂?2𝑇
𝑒  is farm 2’s 
guaranteed yield, which is equal to the farm’s expected yield for year 𝑇, and ?̌?2𝑇 is the simulated yield 
of farm 2. Note that the premium rates are pure premiums and do not account for transaction costs.  
The loss costs and loss probabilities for the two randomly selected farms are given by  
𝐿𝐶1,𝑇 = 𝐸[[(?̂?1𝑇
𝑒 × 𝐹𝑃,𝑇 − ?̌?1𝑇 × ?̌?𝐻,𝑇)𝐼(?̌?1𝑇 × ?̌?𝐻,𝑇 ≤ ?̂?1𝑇
𝑒 × 𝐹𝑃,𝑇)],    (16) 
𝐿𝐶2,𝑇 = 𝐸[(?̂?2𝑇
𝑒 × 𝐹𝑃,𝑇 − ?̌?2𝑇 × ?̌?𝐻,𝑇)𝐼(?̌?2𝑇 × ?̌?𝐻,𝑇 ≤ ?̂?2𝑇
𝑒 × 𝐹𝑃,𝑇)],      (17) 
𝐿𝑃1,𝑇 = 𝐸(𝐼(?̌?1𝑇 × ?̌?𝐻,𝑇 ≤ ?̂?1𝑇
𝑒 × 𝐹𝑃,𝑇))  and       (18) 
𝐿𝑃2,𝑇 = 𝐸(𝐼(?̌?2𝑇 × ?̌?𝐻,𝑇 ≤ ?̂?2𝑇
𝑒 × 𝐹𝑃,𝑇)).        (19) 
In the above equations, 𝐿𝐶1,𝑇 is the loss cost for farm 1 for year 𝑇, 𝐿𝐶2,𝑇 is the loss cost for farm 2, 
𝐿𝑃1,𝑇 is the loss probability for farm 1 for year 𝑇 and 𝐿𝑃2,𝑇 is the loss probability for farm 2. 
The premium rates, loss costs and loss probabilities defined in equations (14) to (19) were calculated 
for 5000 draws of two farms. This provided a distribution of premium rates, loss costs and loss 
probabilities for the first category of farms. The entire process was then repeated for the remaining 
three categories of farms and also for all of the farms without any categorisation.  
To describe the heterogeneity of farms within a category, the mean, median, 2.5th percentile and 
97.5th percentile of the simulated premium rates (i.e. 5000 pairs of 𝑃𝑅1,𝑇 and 𝑃𝑅2,𝑇) were determined. 
Then, the loss costs and the loss probabilities were determined for the farms with premium rates equal 
to the 2.5th and 97.5th percentiles and the medians of the simulated premium rates. For each draw of 
farms, the AIC, BIC and log likelihood were calculated for the fitted three-dimensional Gaussian and t 
96 
 
copulas. The number of times each copula resulted in the lowest AIC and BIC and the highest log 
likelihood were then counted. The copula that performs best on these three measures (i.e. has the 
highest counts) better represents the data, and is therefore the preferred copula (Goodwin and 
Hungerford, 2014).  
 
6.4. Data 
 
Balanced panel data from 56 specialised Dutch arable farms for the period 2010-2014 were obtained 
from the Dutch Farm Accountancy Data Network (FADN). The data set consisted of ware potato 
output, ware potato land area, and expenditure on seedling, protection (e.g. herbicides and pesticides), 
fertilisers and energy materials (e.g. fuel) used for ware potato production. Producer price indexes 
(base year 2010) were obtained from Eurostat for Dutch potato seed, plant protection products and 
pesticides, fertiliser and soil improvers, and energy and lubricants. These price indexes were used to 
deflate the costs of seedling, protection, fertiliser and energy materials used for ware potato 
production. The panel data also included the province of each farm (i.e. Drenthe, Flevoland, Friesland, 
Gelderland, Groningen, Limburg, Noord-Brabant, Noord-Holland, Overijssel, Zeeland, Zuid-Holland) 
and the land area per farm of flower bulbs, vegetables, horticulture, wheat, barley, seed potato, starch 
potato, sugar beet and seed onions. The land areas under each crop and the ware potato land areas 
were used to calculate the Hirfindhal-Hirshman index (HHI), which measures each farm’s degree of 
crop diversification.  
 
The ware potato output, seedling, protection, energy and fertiliser data were rescaled by dividing each 
item by 100000. The ware potato land area data was rescaled by dividing the values by 10. In addition 
to the above FADN data, planting (April) and harvest (November) prices of a November contract of 
European processing potatoes traded in the European Energy Exchange (EEX) were obtained from the 
website barchart.com for the period 2010-2014.  Table 6.1 presents the descriptive statistics of the data 
used in this chapter. 
 
Table 6.1 – Description of data 
 
Variables
1
  Units  Symbols Mean 
Ware potato output 100000 kg 𝑌𝑖𝑡  14.114 
Seedling 
2
 €/100000 𝑋1𝑖𝑡  0.225 
Protection 
2
 €/100000 𝑋2𝑖𝑡  0.176 
Energy 
2
 €/100000 𝑋3𝑖𝑡  0.002 
Fertiliser 
2
 €/100000 𝑋4𝑖𝑡  0.081 
Ware potato land area Hectares/10  𝑋5𝑖𝑡  2.703 
Crop diversification Herfindhal-Hirschman index 𝑋6𝑖𝑡  0.318 
April futures price €/ton 𝐹𝑃,𝑡  109.458 
November futures price €/ton 𝐹𝐻,𝑡  127.600 
Number of farms   56 
1
All inputs are used only for ware potato production. 
2 
Deflated expenditures, with 2010 as base year. 
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6.5. Results and discussion 
 
6.5.1. Farm categorisation 
 
The estimated coefficients of the Just-Pope production function presented in equations (3) and (4) are 
reported in Table A-1 and A-2 of the Appendix. The estimated coefficients cannot be interpreted 
directly because both the expected output and output variance equations of the Just-Pope production 
function are not linear in inputs. Therefore, the marginal effects of each input were calculated for both 
equations and presented in Table 6.2 (expected output) and Table 6.3 (output variance). The marginal 
effects are the first derivatives of each equation with respect to each input and were evaluated at the 
mean values of the inputs. Although not all of the marginal effects reported in Table 6.2 were 
statistically significant, the positive signs indicate that all production inputs had output-increasing 
effects. Only protection (i.e. herbicides and pesticides) and land area had a statistically significant 
effect on expected output. The results can be compared with those of Gardebroek et al (2010), who 
estimated a Just-Pope production function using panel data from Dutch organic and conventional 
arable farms for the period 1990 to 1999. Similar to this chapter, they found that protection and land 
area had a statistically significant and positive effect on the expected output of conventional farms. 
Furthermore, they also found that all inputs, except for fertilisers, had an output-increasing effect. 
Fertilisers had a significant and negative effect on the expected output of conventional farms, which 
the authors attributed to over-fertilisation of land. 
Table 6.2 - Marginal effects of inputs on expected output 
Variable Marginal effect Probability  
Seedling  0.856 0.787 
Protection  11.711** 0.010 
Energy  42.374 0.513 
Fertiliser  0.278 0.969 
Ware potato land area 4.055** 0.000 
**indicates significant values at the 5% level of significance. 
The results in Table 6.3 indicate that the marginal effects of inputs on output variance can differ from 
the marginal effects on expected output. For instance, while seedling had a positive and non-
significant effect on expected output, the effect on output variance was negative and statistically 
significant. The negative effect indicates that improved seedling technologies reduce output 
fluctuations. This result is similar to that of Tiedmann and Latacz-Lohman (2013), who estimated a 
quadratic expected output equation and a linear output variance equation, using panel data from 
German organic and conventional arable farms for the period 1999 to 2007. Table 6.3 shows that land 
area had a positive and significant effect on output variance; this result is again similar to that of 
Tiedmann and Latacz-Lohman (2013) for conventional farms. This is an indication that larger farms 
are less able to react quickly to unfavourable weather conditions at harvest or planting times 
(Tiedmann and Latacz-Lohman, 2013). Although Gardebroek et al. (2010) also found a positive effect 
of land area on the output variance of conventional farms, the effect was not statistically significant. 
The location of a farm was included in the output variance equation. Table 6.3 shows that the location 
of farms can affect output variance. The differing effects of farm location on output variance indicate 
variation in soil types and weather conditions across farms.  
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Table 6.3 - Marginal effects of inputs on output variance 
Variable  Marginal effect Probability 
Seedling  -0.624** 0.023 
Protection  0.353 0.240 
Fertiliser  -0.321 0.144 
Ware potato land area 0.830** 0.037 
HHI (Herfindhal-Hirshman Index) -0.131 0.679 
Drenthe -0.455 0.355 
Flevoland -0.714** 0.010 
Friesland -0.386 0.525 
Gelderland -3.071* 0.092 
Groningen -0.908** 0.026 
Limburg 0.393 0.398 
Noord-Brabant -0.398 0.233 
Noord-Holland -0.103 0.762 
Zeeland 0.417 0.529 
Zuid-Holland -0.037 0.879 
*and **indicate significant values at the 5% and 10% levels of significance, respectively. 
 
Overall, these findings support Goodwin’s (1994) suggestion that observable characteristics, such as 
input use, should be used to properly determine the expected output and output variance of individual 
farms. The results in Table 6.2 and 6.3 indicate that input use does explain changes in expected output 
and output variance and can therefore be used by insurance companies to calculate premiums. 
Knowledge of expected output and output variance enables insurers to categorise farms accordingly 
and calculate premium rates commensurate with expected output and risk.  
 
 
6.5.2. Premium rates, loss costs and loss probabilities per category  
 
The distributions of loss costs, premium rates and loss probabilities for each category of farms are 
reported in Table 6.4 for the Gaussian Copula and in Table 6.5 for the t copula. The variation in the 
loss costs, premium rates and loss probabilities reported in both Table 6.4 and 6.5 shows that farms 
were very heterogeneous, both within and across the four categories of farms. For example, the 
category-specific loss costs differed by at least €1000 between farms with premium rates equal to the 
2.5th percentile and farms with premium rates equal to the 97.5
th
 percentile of the simulated premium 
rates. This variation indicates that calculating a single average premium rate for all farms can lead to 
the problem of adverse selection. This is further illustrated by comparing the average premium rate 
with the category-specific rates (see for instance the mean premium rate in the last column of Table 
6.4). For instance, charging a premium rate of 26.3% on guaranteed revenue per hectare 
underestimates the riskiness of farms in the high relative variance category (which should instead be 
charged a rate equal to 33.1%) and overestimates the riskiness of farms in the low relative variance 
category (which should be charged a rate equal to 24%).   
 
Both Table 6.4 and 6.5 show that farms with a high expected yield had higher loss costs, premium 
rates and loss probabilities than farms with a low expected yield. Similarly, farms with a high relative 
variance had higher loss costs, premium rates and loss probabilities than farms with a low relative 
variance. These results were consistent for all the moments of the distributions of loss costs, premium 
rates and loss probabilities (i.e. 2.5th and 97.5th percentiles, means and medians), except for the 2.5th 
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percentile of loss costs, premium rates and loss probabilities for farms in the low relative variance 
category. A further check was conducted to see if the farms with high expected yield were the same 
farms as those with high relative variance. The results are reported in the last two rows of Table 6.4 
and 6.5, and show that 11 of the 17 farms with high relative variance also had high expected yield. 
Similarly, 32 of the 39 farms with low relative variance also had low expected output. This finding 
contradicts the finding of Skees and Reed (1986), that farms with a higher expected yield should be 
charged a lower premium than farms with a lower expected yield because the former have a lower 
relative risk. A possible explanation for the difference in results is the method used to measure 
expected yields and yield variances. Whereas Skees and Reed (1986) calculated expected yields and 
variances using actual yield data, this chapter used predictions from the Just-Pope function.  
 
Table 6.4 – Simulated premium rates, loss costs and loss probabilities using a Gaussian copula 
 
 Expected yield Relative variance
2
  Overall 
 High Low High Low 
Loss cost
1 
     
2.5th percentile 1234.801 243.623 433.8991 748.106 700 
Median 2014.491 952.443 1883.194 1088.561 1222.208 
97.5th percentile 3951.712 1508.218 3928.19 1677.565 2993.409 
Mean 2019.589 979.465 1984.987 1119.002 1363.167 
Premium rate
      
2.5th percentile 0.234 0.067 0.121 0.181 0.171 
Median 0.311 0.217 0.332 0.238 0.254 
97.5th percentile 0.499 0.326 0.496 0.318 0.439 
Mean 0.321 0.222 0.331 0.240 0.263 
Loss probability      
2.5th percentile 0.485 0.180 0.265 0.403 0.388 
Median 0.588 0.474 0.597 0.484 0.515 
97.5th percentile 0.791 0.632 0.767 0.597 0.746 
Mean 0.596 0.481 0.587 0.489 0.522 
Number of farms 19 37 17 39 56 
Number of farms in high 
expected yield and high 
relative variance categories 
11  11   
Number of farms in low 
expected yield and low 
relative variance categories 
 32  32  
1
Loss costs are expressed in euro per hectare. 
2
 The ratio of yield variance to expected yield. 
 
A comparison of Table 6.4 and 6.5 shows that, although loss costs per category differed between the 
Gaussian and the t copula, the premium rates and the loss probabilities were almost the same. This 
indicates that not much tail dependence is captured by the t copula. That is, the dependence between 
Dutch ware potato prices and yields is not state-dependent (for example, the negative dependence 
between prices and yields does not get stronger in times of extremely low yields). A close examination 
of the loss costs obtained with the t copula showed no clear pattern in the differences between the loss 
costs calculated with the Gaussian and the t copula. If negative dependence occurred in the tails of the 
distribution (i.e. both extremely low prices and extremely low yields will not occur at the same time), 
then the loss costs, loss probabilities and premium rates from the t copula would be expected to be 
lower than those from the Gaussian copula. The results in Table 6.5 show, however, that it is unclear 
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whether there is positive or negative dependence in the tails of the joint distribution of Dutch ware 
potato prices and yields. These results contrast with those of Goodwin and Hungerford (2014), who 
found that the Gaussian copula overpriced risk compared to the t copula. They used US corn and soya 
county-level yield and price data for the period 1960-2012. The difference in results may be because 
county-level yield data are more negatively correlated in the tails of the price and yield distributions 
than farm-level data. For instance, an extremely low yield for an individual farm may not necessarily 
result in extremely high prices, whereas this is more likely if a geographically aggregated yield is 
used.   
 
The number of times each copula resulted in the highest log likelihood, the lowest AIC and the lowest 
BIC values were counted to see which copula better describes the price and yield data. The results, 
shown in Table 6.6, indicate that the Gaussian copula best represented the joint dependence between 
Dutch potato prices and yields. Our results contrast with those of Zhu et al. (2008), who calculated 
premium rates for a whole farm revenue insurance contract and found that the t copula provided a 
better fit than the Gaussian copula. They used US corn and soya county-level yield and price data for 
the period 1960 to 2007. Our results indicate that the dependence between Dutch ware potato prices 
and individual farm yields is not state dependent and can therefore be simply captured by a Gaussian 
copula.  
 
The premium rates obtained in this chapter (approximately 25% on average) are much higher than the 
premium rates found in other literature. For instance, using a t copula, Ahmed and Serra (2015) found 
premium rates of 1.4% for apples and 5.2% for oranges in Spain, for a coverage rate of 75%. Also 
using a t copula and a coverage rate of 75%, Goodwin and Hungerford (2014) found an average 
premium rate of 0.3% for corn and 0.1% for soybean. In this chapter, the average premium rate 
estimated using a t copula (and Gaussian) at a 75% coverage rate was approximately 25% on 
guaranteed revenue per hectare. The difference between the results of this chapter and those of 
previous literature is likely caused by the different types of data used. In this chapter, farm-level yield 
data are used whereas the cited studies used geographically aggregated yield data. Aggregating yield 
data can smooth out differences in yields across farms and therefore mask the heterogeneity of yield 
risk across farms. That is, the variation of an individual farm’s yield over time can be much higher 
than the variation of an aggregated yield over time. 
 
A check of the correlation between log price returns and realised yields for each farm revealed that, 
although correlations were negative for most of the farms (i.e. 43 farms), positive correlations were 
also observed (i.e. 13 farms) (detailed results can be obtained upon request from the authors). Of the 
43 farms with negative yield-log price return correlations, 41 had a negative correlation less than 0.5 
in absolute value. Using FADN panel data from 97 Dutch arable farms for the period 2002-2007, 
Melyukhina (2011) showed that Dutch ware potato yields and prices were positively correlated. 
Although the data used in this chapter cover the period 2010-2014, the rather weak negative 
correlation between prices and yields found in this chapter, coupled with the finding of Melyukhina 
(2011), suggests that Dutch potato farmers are not benefiting from a natural hedge between prices and 
yields. This may also explain why the premium rates found in this chapter are much higher than those 
found in previous literature. The high premium rates reported in this chapter also show that aggregated 
yields may be more negatively correlated with prices than farm-level yields. The results suggest that 
the use of yield data aggregated over a geographical area may underestimate each farm’s likelihood of 
revenue loss and result in undervalued premium rates.  
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Table 6.5 – Simulated premium rates, loss costs and loss probabilities using a t Copula 
 
 Expected yield Relative variance
2
  Overall 
 High Low High Low 
Loss cost      
2.5th percentile 1275.278 201.068 452.011 822.758 830.100 
Median 1989.328 969.766 1810.151 1095.181 1184.075 
97.5th percentile 3925.914 1488.354 3859.542 1706.908 2949.324 
Mean 2020.649 980.971 1971.532 1116.963 1364.947 
Premium rate      
2.5th percentile 0.234 0.07 0.106 0.182 0.173 
Median 0.311 0.222 0.329 0.238 0.254 
97.5th percentile 0.498 0.326 0.498 0.319 0.442 
Mean 0.321 0.223 0.328 0.240 0.264 
Loss probability      
2.5th percentile 0.504 0.174 0.267 0.422 0.428 
Median 0.584 0.477 0.597 0.489 0.511 
97.5th percentile 0.789 0.632 0.762 0.586 0.766 
Mean 0.596 0.481 0.593 0.487 0.523 
Number of farms 19 37 17 39 56 
Number of farm in high 
expected yield and high relative 
variance categories 
11  11  11 
Number of farm in low 
expected yield and low relative 
variance categories 
 32  32  
1
Loss costs are expressed in euro per hectare. 
2
 The ratio of yield variance to expected yield. 
 
 
Table 6.6 –Fit of the Gaussian and t copulas  
 
 Expected yield Relative variance
3
  Overall 
 High Low High Low 
Criteria
1 G
2 
T G T G T G T G T 
LLF 1155 1122 1678 433 1315 1096 1589 505 1412 674 
AIC 2221 56 2039 72 2378 33 2020 74 2024 62 
BIC 2221 56 2039 72 2378 33 2020 74 2024 62 
1
The reported numbers are the number of times each type of copula resulted in the highest log likelihood (LLF), 
and the lowest AIC (Akaike information criteria) and BIC (Schwartz information criteria). 
2
G: Gaussian copula, T: t copula 
3
 The ratio of yield variance to expected yield. 
 
 
6.6. Conclusion 
 
The income of EU farmers has become increasingly volatile because of increased volatility in both 
prices and yields. Although insurance schemes to protect farmers from income drops caused by 
decreases in both prices and yields are not currently available in the EU, such schemes have policy 
support within the CAP. This chapter calculated premium rates for a revenue insurance contract for 
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four categories of farms in the Dutch ware potato sector. In a first step, a Just-Pope production 
function was estimated to predict each farm’s expected yields and yield variances. Next, these 
predictions were used to group farms into four categories (i.e. high expected yield, low expected yield, 
high relative variance and low relative variance). Finally, premium rates were calculated for each farm 
category by modelling the joint dependence of prices and yields using a Gaussian and t copula. The 
analysis used balanced panel data on ware potato output and inputs from 56 specialised Dutch arable 
farms and prices of ware potato futures contracts traded in the European Energy Exchange, for the 
period 2010 to 2014.  
 
An average premium rate of approximately 25% on guaranteed revenue per hectare was found for the 
Dutch ware potato sector. The Gaussian copula better represented the dependence between Dutch ware 
potato prices and yields than the t copula. This indicates that the dependence between Dutch potato 
prices and yields is not state-dependent. For both types of copula, the simulated premium rates varied 
across the four categories of farms. For the Gaussian copula, for instance, mean premium rates for the 
high expected yield category, low expected yield category, high relative variance, and low relative 
variance category were 32.1%, 22.2%, 33.1% and 24.0% on guaranteed revenue per hectare, 
respectively. In particular, the results show that farms with a high expected yield or a high relative 
variance should pay the highest premium rate compared to farms in the other two categories. The 
differences in premium rates within and across categories of farms indicate that farms are 
heterogeneous in loss costs and loss likelihoods, and therefore charging the same average premium 
rate to all Dutch ware potato farms can lead to adverse selection.   
 
The relatively high premium rates for the Dutch ware potato sector indicate that a natural price-yield 
hedging opportunity is not available to Dutch potato farmers. Revenue insurance contracts can be 
offered through mutual funds, which currently have policy support within the CAP 2012-2020. 
Although Article 39 of the EU regulation No. 1305/2013 on rural development defines income as the 
total income of the farmer (European Commission, 2016a), the design and implementation of revenue 
insurance schemes may be less challenging than whole-farm income insurance schemes. This is 
because the revenue of farmers (i.e. price multiplied by yields) can be more objectively assessed based 
on farmers’ production history and futures prices than the total income of a farmer, which can be 
subject to misreporting by farmers. 
 
The results also have business implications. Revenue insurance schemes provide an opportunity for 
farmers to substitute the use of futures markets with revenue insurance contracts that are based on 
futures prices. Farmers have often argued that they find the use of futures markets to be cumbersome. 
The findings further show the need to consider the risk heterogeneity of farms when calculating 
premium rates. This can be done by categorising farms into risk groups and calculating premium rates 
per group. Insurance companies can use a farm’s input use, which is observable, to predict a farm’s 
expected yields and variances, which can in turn be used to categorise farms into groups.  
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Appendix 
 
Table A-1 – Expected output equation of the Just-Pope production function  
Variable Parameter Coefficient Probability  
Seedling  𝛼1 0.155 0.975 
Protection  𝛼2 22.332** 0.011 
Energy  𝛼3 13.091 0.906 
Fertiliser  𝛼4 -2.528 0.854 
Total area  𝛼5 3.536** 0.000 
Seedling
2 𝛼11
 -25.727 0.272 
Protection
 𝛼22
 3.287 0.941 
Energy
2  𝛼33
 -1928.89 0.103 
Fertiliser
2 𝛼44
 52.359 0.528 
Total area
2 𝛼55
 0.232** 0.026 
Seedling x protection 𝛼12 132.56** 0.016 
Seedling x energy 𝛼13 1517.474** 0.000 
Seedling x fertiliser 𝛼14 -41.779 0.672 
Total area x seedling 𝛼15 -1.535 0.409 
Protection x energy 𝛼23 -187.737 0.689 
Protection x fertiliser 𝛼24 -180.467** 0.038 
Total area x protection 𝛼25 -8.466** 0.008 
Energy x fertiliser 𝛼34 2667.589* 0.067 
Total area x energy 𝛼35 -183.567** 0.000 
Total area x fertiliser 𝛼45 9.948 0.238 
Trend 𝜃1 0.328 0.317 
Trend
2 𝜃2 -0.060 0.225 
Seedling x trend 𝜑1 -2.356* 0.068 
Protection x trend 𝜑2 -1.202 0.534 
Energy x trend 𝜑3 2.724 0.944 
Fertiliser x trend 𝜑4 0.768 0.793 
Area x trend 𝜑5 0.239 0.133 
Constant 𝛼 1.336 0.238 
Overall R
2 
  0.957  
Within R
2 
 0.922  
Overall R
2 
 0.915  
*indicates significant values at the 5% level and ** at the 10% level. 
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Table A-2 – Output variance equation of the Just-Pope production function  
 
Variable  Parameter Coefficient  Probability 
Seedling  𝛽1 -6.596* 0.051 
Protection  𝛽2 1.126 0.642 
Fertiliser 𝛽4 3.531 0.129 
Total area 𝛽5 0.329 0.943 
HHI (Herfindhal-
Hirshman index) 
𝛽6 -0.294 0.934 
Seedling
2 
 𝛽11 -0.342 0.555 
Protection
2 𝛽22
 -0.216 0.709 
Fertiliser
2 𝛽44
 -0.244 0.305 
Total area
2 𝛽55
 0.557 0.511 
HHI
2 𝛽66 0.042 0.967 
Seedling x protection 𝛽12 -1.304 0.112 
Seedling x fertiliser 𝛽14 0.662 0.319 
Total area x seedling 𝛽15 1.657 0.123 
Seedling x HHI 𝛽16 -2.326** 0.020 
Protection x fertiliser 𝛽24 1.009* 0.058 
Total area x protection 𝛽25 0.353 0.695 
Protection x HHI 𝛽26 1.245 0.192 
Total area x fertiliser  
𝛽45 
-1.629** 0.021 
Fertiliser x HHI 𝛽46 0.705 0.265 
Area x HHI 𝛽56 0.831 0.455 
Drenthe 𝛾1 -0.455 0.355 
Flevoland 𝛾2 -0.714** 0.010 
Friesland 𝛾3 -0.386 0.525 
Gelderland 𝛾4 -3.071* 0.092 
Groningen 𝛾5 -0.908** 0.026 
Limburg 𝛾6 0.393 0.398 
Noord-Brabant 𝛾7 -0.398 0.233 
Noord-Holland 𝛾8 -0.103 0.762 
Zeeland 𝛾9 0.417 0.529 
Zuid-Holland 𝛾10 -0.037 0.879 
Constant  𝛽 -0.037 0.879 
Overall R
2 
 0.367  
*indicates significant values at the 5% level and ** at the 10% level. 
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Chapter 7  
General discussion 
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7.1. Introduction 
 
The food crisis of 2006/2007 has sparked considerable research and policy interest in the volatility of 
food and agricultural commodity prices. Although a decade has passed since the crisis, the agricultural 
sector of the European Union (EU) is still susceptible to price volatility owing to the reduced 
government market interventions and increased liberalization of the sector (Meuwissen et al., 2011; 
Severeni and Cortignani, 2011). Market interconnectedness along food supply chains assures that price 
volatility originating at one stage of the chain is transmitted along the chain thereby exposing all chain 
actors to risk and uncertainty. If left unmanaged, price volatility can have harmful impacts on 
investment, production and other business decisions of food chain actors (Tangermann, 2011; Taya, 
2012).  
The general objective of this thesis was to examine the transmission and management of food price 
volatility in food supply chains. Chapter 2 reviewed the literature and identified gaps in the literature. 
Chapter 3 investigated empirically and theoretically the impact of market power on price volatility 
transmission in the German fresh pork supply chain. Price transmission and price volatility 
transmission were investigated by estimating a vector error correction model (VECM) and ordinary 
least square (OLS) regressions. The conjectural variation approach was used to measure market power. 
Chapter 4 explored through interviews the perceptions and management of price volatility by 42 chain 
actors in 6 EU food supply chains (i.e. Spanish tomatoes, German pork, Dutch tomatoes, Bulgarian 
wheat, French wheat and Dutch cheese). Chapter 5 presented a method to evaluate the effectiveness of 
price volatility management strategies along food supply chains. The method was illustrated with 
strategies identified in Chapter 4 for the Spanish tomato and French wheat chains. Chapter 6 
calculated premium rates of an agricultural revenue insurance contract, a price volatility management 
strategy which has yet to be implemented in European agriculture. Data for the Dutch ware potato 
sector is used for the analysis. The chapter calculated premium rates for homogenous groups of farms 
categorized based on their expected yields and yield variances. Expected yields and variances were 
predicted based on the estimation of a Just-Pope production functions. In the simulations of premium 
rates, copulas were used to model the dependence between yields and prices.  
The remainder of this chapter first synthesizes and reflects on the results (Section 7.2) and the methods 
used in this thesis (Section 7.3). Section 7.4 reflects on the data used in this thesis. This is followed by 
Section 7.5 which provides the business implications and Section 7.6 the policy implications of this 
thesis. Section 7.7 ends the chapter with the main conclusions of the thesis. 
 
7.2. Synthesis of results  
 
This thesis addressed two key issues, which are the transmission of price volatility in food supply 
chains and the management of price volatility by food supply chain actors. A synthesis of the results 
related to each issue and the relationship between the two issues are discussed below.  
Price volatility transmission 
The agricultural economics literature has often been concerned with the transmission of price levels 
than with the transmission of price volatility (Chapter 2). A possible reason could be the implicit 
assumption that the transmission of price levels implies the transmission of price volatility and vice 
versa. The definitional distinction between the two types of transmissions has not always been 
highlighted in the previous literature. Chapter 2 addressed this gap by defining price level transmission 
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and price volatility transmission as the transmission of predictable and non-predictable price changes 
in the chain, respectively. The chapter further argued that the transmission of price levels may not 
necessarily entail the transmission of price volatility in the chain, and vice versa. In the previous 
literature, the studies of Natcher and Weaver (1999) and Serra (2011) support this argument. This 
thesis also provided further evidence supporting this argument. In Chapter 3, it was found that the 
slaughterhouses transmitted predictable short-term farm price changes while not transmitting 
unpredictable farm price changes (i.e. farm price shocks). Such results imply that a chain actor may 
have a competitive pressure to respond to predictable price changes. On the other hand, chain actors 
may expect competitors not to respond to unpredictable price changes as these can be perceived as 
temporary. 
The issue of asymmetric price transmission has considerable importance in the literature on price level 
transmissions. The literature often found that margin-squeezing increases in input prices (or decreases 
in output prices) will be transmitted faster and/or more completely than the corresponding margin-
stretching price changes (Meyer and Von-Cramon Taubadel, 2004). Studies that investigated 
asymmetric transmission of unpredictable price changes were also identified in the review of Chapter 
2. For instance, Zheng et al (2008) find that retail prices respond more to positive farm price shocks 
than to negative farm price shocks. Asymmetric price volatility transmission was not however 
empirically investigated in this thesis (i.e. in Chapter 3). This can be considered as a limitation of the 
chapter as more insight could have been obtained on the pricing behaviour of actors in the German 
pork chain. The analysis of asymmetric price volatility transmission can be left as an issue for future 
research. 
Although Chapter 3 did not investigate asymmetries in the sign of price shock transmission (i.e. 
traditional definition of asymmetry - transmission of negative versus positive shocks), it showed that 
price shock transmission can be asymmetric in the direction of causality. Asymmetry in the direction 
of causality implies here that input price shocks are transmitted while output price shocks are not, or 
vice versa. In Chapter 3, it was found that although consumer price shocks transmitted upstream in the 
chain, farm price shocks were not transmitted downstream in the chain. These results cannot however 
be generalized to all food  supply chains as evidenced in the review of Chapter 2. While some studies 
find price volatility transmit from the retail stage to upstream stages in the chain (e.g. Apergis and 
Rezitis, 2003; Khiyavi et al., 2011), others find that causality runs from the farm to the retail stage 
(e.g. Zheng et al., 2008; Uchezuba et al., 2010). The degree of price volatility transmission in the food 
supply chain is therefore chain-specific. 
The degree of price volatility transmission in the chain is determined among other by the degree of 
market power of food chain actors (Chapter 3). Although the literature on price volatility transmission 
acknowledges that market power has an effect on volatility transmission, it did not provide any 
empirical or theoretical evidence for such an effect (Chapter 2). Chapter 3 filled this literature gap by 
investigating price volatility transmission in the German pork chain. In Chapter 3, it was found that 
retailers use market power to transmit consumer price shocks to upstream stages in the chain while 
preventing the transmission of farm price shocks. These results are in line with Zheng et al. (2008), 
Uchezuba et al. (2010), Serra (2011), Alexandri (2011) and Rezitis (2012) who also suggest that 
retailers use market power to keep consumer prices irresponsive to price shocks in upstream stages of 
the chain. The above studies do not, nevertheless, provide any empirical or theoretical evidence for 
their claim. 
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Price volatility management strategies 
Although price volatility may have negative consequences for businesses, price volatility may not 
necessarily result in the implementation of price volatility management strategies by food chain actors 
(Chapter 4, Chapter 5). Price volatility defined as the deviation of prices from expected levels is 
perceived as price risk and therefore results in the implementation of strategies if the deviation exceeds 
a threshold level, if it is caused by shocks in demand and/or supply (i.e. and not speculation), if 
margins are not stable and if the deviation persists for a certain period of time (Chapter 4). The 
threshold price deviation triggering strategies depends in turn on the cost of the strategy, the chain 
actor’s risk attitude, the price volatility the chain actor would face if a strategy is implemented and the 
volume traded (Chapter 5). The above findings highlight that, price volatility is only one aspect of 
price risk. That is, in contrast to price volatility, price risk depends on more factors than the deviation 
of prices from expected levels (i.e. the size of the deviation, the persistence of the deviation, the 
stability in margins and the cause of deviation). 
Chain actors use a wide set of strategies to manage the risk from price volatility (Chapter 4). The 
current literature on agricultural risk management strategies focuses on only a few types of strategies. 
These include hedging in derivative markets, forward contracts, and diversification (for instance in 
Martin 1995, Meuwissen et al. 2001, Hall et al. 2003, Bergfjord 2009). Although a long list of 
strategies was identified in Chapter 4, this list is not exhaustive as this thesis could have explored an 
even more diverse set of strategies if a wider sample of chains and chain actors had been considered. 
For instance, one type of strategy not indicated in Chapter 4 is the use of revenue insurance contracts 
to manage price risk. Chapter 6 argues that revenue insurance can be a useful tool to manage income 
volatility arising as the result of both price and yield volatility. This is particularly true if the 
opportunity of a natural hedge between prices and yields is limited (Chapter 6). A possible reason why 
revenue insurance was not indicated as a price volatility management strategy by the farmers 
interviewed in Chapter 4 could be because revenue insurance schemes do not exist yet in the 
investigated food markets (i.e. German pig, Dutch milk, Dutch tomatoes, Spanish tomatoes, French 
wheat and Bulgarian wheat).   
The degree of market power in the food supply chain does not only have an effect on price volatility 
transmission in the chain but also on price volatility management strategies used in the chain. In fact, a 
two-way relationship can be identified between the degree of market power and price volatility 
management strategies in the chain. In Chapter 3, it was found that retailers used market power to 
hinder the transmission of farm price shocks while they transmitted consumer price shocks to 
slaughterhouses. It can be argued that retailers’ market power permits them to use a strategy in which 
they hinder the transmission of farm price shocks to keep consumer prices stable. On the other hand, 
the transmission of consumer price shocks to the slaughterhouse stage can be considered as a strategy 
that retailers use to protect their own margins from being squeezed or unstable as a result of consumer 
price shocks. Some price volatility management strategies increase the market power of the chain 
actors that implement them (Chapter 4). Example of such strategies are mergers among wholesalers to 
gain more market power and secure a higher output price (Dutch tomatoes) and producing and trading 
improved quality products (Spanish tomatoes, Bulgarian wheat) (Chapter 4). The relationship between 
market power and price volatility management strategies is a reminder that price volatility is not only 
managed through traditional instruments such forward contracts and derivative markets as often 
suggested in previous literature, but that it can also be managed by way of altering market power 
relations in the chain (Chapter 4).  
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Relation between price volatility transmission and price volatility management strategies 
Results of this thesis highlight the two-way relationship between price volatility transmission and the 
management of price volatility by food chain actors. A number of strategies identified in Chapter 4 
can have an effect on the degree of price volatility transmission. The strategy of producing and trading 
premium products can enable chain actors to easily transmit their input price shocks to their customers 
as these are believed to be less sensitive to changes in the prices of premium products compared to 
those of standard products (Chapter 4). Forward contracts that fix prices only when price changes 
remain within a certain price band (e.g. in the Dutch cheese chain) permit one to transmit a price shock 
if the size of shock exceeds a certain level. Some of the studies in Chapter 2 also argued that contracts 
can have an effect on price volatility transmissions in the chain (for instance, Khan and Helmers, 
1997; Apergis and Rezitis, 2003; and Khiyavi et al., 2012). As indicated in Chapter 2, no studies have 
been conducted to date on the effect of strategies on price volatility transmission in the chain. In 
Chapter 5, although the effect of strategies on price volatility was investigated per stage of the food 
supply chain, the effect of a strategy in one stage of the chain on the price volatility in another stage of 
the chain was not investigated. This can be an avenue for future research. 
Price volatility transmission can also affect the choice of strategies (Chapter 4). For instance, in the 
Dutch cheese chain, a strategy that cheese processors use is to avoid long-term price fixing sales 
contracts and opt for shorter sales contracts (Chapter 4). This is because of the difficulty to transmit 
sudden shocks in milk prices by adjusting cheese prices. The choice for contracts with flexible sales 
prices also arises as a result of the difficulty to transmit milk price shocks to cheese prices. Overall, the 
results above indicate that the mechanism and extent of price volatility transmission in the chain 
cannot fully be understood if one has limited knowledge on the price volatility management strategies 
in the chain (and vice versa). 
 
7.3. Methodological approaches  
 
This section first reflects on the measurements of price volatility and the degree of market power in the 
chain used in this thesis. It then presents a reflection on methodological issues related to the 
identification, effectiveness and pricing of price volatility management strategies.  
Measurement of price volatility 
A commonality across the chapters of this thesis is that price volatility is defined as the deviation of 
observed prices from expected prices. This definition is also in line with the literature (Brümmer et al., 
2013; Huchet-Bourdon, 2011; FAO et al., 2011). Nevertheless, the methods used to measure expected 
prices and price volatility differ across chapters. The methods for measuring expected prices and price 
volatility are discussed in more detail below. Table 7.1 summarizes the measures of expected prices 
and price volatility used in the different chapters. 
Expected prices 
Three specifications of expected prices are used in this thesis. Chapter 3 measured expected prices 
using the multivariate time-series model called vector error correction model (VECM).  Chapter 5 
used a linear trend model to measure expected prices. In Chapter 6, the futures price at planting time is 
used as the harvest time expected price. A commonality across the three measures is that expected 
prices vary over time and that they are based on information about past prices. A difference in the 
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measures is that in Chapter 3 and 5, expected prices are model based while expected prices in Chapter 
6 they are not.  
The modelling of expected prices should account for long-term trends, seasonality and cycles to avoid 
mistaking changes in expected prices for volatility
2
 (Brümmer et al., 2013). While the measurement of 
expected prices in Chapter 3 accounts for long-term trends and seasonal effects, it does not account for 
cycles due to the short-time span considered (i.e. 2000-2011). The fact that Chapter 5 only accounts 
for trends can be considered a limitation of the chapter. A line of improvement in the measurements of 
expected prices is the harmonization of the measurements used in Chapter 3 and 5. More specifically, 
a VECM accounting for long-term trends, seasonality and price linkages in the chain could have 
provided a better measure of expected prices in Chapter 5 compared to accounting only for a trend in 
the prices. The model specification used in Chapter 3 (VECM) provides a richer information about 
expected prices than the one used in Chapter 5 as it also accounts for market linkages across stages of 
the food supply chain. Although the VECM is widely applied in the price volatility transmission 
literature (Chapter 2), the literature does not provide a theoretical underpinning for the empirical 
modelling of price linkages in the chain. This literature gap is addressed in Chapter 3 by modelling the 
long-term price linkages in the food chain using the framework of Sexton and Zhang (2001) and 
Verreth et al. (2015). 
The difference in measures of expected prices across the chapters is justified in light of the differences 
in research focuses. While Chapter 3 and 5 focus on prices along the chain, Chapter 6 is focuses only 
on the farm stage. The fact that futures prices are only available for agricultural commodities (i.e. at 
farm level) makes it impossible to use futures prices along the chain. Therefore, expected prices along 
the chain should be generated using spot prices at various stages of the chain. Although expected 
prices could have been generated using time-series models in Chapter 6 (e.g. as in Ahmed and Serra, 
2015), the availability of futures price data for the Dutch ware potato sector and the superiority of 
futures prices over spot prices in terms of quality (Brümmer et al., 2013) makes futures prices a better 
measure of expected prices. Besides, futures markets are argued to provide objective reference prices 
for the rating of agricultural insurance schemes (Meuwissen et al., 2011).  
Price volatility 
An assumption underlying the definition of price volatility as the deviation of prices from expected 
prices is that price volatility is unobserved and should be inferred from the models used to determine 
expected prices (see discussion above). Price deviations (i.e. difference between observed prices and 
expected prices) form the basis for price volatility modelling. The literature offers alternative ways to 
model price volatility depending on the objective at hand. If the objective is to understand past price 
volatility (i.e. ex-post volatility), parametric models (i.e. based on model parameters) such as 
generalized conditional heteroskedasticity models (GARCH) and non-parametric measures such as 
“realized volatility” (i.e. based on squares of daily price returns) are suitable (Brümmer et al., 2013). 
On the other hand, if the objective is to determine the expectations of market participants about future 
price volatility (i.e. ex-ante volatility), then the concept of implied volatility is relevant (Brümmer et 
al., 2013). The term implied arises from the fact that volatility is inferred from the prices of derivative 
contracts such as options (Badarji et al., 2011).  
                                                 
2
 The economics literature defines four types of prices expectations: naive, adaptive, quasi-rational, 
and rational. Expected prices generated using predicted values from time-series models characterize 
quasi-rational expectations (Chavas, 1999). 
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In Chapter 3, price volatility is measured using an OLS regression. In the price volatility transmission 
literature, multivariate GARCH (MGARCH) models are typically used to model price volatility 
transmissions in the chain (Chapter 2). A limitation of such models is that they lack a theoretical basis 
underlying price volatility linkages in the chain. Chapter 3 addressed this limitation by using Thille’s 
(2006) framework to model price volatility transmission in such a way that the effects of market power 
in the chain are also incorporated. Following Thille’s (2006) framework, the estimated volatility 
model was an ordinary least square regression in which the squares of the observed monthly price 
changes was the dependent variable (measuring price volatility) while the squares of the residuals (i.e. 
deviations from the expected price model - VECM) were the independent variables that proxied the 
variances in the farm and consumer price shocks. This is in contrast to MGARCH models which base 
price volatility measurement only on the squares of the residuals from the VECM (or another expected 
price model).  
Unlike Chapter 3, in Chapter 5 the residuals from the linear trend model were not further modelled. 
Instead, four measures of price volatility were estimated, i.e. the coefficient of variation, the skewness, 
the kurtosis, the 5th percentile and the 95th percentile of the price residuals. Unlike the approach 
followed in Chapter 3, the approach in Chapter 5 assumes that price volatility is not-time varying. This 
is because the four volatility measures are calculated over the whole sample period. Since the 
objective in Chapter 5 was to compare price volatility when strategies are implemented by chain actors 
and when they are not, such comparison is easier when price volatility is measured over the whole 
sample period than for each time period (i.e. monthly and weekly). Price volatility was not measured 
in Chapter 6. Nevertheless, the stochastic nature of prices was captured in the premium rate 
simulations through the distribution of log-price returns (i.e. ratio of planting and harvest futures 
prices).  
In Chapter 4, price volatility was defined as the percentage deviation of prices from their expected 
levels. The interview results showed that chain actors perceived price deviations from expected levels 
as volatility only when the percentage deviations exceed a certain threshold (i.e. 10-15%). This 
introduces the concept of threshold and excess price deviations with the latter being the amount of 
price deviation above the threshold level. Chapter 4 further introduces the concept of persistence of 
price volatility which is defined as the time period during which observed prices remain above or 
below expected levels. The concepts of threshold price deviation and persistence of deviation highlight 
the complexity underlying the measurement of price volatility. Dissecting price volatility into its 
various components can contribute to a better measurement of price volatility. Figure 7.1 illustrates the 
various components of prices that one needs to consider to improve price volatility measurements. 
These components are expected prices, threshold price deviations, excess price deviations, total price 
deviations (excess plus threshold deviations) and persistence of total price deviations. The Figure 
decomposes the deviation of prices at time t into its threshold and excess components. The persistence 
of deviation measures the time duration between time t (i.e. when prices deviate from their expected 
levels) until they return back to their expected levels (i.e. time t +1).    
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Table 7.1- Methods for measuring expected prices, price deviations and price volatility 
Chapters Expected prices Price volatility 
3 - Market power and price 
volatility transmission 
 
Vector error correction 
model (VECM) on prices 
Square of the monthly price 
changes 
5 - Effectiveness of strategies Linear trend equation on 
prices 
Price residuals’: 
- Coefficient of variation 
- Skewness 
- Kurtosis 
- 5th percentile 
- 95th percentile 
6 - Revenue insurance Planting price of a futures 
contract expiring at harvest 
NA
1 
1
Not applicable because price volatility was not measured in Chapter 6. 
 
Figure 7.1 – Components of price volatility 
 
Modelling market power 
The literature distinguishes four approaches for measuring market power. These are industry case 
studies, the structure-conduct-performance paradigm (SCP), the New Empirical Industrial 
Organization (NEIO) approaches and time-series models (e.g. asymmetric transmission models) 
(Digal and Ahmadi-Esfahani, 2002). Unlike the SCP paradigm and time-series models, NEIO 
approaches have theoretical foundations (Digal and Ahmadi-Esfahani, 2002). The conjectural 
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variation approach, which is one of the NEIO approaches, is used in Chapter 3 to measure the degree 
of market power. Although the conjectural variation approach has theoretical foundations, it is also 
sensitive to simplifying modelling assumptions. For instance, the assumptions made in Chapter 3 
about firms’ technology (i.e. constant marginal marketing and processing costs of retailers and 
processors) and the functional forms of demand and supply functions (i.e. linear) can affect estimation 
results. For instance, assuming a quadratic marketing and processing cost function would not permit to 
measure marginal costs through a constant term in the error-correction term of the VECM.  
Another weakness of the conjectural variation approach relates to the empirical estimation of the 
market power parameter (Digal and Ahmadi-Esfahani, 2002). In Chapter 3 for instance, it was not 
possible to distinguish the parameter measuring the oligopsony power exercised by the 
slaughterhouses on farmers from that measuring the oligopsony power exercised by the retailers on 
slaughterhouses when estimating the VECM. Therefore, only one parameter for oligopsony power in 
the chain could be estimated. A similar challenge was faced in the OLS equations used to related 
market power with price volatility transmission. The OLS coefficient on the variable measuring 
consumer price shocks is a combination of the oligopoly and oligopsony power parameters of the 
retailer towards consumers and slaughterhouses, respectively, and of the oligopsony power parameter 
of the slaughterhouse towards farmers. Therefore, the effect of the retailer’s oligopoly power on 
consumer price shock transmission cannot be identified in a straight forward manner from the effects 
of other market power parameters.    
Despite its limitations, it can be argued that the conjectural variation approach can be a better measure 
of market power compared to measuring market power through measures of market structure (e.g. 
concentration ratios, Herfindhal-Hirschman index) used in the SCP paradigm. This is because the 
conjectural variation approach models firm conduct (i.e. degree of market competitiveness) in contrast 
to measures of market concentration which do not convey such information (Lee, 2007). Although the 
SCP paradigm asserts that market structure determines and therefore proxies market conduct, causality 
can also run the other way around (Lee, 2007).  
Identification, effectiveness and pricing of price volatility management strategies 
In this thesis, price volatility management strategies were identified (Chapter 4) and their effectiveness 
was evaluated (Chapter 5). In Chapter 6, a price volatility management strategy (i.e. revenue 
insurance) was priced (i.e. premium rates were calculated). Chapter 4 used an exploratory and open-
ended approach to identify price volatility management strategies used by chain actors to manage the 
risk from price volatility. The previous literature on agricultural risk management (i.e. which focuses 
on the farm stage) generally uses a survey approach whereby farmers are asked to rate their 
preferences of a pre-specified list of strategies using Likert scales (e.g. Patrick et al., 1985; Wilson and 
Armstrong, 1987; Martin, 1996; Knutson et al., 1998; Meuwissen et al., 2001; Hall et al., 2003; 
Greinier et al., 2009; Bergfjord, 2009). Using structured types of questionnaires limits the opportunity 
to identify a wider set of strategies that farmers might have used to manage price risk. In this regard, 
the open-ended approach followed in this thesis is commendable. A limitation of the approach 
followed in Chapter 4 is the small sample size used and therefore the lack of the generalizability of the 
results to a wider sample size. To be able to generalize the wide set of strategies identified in Chapter 
4 to a wider sample size, the identified strategies could be pre-specified in a structured type of 
questionnaire and their relevance be rated by chain actors through a large-scale survey. Therefore, the 
open-ended approach followed in Chapter 4 could be supported with the more structured approach 
followed in previous literature. 
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A method for evaluating the effectiveness of price volatility management strategies in reducing price 
volatility was presented in Chapter 5. The method was then illustrated using strategies used in the 
Spanish tomato and French wheat chains. An advantage of the presented method is that different 
stages of the chains are considered (i.e. farm, wholesale and processing). In addition, strategies that 
involve both the adjustment of prices (e.g. forward contracts) and the timing of sale (e.g. waiting a 
week before selling tomatoes) were considered. This is in contrast to the previous literature which 
mainly focuses on the farm stage and on strategies that involve the adjustment of prices (e.g. Neyhard 
et al., 2013; Manfredo et al., 2003). A challenge in the method presented in Chapter 5 is the 
parameterization of the strategies as this involves making numerous assumptions about the strategies. 
For instance, determining the prices a chain actor would face if he/she uses a forward contract involves 
making assumptions on how the contract price is set. This in turn can affect the effectiveness of the 
considered forward contract to reduce price volatility. For instance, while the selling forward contracts 
of Spanish tomato wholesalers perform similarly than the base scenario (i.e. no strategies), those 
entered by French wheat processors result in prices that are more positively skewed and with a higher 
kurtosis than the base scenario. Future research can check the sensitivity of results to alternative 
parameterization of strategies. 
A price volatility management strategy not indicated in the interviews of Chapter 4 is agricultural 
revenue insurance. Premium rates of a hypothetical revenue insurance contract were calculated in 
Chapter 6. The findings in Chapter 6 showed that premium rates of a revenue insurance contract for 
the Dutch ware potato sector were much higher than the rates calculated in other studies (e.g. Goodwin 
and Hungerford, 2014; Ahmed and Serra, 2015). The premium rates could be much lower if a 
coverage rate lower than 75% had been used. Future research could investigate the sensitivity of 
premiums rates to alternative coverage rates. Premium rates can also be lower if a whole-farm revenue 
insurance (i.e. insuring total revenue from multiple crops) was considered instead of a revenue 
insurance contract only for ware potatoes. Zhu et al. (2008) for instance have shown that the negative 
dependence between the revenues of several crops results in a lower premium rate compared to a one-
crop contract. Whole-farm insurance contracts can be feasible for arable farms as these generally 
operate on a rotational plan, thus planting multiple crops. Future research can therefore evaluate 
premium rates of a whole-farm revenue insurance contract for Dutch arable farms.  
 
7.4. Data issues 
 
An important issue in price volatility analyses is the frequency of price data used in the analysis (i.e. 
whether the data is daily, weekly, monthly, etc.) because the extent to which prices vary over time 
depends on the time frequency considered. In Chapter 3, monthly pork price data was used to 
investigate price volatility transmission in the German pork chain. In Chapter 4, however, it was 
shown that prices in the German pork chain are, in practise, set on a weekly basis. Therefore, the use 
of weekly data at the different stages of the chain would have captured more dynamics in price and 
price volatility transmission in the chain. Since using monthly average prices smooths price changes 
that occur weekly, the price volatility transmitted from one chain stage to another can be lower than 
when measured on a weekly basis. Although high frequency price data was available at the farm stage, 
data were not available for the rest of the chain. If weekly prices had been used in Chapter 3, there 
would have been a possibility of detecting a transmission of farm price shocks to the slaughterhouses, 
for instance. The use of high frequency price data was however less necessary in Chapter 6. In Chapter 
6, the monthly averages of the daily futures prices at time of planting (i.e. month of April) and the 
monthly averages of the daily futures prices at time of harvest (i.e. month of November) were used. 
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Using monthly averages of daily prices can better reflect the planting and harvest months’ prices than 
using prices on a specific day of the planting and harvest months (e.g. last trading day of April and 
November). Since daily futures prices can highly fluctuate, using a price on a specific day of the 
month may not represent prices for the whole month.       
Another issue relates to whether the used price data reflects the price of a specific food product or a 
basket of food products. In Chapter 3 for instance, the pork meat data used were averages of the prices 
of different pork cuts. Therefore, possible differences in price and price volatility transmission for 
different pork cuts could not be identified. Based on the findings from Chapter 4, it is expected that the 
retail sector better transmits input price shocks in case of premium pork cuts than it transmits input 
price shocks related to non-premium pork cuts. This is because consumers of premium products are 
expected to be less sensitive to price changes (Chapter 4). The analyses conducted in Chapter 3 
therefore may have smoothed out any differences in transmission that may exist across different pork 
cuts.  
In time-series price analysis, the length of the time-series is also of importance. In Chapter 3, the 
relatively short time span of the data (2000-2011) available for the chapter can be considered as a 
limitation. The fact that periods with lower price volatility from 2011 onwards were not considered in 
the analysis may be limiting as price and price volatility transmission can change over time. 
Considering the period post 2011 would have permitted to analyse changes in price shock 
transmissions by slaughterhouses and retailers in the pre- and post-2011 periods. Serra (2011) for 
instance has shown that retailers better transmit farm price volatility during low volatility periods than 
during high volatility periods. The time span of the prices and yields data used in case of Chapter 6 is 
also limited (only 5 years from 2010 to 2014). The limited time span in Chapter 6 may, nevertheless, 
be acceptable as 5 years (or more) historical data is used in practise to assess farmers’ income losses in 
insurance programs in the EU (see Bielza et al., 2007).  
 
7.5. Business implications  
 
This thesis suggests that, in the food supply chain, farmers and particularly those who produce non-
storable products are chain actors that are the most vulnerable actors to price volatility. Farmers 
generally produce undifferentiated products, have limited ability to adjust supply to price signals and 
are much larger in number than actors downstream in the food supply chain. As also shown in Chapter 
4, farmers’ strategies fall in the ‘survival’ category meaning that their strategies are mostly limited to 
minimizing losses in times of adverse price shocks as opposed to the ‘adaptive’ strategies used by the 
rest of the chain. The latter type of strategies aimed at keeping margins stable in spite of adverse price 
shocks. Farmers producing non-storable products such as tomatoes and pigs are pressured to sell 
products even in times of large drops in prices (Chapter 4) and therefore have a limited flexibility that 
producers of storable products have (e.g. wheat producers). Solutions that allow farmers to earn a fair 
price even in times of volatile prices are therefore needed for farmers of non-storable products. 
Solutions can include product value addition through better variety selection, focusing on niche 
markets and further processing of produce. These strategies were argued by the chain actors 
interviewed in Chapter 4 to yield stable and high prices for their produces. 
This thesis showed that price volatility can transmit in the food supply chain. This indicates that chain 
actors can use information about price developments in other stages of the chain to predict price 
developments in their own market. For instance in Chapter 3, it was found that consumer price shocks 
119 
 
were transmitted by retailers to the slaughterhouse stage. This implies that slaughterhouses can use 
information about price developments in the consumer market to make strategic decisions. As an 
example, one of the sources of consumer price shocks in the meat market is news of animal food 
scares (Van Asseldonk et al., 2000; Serra, 2011). If slaughterhouses are aware that price drops in the 
consumer markets caused by the news will also result in a drop in their own prices, they can plan for a 
flexible pig sourcing strategy that allows them to easily reduce the number of pigs sourced if an 
animal food scare should occur.  
Previous studies on price risk management strategies of actors downstream to the farm stage argue that 
forward contracts are preferred instruments to cope with price volatility (for instance in Heyder et al., 
2010). The finding in Chapter 4 showed, however, that price-fixing contracts may not be attractive 
means to cope with price risk particularly if one is not able to secure such a contract for both inputs 
and outputs. The limited use of price-fixing contracts by food chain actors has implications for credit 
institutions that make loans conditional on chain actors’ engagement in forward contract agreements 
with clients. It indicates that credit institutions should provide chain actors the flexibility to engage in 
contracts that do not fix prices. The limited preference for price fixing contracts arises from the 
difficulty of predicting prices by the chain actors (Chapter 4). In this regard, the provision of accurate, 
timely and detailed price predictions by financial consultancy companies is necessary.  
The results reported in Chapter 6 have implications for insurance companies. Chapter 6 argues that the 
problem of adverse selection can be countered by insurance companies by calculating premium rates 
that vary across risk categories of farms. Risk categories of farms can be formed by predicting 
farmer’s expected yields and yield variances based on the farms’ input uses. Categorization of farms 
into risk groups can prevent risky farms from being undercharged and non-risky farms from being 
overcharged. 
  
7.6. Policy implications 
 
Price volatility becomes an issue of concern and requires policy support when it induces risk averse 
behaviour and leads to inefficient investment decisions (FAO et al., 2011) and when it becomes a 
threat to food security (Hernandez et al., 2013). In the EU agriculture, market measures under the CAP 
have traditionally kept market prices at high and stable levels (Bardaji et al., 2016; Tangermann, 
2011). Since world trade agreements require a more liberalized agricultural market, current EU market 
measures focus more on indirect measures such fixed area payments aimed at stabilizing farm income 
instead of measures with direct impact on prices (Bardaji et al., 2016). Supporting private price 
volatility management initiatives of food chain actors can also qualify as a measure with limited 
distorting effect on prices and trade. Findings of this thesis suggest that farmers need policy support 
more than actors in the rest of the chain. The strategies that farmers currently use to deal with price 
volatility suggest that farmers have limited control over prices that they receive (Chapter 4). Examples 
of such strategies are postponing the timing of sales by Spanish tomato and German pig farmers and 
avoiding major investments and substituting expensive ingredients by Dutch dairy farmers (Chapter 
4).  
One area of policy support is the provision of farm extension services related to the use of futures 
contracts. In the case of German pig farmers for instance, although a futures market for pigs exist, 
farmers are reluctant to hedge because of the limited liquidity of these markets. Educating farmers on 
the benefits and mechanisms of trading in such markets can increase the liquidity of the markets and 
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encourage farmers to hedge. Providing policy incentives to encourage farmers to join farmer producer 
organizations or cooperatives can be another area of policy support. Farmers who are member of these 
organizations can mobilize the financial capability needed to add value to their products through 
further processing and to concentrate supply and therefore build countervailing power vis-a-vis the 
downstream stages of the chain. A stronger market power in turn enables better negotiation of trade 
terms including prices during times of adverse price movements.  
Extension services related to agricultural revenue insurance schemes are another area of policy 
support. The case of the Dutch ware potato sector investigated in Chapter 6 showed that revenue 
insurance premium rates for this sector are relatively high compared to those obtained for other sectors 
in other studies (e.g. in Ahmed and Serra, 2015). This shows that the opportunity for a natural hedge 
between prices and yields is limited in the Dutch ware potato sector. This highlights the need to take 
up a revenue insurance contract to cope with both price and yield risk. Since price and yield risks are 
systemic in nature, the provision of reinsurance by governments can also be another area of policy 
support to encourage private insurers to offer revenue insurance contracts to farmers.   
The concept of excessive price volatility (or excess price deviation from expected levels) introduced 
earlier in this chapter is relevant when defining market interventions such as the management of food 
storage (i.e. keeping and release of stocks) to ensure food security. If properly defined, the level of 
excessive volatility can signal policy makers of when such policy interventions should take place. It 
may however be necessary to distinguish between excess volatility that needs a strategic action of food 
chain actors from the excess volatility that requires policy interventions, with the latter type being 
beyond the capability of chain actors to cope with. 
The policy relevance of defining excess price volatility is well acknowledged in the literature (Badarji 
et al., 2011; FAO et al., 2011). It is argued that policy interventions are justified only when price 
volatility exceeds a certain threshold. Chapter 4 showed that even food chain actors implement coping 
strategies when price volatility (i.e. price deviation from an expected level) exceeds a certain 
threshold. It may therefore be necessary to distinguish the level of excess price volatility that can be 
coped with by food chain actors from the level of excess price volatility that needs policy intervention 
as these two levels may differ. 
   
7.7. Main conclusions 
 
The objective of this thesis was to investigate the transmission of price volatility and its management 
by food supply chains. The main conclusions are as follows: 
 A largely ignored aspect in the agricultural economics literature is the effect of contextual 
factors such as the degree of market power and pricing strategies used in food supply 
chains on the degree of price volatility transmission (Chapter 2). 
 German pork retailers use their market power to reduce the transmission of upstream (i.e. 
farm, slaughterhouse) price shocks to consumers (Chapter 3). 
 Deviations of prices by more than 10 to 15% from expected levels are perceived as price 
volatility by food chain actors (Chapter 4). 
 Strategies used by food chain actors to manage the risk from price volatility include not 
only traditional strategies such as future and forward contracts but also strategies such as 
121 
 
the production of premium products, vertical and horizontal collaborations and strategies 
that involve the enhancement of productivity and cost efficiency (Chapter 4). 
 While the selling forward contracts used by Spanish tomato wholesalers perform similar 
to the base scenario (i.e. no strategies) on all volatility measures, those used by French 
wheat processors result in prices that are more positively skewed and with a higher 
kurtosis than the base scenario (Chapter 5). 
 The premium rate charged on guaranteed revenue per hectare to farms with a high 
expected yield (a high yield variance to expected yield ratio) are approximately 22%  
(34% ) higher than the average premium rate calculated if all farms were in one pool. 
(Chapter 6). 
 The market power of a chain actor increases if certain price volatility management 
strategies (e.g. merger among wholesalers) are implemented while the opportunity to 
implement some strategies (e.g. transmitting price shocks) increases if a chain actor has 
some degree of market power (Chapter 3 and 4).  
 The extent of price volatility transmission in a food supply chain is the outcome of the 
degree of market power exercised and the price volatility management strategies 
implemented by food supply chain actors (Chapter 2, 3 and 4). 
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Summary 
 
The 2006-2011 period has been marked by increased volatility in food an agricultural commodity 
prices at a global level. Several factors contributed to the rise of price volatility. Demand booming 
factors such as economic growth, shifting dietary patterns in developing countries and growth of the 
biofuel industry, and supply slowing factors such as the weak transfer of market price signals to 
farmers are attributed to the rise in food price volatility. Prices in the EU agricultural market have 
traditionally been kept stable with market measures under the CAP such as border protection through 
import barriers, export subsidies, production quotas and intervention. Nevertheless, the mounting 
pressure of such market interventions on the EU budget and the increasing tensions with the EU’s 
trading partners have led to CAP reforms that gradually shifted the policy from market interventions to 
decoupled single farm payments and opened up the EU to international markets. The liberalization of 
the EU market has in turn exposed EU farmers to price shocks in global agricultural markets. 
Although a decade has passed since the 2006/07 food crisis, the agricultural sector of the EU is still 
susceptible to price volatility owing to the increased liberalization of the sector. Market 
interconnectedness along food supply chains assures that price volatility originating at one stage of the 
chain is transmitted along the chain thereby exposing all chain actors to risk and uncertainty. If left 
unmanaged, price volatility can have harmful impacts on investment, production and other business 
decisions of food chain actors. 
The overall objective of this thesis is to investigate the transmission and management of price 
volatility in food supply chains. Five sub-objectives follow from the main objective. These are to 1) 
review the existing price volatility transmission literature in food supply chains and identify the 
research gaps, 2) investigate the effect of market power on price volatility transmission in a food 
supply chain, 3) explore price volatility perceptions and management strategies of actors in food 
supply chains, 4) design a method for evaluating the effectiveness of price volatility management 
strategies in reducing the price volatility faced by food supply chain actors , and to 5) calculate 
premium rates of an agricultural revenue insurance contract by taking into account the risk 
heterogeneity of farms.   
Chapter 2 reviews the previous literature on price volatility transmission in food supply chains. The 
review first illustrates the definitional and methodological differences between price transmission and 
price volatility transmission in food chains. The review then explores methods adopted to investigate 
price volatility transmission and the data used. It then identifies the research gaps in previous literature 
and suggests improvements for further research. One of the gaps identified in the reviewed literature is 
the lack of attention given to the effects of contextual factors on price volatility transmissions in food 
supply chains. Contextual factors include market power in the chain and pricing strategies (e.g. 
contracts) by chain actors. Although the reviewed literature acknowledges that such factors can have 
an effect on price volatility transmission in the chain, such effects are not investigated to date, neither 
theoretically nor empirically. 
Chapter 3 addresses a gap identified in the previous literature by investigating the effect of market 
power both on price transmission and price volatility transmission in the German fresh pork chain. 
Theoretical models of price transmission and price volatility transmission are first developed to 
theoretically link both types of transmission with market power. Market power is measured using the 
conjectural variation approach. The theoretical models are then used to empirically estimate price 
transmission and price volatility transmission in the German fresh pork chain. A vector error 
correction model and least square regressions are used for the empirical estimations. Monthly farm, 
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slaughterhouse and retail pork prices for the period 2000-2010 were used for the empirical application. 
Results show that retail market power limited both types of transmissions. Competition inducing 
policy measures coupled with measures that support price risk management initiatives of chain actors 
are encouraged to protect chain actors from possible squeezes in margins resulting from the non-
transmission of predictable and non-predictable price changes. 
Chapter 4 explores price volatility perceptions and management strategies of food chain actors by 
conducting interviews with forty-two actors in six EU food supply chains (i.e. Dutch cheese, Dutch 
tomatoes, Spanish tomatoes, French wheat, Bulgarian wheat and German pork). Price volatility 
perceptions are explored by asking chain actors on percentage price deviations from expected levels 
which they perceived as price volatility. Actors are then asked about the strategies they use to deal 
with price volatility. Results show that deviations of prices by more than 10 to 15 % from expected 
levels were perceived as price volatility by a majority of the chain actors. Results further show that 
price volatility management strategies in EU food chains are diverse and well beyond traditional 
instruments such as futures and forward contracts 
Chapter 5 outlines a method to evaluate the effectiveness of price volatility management in food 
supply chains. The presented method proposes a way to remove the effects of market power in the 
chain when evaluating the effectiveness of strategies in food supply chains. The method uses the 
percentage price deviations defined in Chapter 4 to define triggers of strategy implementation of food 
chain actors. Strategies identified in Chapter 4 for the Spanish tomato and French wheat farmers and 
wholesalers are used to illustrate the presented method. Weekly farm and wholesale tomato prices and 
monthly farm and wholesale wheat prices for the period January 2005 to December 2014 were used 
for the illustrations.  
Chapter 6 calculates premium rates of a revenue insurance contract for Dutch ware potato farmers. 
Premium rates are calculated by categorizing farms based on their expected yields and yield variances. 
These two measures are used because they affect farmers’ likelihood of losses and therefore determine 
farmers’ risk levels. Farmers’ categorization can in turn help to reduce the problem of adverse 
selection. Four categories were identified: Farms with high expected yields, low expected yields, high 
yield variance to expected yield ratios and low yield variance to expected yield ratios. Expected yields 
and yield variances are predicted by estimating a Just-Pope production function. To simulate the 
premium rates, the dependence between prices and yields is modelled using copulas. Results show that 
the Gaussian copula which best represented the dependencies between prices and yields results in 
premium rates of 32.1%, 22.2%, 33.1% and 24.0% on guaranteed revenue per hectare for the high 
expected yield, low expected yield, high yield variance to expected yield ratio and low yield variance 
to expected yield ratio categories, respectively. The difference in premium rates across categories of 
farms implies that charging the same average premium rate to all Dutch ware potato farms can lead to 
adverse selection.   
Chapter 7 synthesizes the results and reflects on the data and methods used in the different chapters. 
The chapter synthesizes results related to two key issues addressed in this thesis. These are the 
transmission of price volatility in food supply chains and the management of price volatility by food 
supply chain actors. The relationship between these two key issues is also discussed. Results in 
Chapter 2 and 3 suggest that price volatility transmission may not necessarily imply the transmission 
of price levels in the chain, and vice versa. The results in Chapter 3 further suggested that the degree 
of retail market power reduces the transmission of farm price shocks while enhancing the transmission 
of consumer price shocks. Chapter 4 and 5 showed that price volatility does not necessarily result in 
the implementation of price volatility management strategies. That is, food chain actors perceive price 
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volatility as risky and therefore implement coping strategies not simply because observed prices have 
deviated from their expected levels but also because the price deviation exceeds a certain threshold, 
persist for a certain period of time and are caused by factors other than speculation (Chapter 4). 
Furthermore, the implementation of a strategy depends on the cost of the strategy, the chain actor’s 
risk attitude, the price volatility the chain actor would face if a strategy is implemented and the volume 
traded (Chapter 5). Whether margins remain stable also matters to decide on the implementation of a 
strategy (Chapter 4). A two-way relationship between strategies and the degree of market power is 
highlighted in Chapter 7. That is, the market power of a chain actor increases if certain price volatility 
management strategies are implemented (Chapter 4) while the opportunity to implement some 
strategies increases if a chain actor has some degree of market power (Chapter 3). A number of 
strategies identified in Chapter 4 can have an effect on the degree of price volatility transmission. Price 
volatility transmission can also affect the choice of strategies (Chapter 4). Based on the findings of this 
thesis, the following main conclusions can be drawn: 
 A largely ignored aspect in the agricultural economics literature is the effect of contextual 
factors such as the degree of market power and pricing strategies used in food supply 
chains on the degree of price volatility transmission (Chapter 2). 
 German pork retailers use their market power to reduce the transmission of upstream (i.e. 
farm, slaughterhouse) price shocks to consumers (Chapter 3). 
 Deviations of prices by more than 10 to 15% from expected levels are perceived as price 
volatility by food chain actors (Chapter 4). 
 Strategies used by food chain actors to manage the risk from price volatility include not 
only traditional strategies such as future and forward contracts but also strategies such as 
the production of premium products, vertical and horizontal collaborations and strategies 
that involve the enhancement of productivity and cost efficiency (Chapter 4). 
 While the selling forward contracts used by Spanish tomato wholesalers perform similar 
to the base scenario (i.e. no strategies) on all volatility measures, those used by French 
wheat processors result in prices that are more positively skewed and with a higher 
kurtosis than the base scenario (Chapter 5). 
 The premium rate charged on guaranteed revenue per hectare to farms with a high 
expected yield (a high yield variance to expected yield ratio) are approximatively 22%  
(34% ) higher than the average premium rate calculated if all farms were in one pool. 
(Chapter 6). 
 The market power of a chain actor increases if certain price volatility management 
strategies are implemented (e.g. merger among wholesalers) while the opportunity to 
implement some strategies (e.g. transmitting price shocks) increases if a chain actor has 
some degree of market power (Chapter 3 and 4). 
 The extent of price volatility transmission in a food supply chain is the outcome of the 
degree of market power exercised and the price volatility management strategies 
implemented by food supply chain actors (Chapter 2, 3 and 4).    
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